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This dissertation is a combination of three papers on capital markets.
The first chapter studies on the impact of cost of capital on corporate invest-
ment and financing decisions. Previous literature shows that the implied cost of
capital (ICC) has a negative effect on investment, while the factor model-based
estimates have positive effects on investment. Our paper documents that these
alternative cost-of-equity proxies also have opposite effects on equity issuance.
We show that the ICC has negative effects on investment and equity issuance by
capturing the firm-specific discount rate news, whereas the factor model-based
estimates have positive effects on these decisions by capturing the market-wide
cash flow news. Thus, the opposite effects of the ICC and factor-model based
estimates can be explained by their distinctive information contents.
In the second chapter, I evaluate the economic consequences of advisory mis-
conduct by estimating the effect of publicly disclosed regulatory actions of mu-
tual fund advisors on fund flows. Based on a broad set of misconduct events
from 2000-2013, I find a 5% reduction in fund flows to malfeasant advisors in
one year following the misconduct. Further analysis using the 2001 SEC elec-
tronic filing mandate as a positive shock to misconduct transparency corrob-
orates these results. In order to mitigate the negative impact on flows, mutual
fund companies tend to raise marketing expenditures, reduce contractual incen-
tives and relax investment restrictions in subsequent years. Moreover, advisory
misconduct adversely affects advising relationships and advisor survival. My
findings highlight the significant impact of misconduct on fund flows and ad-
visory contracting in the mutual fund industry.
In the last chapter, we evaluate the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Pro-
grams for both borrowing and lending funds in fund families. We find strong
support for the positive effect for borrowing funds. Under extreme distress ILP-
funds have 0.32% higher returns than non-ILP funds in the following week.
Sub-sample analysis shows that the positive effect is mainly driven by equity
and municipal funds, and the effect is more pronounced when funds hold illiq-
uid assets, when external funding cost is high, and when fund families are more
diversified in styles. Moreover, Interfund Lending Programs facilitate liquidi-
ty management and reduce external borrowing activities. But we find limited
evidence concerning the effectiveness for lending funds. Taken together, our
results suggest that Interfund Lending Programs play a crucial part as internal
capital market in fund families.
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CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE COST-OF-EQUITY
PROXIES ON CORPORATE INVESTMENT AND FINANCING
The CAPM and the (Fama and French, 1992, 1993) model (FFM) are current-
ly the standard textbook choices for estimating the cost of equity. Yet, there
is mounting skepticism over their application for capital budgeting decisions
from both academic researchers and practitioners. For instance, Levi and Welch
(2014) contend that factor model-based estimates are useless for capital bud-
geting purposes as they predict subsequent returns with a wrong sign. Hackel
(2011) also raises doubt about using factor models in estimating the cost of eq-
uity.
Recent literature suggests the implied cost of capital (ICC) as an alternative
way of estimating the cost of equity, by equating the stock price to the present
value of expected future cash flows.1 Frank and Shen (2016) document that the
ICC has the anticipated negative effect on investment. They also show, however,
that the factor model-based estimates have positive effects on investment. Our
paper contributes to understanding the puzzling opposite effects of alternative
cost-of-equity proxies on investment by investigating the nature of their infor-
mation contents.
1The ICC has been used in various contexts, especially in asset pricing. For example, previ-
ous papers use the ICC to study: the unconditional equity premium (Claus and Thomas (2001)
and Fama and French (2002)); stock market return predictability (Li et al. (2013)); theories on
betas (Kaplan and Ruback (1995), Botosan (1997), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Gode and Mohanram
(2003), Brav et al. (2005), and Easton and Monahan (2005)); international asset pricing (Lee et al.
(2009)); default risk (Chava and Purnanandam (2010)); cross-sectional expected returns (Hou
and Van Dijk (2010), Botosan et al. (2011)); stock return volatility (Friend et al. (1978)); and the
cost of equity (Burgstahler et al. (2006), Botosan and Plumlee (2005), and Hughes et al. (2009)).
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According to Abel and Blanchard (1986), investment is affected negative-
ly by discount rates and positively by expected cash flows. In particular, they
show that the discount rate and the marginal profit components of Tobin’s q
have significant and opposite effects on investment beyond q. Accordingly, if
the discount rate drives the stock return, the expected stock return will show a
negative effect on investment because an increase in the discount rate implies
higher expected return (Campbell et al. (2010)) and low investment (Abel and
Blanchard (1986)). When the stock return is driven by cash flow growth, how-
ever, the expected stock return will have a positive effect on investment (Fama
(1990) and Schwert (1990)). Thus, whether the ICC and factor model-based es-
timates capture the shocks to expected cash flows or discount rates is critical in
understanding their opposite effects on corporate investment.
The ICC is designed to capture the firm-specific discount rate as demonstrat-
ed in Pastor et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2013). Factor model-based estimates,
however, may be related more to cash flows and market-wide information. For
instance, Vuolteenaho (2002) find that firm-level stock returns are mainly driven
by cash flow news rather than by discount rate news. Campbell and Vuolteena-
ho (2004) find that the required return on a stock is determined by permanent
cash flow shocks to the market and the temporary shocks to the market discount
rate. Chen et al. (2013) show that the common variation in stock returns is driv-
en more by cash flow news than discount rate news. Moreover, Campbell et al.
(2010) suggest that the systematic risks of value and growth stocks are deter-
mined by the properties of their cash flow fundamentals. Patton and Verardo
(2012) also suggest that betas reflect the revised expectations about the prof-
itability of the aggregate economy. These studies imply that factor model-based
estimates may capture more of cash flow news that are related to the aggregate
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economy or market-wide shocks.
Given the current state of the literature on the cost of equity, the focus of our
investigation is twofold: 1) whether the cash flow or discount rate news is re-
flected on the cost-of-equity proxies and corporate investment; and 2) whether
private or market-wide information drives the link between the cost-of-equity
proxies and corporate investment. To this end, we also explore the equity fi-
nancing channel because Morck et al. (1990) and Baker et al. (2003) suggest that
the key channel for the cost of equity to affect corporate investment is through
the issuance of new equity. Given that the cost of equity is a critical input from
the stock market in the capital budgeting process, the equity financing channel
may help us better understand the information contents of cost-of-equity prox-
ies, particularly in the presence of asymmetric information. Moreover, the link
between cost-of-equity proxies and equity issuance has not yet been explored.
Following Chen et al. (2013) and Campbell and Shiller (1988), we decompose
realized stock returns into two components; discount rate news and cash flow
news. We confirm that cash flow news has positive effects, while discount rate
news has negative effects, on investment and equity issuance decisions. We then
show that ICC measures are associated positively with discount rate news and
negatively with cash flow news, whereas factor model-based estimates are asso-
ciated negatively with discount rate news and positively with cash flow news.
Furthermore, using the Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) two-beta model and
similar decomposition of other factors, we find that corporate investment and
equity issuance decisions are mainly driven by the bad beta which reflects news
about market-wide cash flows. These results suggest that the positive effects
of the factor model-based estimates on investment and equity issuance come
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mainly from market-wide cash flow news. Thus, the opposite effects of the ICC
and factor model-based estimates on investment and financing decisions can be
attributed to the ways they reflect cash flow news and discount rate news.
To further understand the link between the cost-of-equity proxies and dis-
count rate news/cash flow news in more controlled settings, we also examine
their behavior around recessions and following exogenous shocks. The reces-
sion periods are characterized by the heightened uncertainty and risk aversion
of investors with diminishing cash flows (Gonza´lez-Hermosillo (2008), Coudert
and Gex (2008), and Frank and Goyal (2009)), which implies positive discount
rate shocks and negative cash flow shocks. Our results show that, prior to re-
cessions, ICC measures steeply increase, reflecting mainly positive discount rate
shocks, whereas factor model-based estimates exhibit steep decreases, reflecting
mainly negative cash flow shocks. These results suggest that the ICC captures
mainly the discount rate news, while factor model-based estimates capture the
cash flow news.
We also utilize Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Re-
lief Reconciliation Act of 2003 as exogenous shocks to the discount rate. Dhaliw-
al et al. (2007) and Dai et al. (2013) show that these legislations have reduced the
cost of equity for financially constrained firms. We find that, following these leg-
islations, ICC measures decrease, while factor model-based estimates increase,
especially for financially constrained firms whose investment and financing de-
cisions are most likely to be sensitive to the discount rate shock. Again, these
findings indicate that the ICC captures mainly the discount rate shock, while
factor model-based estimates capture the cash flow effect of the discount rate
shocks.
4
The effect of the cost of equity on investment through the external financ-
ing channel is expected to be more pronounced for firms with greater financial
constraint/equity dependence (Baker et al. (2003)). Accordingly, we examine
the effects of the cost-of-equity proxies on net equity issuance as well as in-
vestment, conditional on firm’s equity dependence. We find that the ICC has
significant and negative effects on equity issuance and investment for equity-
dependent firms. The factor model-based estimates do not show significant
effects on these decisions for equity-dependent firms. Instead, they show posi-
tive effects on investment and equity issuance for less equity-dependent firms.
These results suggest that the ICC, reflecting mainly the firm-specific discoun-
t rate news, has significant effects on investment and financing decisions, for
firms that are more likely to be sensitive to the discount rate news. In contrast,
the factor model-based estimates appear to predict investment and financing
decisions positively for less equity-dependent firms by reflecting fundamentals
affecting cash flows. These results suggest that the ICC and factor-model based
estimates may also differ in another dimension: whether they reflect the private
or public information.
Chen et al. (2007) suggest that investment decisions respond to stock prices
as firms are informed about their investments from the stock market. The main
driver of such an information feedback channel is private information which is
the component of stock return that is not explained by the market and indus-
try portfolio. Consequently, we test whether the effects of the ICC and factor
model-based estimates on investment and financing decisions are through the
private or public information channel. Our findings show that the ICC has sig-
nificant and negative effects on investment and equity issuance for firms with
greater private information, whereas factor model-based estimates show signif-
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icant and positive effects for firms with less private information.
We further examine the effects of the ICC and factor model-based estimates
on investment including M&As (and R&D), because previous studies suggest
that these investments are particularly affected by private information on s-
tock valuation.2 We find that the ICC has significant and negative effects on
this broadly defined investment, whereas factor model-based estimates show
insignificant effects. These findings suggest that firms’ investment decisions are
particularly sensitive to private information on the discount rate. We further
address errors-in-variable issues regarding q and cost-of-equity proxies, utilize
fundamentals-based q, control for other firm characteristics, and consider alter-
native specifications. Our results remain robust.
Taken together, our results suggest that the opposite effects of the ICC and
factor model-based estimates on corporate investment and financing decisions
can be explained by their distinct information contents. The ICC has negative
effects on investment and financing decisions as it contains information about
the firm-specific discount rate. Its main effects are found for firms with more
equity dependence and more private information whose decisions are likely to
be most sensitive to the discount rate news. In contrast, factor model-based
estimates contain information about market-wide cash flows and have positive
effects on investment and equity issuance for firms with less equity dependence
and less private information.
Our findings have important implications for finance instructors and re-
searchers. We teach students that capital budgeting decisions involve estimat-
ing cash flows from a project, and then applying the cost of capital from capital
2For example, see Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004),
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), Dong et al. (2006), and Brown et al. (2009).
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markets as the discount rate or the hurdle rate. Our results suggest that the ICC
is close to the effective cost of equity managers come up with after considering
the market conditions and expected cash flows. In contrast, factor model-based
estimates contain information about market-wide expected cash flows. In this
regard, factor models miss out some important information on the discount rate,
especially for firms whose investment and financing decisions are most sensi-
tive to it.
Our paper is related to the literature on estimating the cost of equity. The
cost of equity is indispensable for capital budgeting but the current practice of
estimating it remains controversial. Levi and Welch (2017) maintain that fac-
tor models fail because they are based on common inputs for factor exposures
estimated from historical observations.3 Our results suggest that factor models
do not capture the firm-specific discount rate but market-wide cash flow infor-
mation. Frank and Shen (2016) argue that both the ICC and factor-model-based
estimates, despite their opposite effects, provide relevant and independent in-
formation for corporate investment. However, they remain agnostic as to the
information contents of these cost-of-equity proxies. Our study contributes to
the literature by showing the nature of information conveyed by these alter-
native proxies and by explaining their opposite effects. Levi and Welch (2017)
argue that one obstacle to abandoning factor models may be the absence of an
alternative. We suggest that the ICC could be a practical alternative to factor
models.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the relation between fac-
tor model-based and survey-based expected returns. Greenwood and Shleifer
(2014) document that factor model-based estimates and the surveyed expect-
3They suggest that incorporating forward-looking betas may improve factor models.
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ed returns are negatively correlated with each other. Moreover, they show that
the survey expectations are more consistent with investors’ actual behavior like
mutual fund inflows. Gennaioli et al. (2016) further show that the survey expec-
tation of earnings also affects corporate investment. Consistent with these find-
ings, our results suggest that the ICC, reflecting the forward-looking discount
rate based on the analysts-surveyed expected cash flows, negatively affect cor-
porate investment and financing decisions, while factor model-based estimates
show opposite effects.
Our study is also linked to the q-model theory with the interdependence
of investment and financing decisions (for example, Gomes (2001) and Bolton
et al. (2011)). This theory suggests that external financing costs due to asymmet-
ric information and managerial incentive problems have impact on investment
beyond q. Consistent with the theory, our findings suggest that the ICC is highly
informative beyond q, particularly about the risk of investment opportunities.
We also contribute to the literature on private information in stock price for
investment decisions. For example, previous studies conjecture that the stock
market affects corporate investment as it informs managers about real variables
(Dow and Gorton (1997), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), Dow and Rahi
(2003), Chen et al. (2007), and Goldstein and Guembel (2008)).4 Our findings
suggest that the discount rate implied by the stock price is particularly impor-
tant information for managers to assess investment and financing decisions. By
capturing the firm-specific discount rate, the ICC informs managers about the
market’s assessment of the firm’s project risk, which they incorporate in their
investment and financing decisions.
4Bond and Goldstein (2011) provides an excellent review on the real effects of financial mar-
kets and their implications.
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1.1 Data and Methodology
1.1.1 Sample Construction
Our initial sample consists of US firms from the Center for Research in Securi-
ty Prices (CRSP)/ Compustat Merged Database from 1985 to 2013. We obtain
the stock price, the number of shares outstanding, the SIC code, monthly re-
turns from CRSP, firm-level annual accounting data from Compustat, analysts’
earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S, and the nominal GDP growth rates from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. We exclude firms operating in regulated utilities
(SIC code 4000-4999) and financial industries (SIC code 6000-6999). We further
drop firm-year observations with negative sales or total assets. Since comput-
ing ICCs requires analysts’ earnings forecasts, the number of firms with valid
information is reduced to 40,123 firm-year observations.
1.1.2 The Proxies for the Cost of Equity
We estimate the cost of equity using the CAPM, the Fama and French (1992,
1993) 3-factor model (FF3M), and the 4-factor model (FF4M, Carhart (1997)).
There is no consensus about the computing procedure of the ICC in the liter-
ature. Each study makes its own specific assumptions to facilitate the compu-
tation of the ICC. We compute the ICC in three different ways for each firm,
following the procedures utilized by Claus and Thomas (2001) (ICC-CT ), Geb-
hardt et al. (2001) (ICC-GLS ), and Li et al. (2013)(ICC-LNS ), respectively. We
provide the detailed estimation procedures in Appendix A.
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1.1.3 Return Decomposition
We first follow the methodology of Chen et al. (2013) to decompose the realized
return into two components: (1) cash flow news (CFN), defined as the price
change holding the discount rate constant, and (2) discount rate news (DRN),
defined as the price change holding the cash flow forecasts constant. Specifical-
ly, the stock return between month t and t + 1 can be written as follows:
ri,t =
Pi,t+1 − Pi,t
Pi,t
=
f
(
ci,t+1, di,t+1
) − f (ci,t, di,t)
Pi,t
= CFN i,t − DRN i,t, (1.1)
where f (·) is the discounted cash flow function, and ci,t and di,t are the cash flow
forecast and the discount rate of firm i at month t, respectively. The cash flow
news (CFN) and discount rate news (DRN) could be expressed as:
CFNi,t =
1
2
[
f
(
ci,t+1, di,t+1
) − f (ci,t, di,t+1)
Pi,t
+
f
(
ci,t+1, di,t
) − f (ci,t, di,t)
Pi,t
]
(1.2)
DRNi,t = −12
[
f
(
ci,t, di,t+1
) − f (ci,t, di,t)
Pi,t
+
f
(
ci,t+1, di,t+1
) − f (ci,t+1, di,t)
Pi,t
]
. (1.3)
We compound the monthly CFN and DRN to annualize over the firm’s fiscal
year. Since this methodology uses earnings forecasts and stock prices, it iden-
tifies forward-looking cash flow news and discount rate news by construction
(Chen et al. (2013)). The ICC is also based on earnings forecasts and stock price.
Therefore, to ensure that our results are not spuriously induced by common
earnings forecasts, we also consider alternative methodology.
Campbell and Shiller (1988) develop an alternative methodology to decom-
pose the stock return into CFN (related to future dividends) and DRN (related
to the discount rate). The basic idea is to predict cash flows and discount rate
from predictive variables, and then compute CFN and DRN as residuals. They
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use the vector autoregression (VAR) to generate a forecast of cash flows and dis-
count rates. Vuolteenaho (2002) further develop this methodology to be based
on the unexpected return. In particular, omitting the firm subscript i, the unex-
pected return can be expressed as
rt − Et−1 (rt) = CFNt − DRNt. (1.4)
Following Vuolteenaho (2002), we estimate the components of equation (1.4)
with the following VAR system of log-linear dynamic equations:
rt = α1rt−1 + α2roet−1 + α3bmt−1 + η1t (1.5)
roet = β1rt−1 + β2roet−1 + β3bmt−1 + η2t (1.6)
bmt = γ1bmt−1 + γ2roet−1 + γ3bmt−1 + η3t. (1.7)
where r is market-adjusted log stock return, roe is market-adjusted log return on
equity, and bm is the market-adjusted log book-to-market ratio. This approach
uses ROE as the basic cash flow fundamental to predict cash flows and discount
rate.
The Campbell and Shiller (1988) approach provides a decomposition of the
unexpected total equity returns, whereas the Chen et al. (2013) approach pro-
vides a decomposition of the total capital appreciation on a stock (including
both expected and unexpected capital appreciation). Separating DRN and CFN
from the stock return allows us to examine whether and how distinctively cost-
of-equity proxies capture DRN and CFN. According to the Abel and Blanchard
(1986) model, CFN is expected to have a positive effect, while DRN is expected
to have a negative effect, on investment.
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1.1.4 Summary Statistics
Panel A in Table 1.1 provides the summary statistics for the sample. The average
(median) capital expenditure (CAPX) is 6.8% (4.6%) of total assets. The average
net equity issuance is 11.2% of total assets and the median is mere 0.8%. Thus,
firms engage in fairly active capital investment activities, while issuing equi-
ty lumpily and less frequently. The average ICC ranges from 9.8% (ICC-GLS)
to 14% (ICC-LNS), while the factor model-based estimates range from 11% to
12.1%.
We report the correlation matrix for our estimates on Panel B. ICC measures
and factor model-based estimates are highly correlated among themselves, re-
spectively, but there are also significant positive correlations between factor
model-based estimates and ICC measures. ICC measures have significant and
positive correlations with the discount rate news but show mixed correlations
with cash flow news. The CAPM estimate also shows positive correlation with
the discount rate news, whereas the FFM estimates show little correlation with
the discount rate news. Both the CAPM and the FFM estimates show little cor-
relation with cash flow news.
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1.2 Empirical Results
1.2.1 The Cost of Equity and Corporate Investment
In order to investigate the effect of each of the cost-of-equity proxies on corpo-
rate investment, we start with the following baseline regression model:
Ii,t = α0 + α1Rei,t−1 + α2CFi,t + α3Qi,t−1 + ηt + θi + εi,t, (1.8)
where subscripts i and t represent firm and time, respectively. I is investment
(capital expenditure scaled by beginning-of-the-year assets), Re is the cost-of-
equity proxy, CF is cash flow divided by total assets, and Q is Tobin’s q. We
also include firm fixed effects θi and year effects ηt in order to control for un-
observable firm-specific characteristics and general economic trends. Detailed
definitions of variables are provided in Appendix B.
Table 1.2 reports the estimation results of investment regression (1.8). The co-
efficient estimates on all ICC measures are significant and negative, suggesting
that firms invest less when the cost of equity is higher. In contrast, the coef-
ficient estimates on factor model-based estimates are positive and significant,
suggesting that firms invest more when the cost of equity is higher. The results
also show that CF and Q have significant and positive effects on investment,
consistent with previous results.
In order to examine whether the ICC absorbs the explanatory power of factor
model-based estimates, or vice versa, we simultaneously include both the ICC
and factor model-based estimates in columns (8)-(10). The results show that the
coefficient estimates change little, suggesting that both ICC and factor model-
based estimates have independent and opposite effects on investment.
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Our findings confirm the opposite effects of the ICC and factor model-based
estimates on investment documented by Frank and Shen (2016). In the next sec-
tion, we also examine their effects on equity issuance. Given that equity financ-
ing is a key channel for the effect of the cost of equity on investment (Morck et al.
(1990) and Baker et al. (2003)), it is interesting to see if firms’ equity issuance is
also similarly affected by these alternative cost-of-equity estimates. Moreover,
the literature has not yet explored this link.
1.2.2 The Cost of Equity and Net Equity Issuance
In Table 1.3, we investigate the effects of the cost-of-equity proxies on net
equity issuance using the same regression model of (1.8) with the dependent
variable replaced by net equity issuance. The coefficient estimates on ICC mea-
sures are all significant and negative, whereas the coefficient estimates on factor
model-based estimates are positive and significant. The results also suggest that
CF and q have positive effects on net equity issuance.
Our findings of the negative relations between the ICC and investment/net
equity issuance suggest that firms increase their equity issuance and investment
when the cost of equity is relatively low. Factor model-based estimates, howev-
er, show opposite effects. Thus, the ICC and factor model-based estimates con-
tain information relevant not only for investment but also for equity issuance.
In the next section, we try to understand the nature of information conveyed by
these estimates and their opposite effects on investment and equity issuance.
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1.2.3 Cash Flow News and Discount Rate News
In order to understand the contradicting effects of the ICC and factor model-
based estimates, we examine their relations with the cash flow news (CFN) and
discount rate news (DRN). We first examine how CFN and DRN affect invest-
ment and net equity issuance based on the following regression model:
Yi,t = β0 + β1CFi,t + β2Qi,t−1 + β3CFNi,t−1 + β4DRNi,t−1 + ηt + θi + εi,t. (1.9)
where Yi,t is either investment or net equity issuance as used before.
Table 1.4 reports the estimation results for both investment and equity is-
suance. In all regressions, the coefficient estimates on CFN are positive and
significant, while those on DRN are negative and significant. The results are
similar whether we use the Chen et al. (2013) or Campbell and Shiller (1988) ap-
proach for theCFN-DRN decomposition. Thus, these findings confirm that CFN
has positive effects, while DRN having negative effects, on investment and eq-
uity issuance decisions. These findings are consistent with Abel and Blanchard
(1986) who find that the cash flow and discount rate components of q still show
significant effects when added to the q-investment regression.
Given the findings of the opposite effects of CFN and DRN on investment
and equity issuance, we now examine how cost-of-equity proxies are associated
with CFN/DRN with the following regressions:
Rei,t = α0 + α1CFNi,t + α2DRNi,t + εi,t. (1.10)
The results are reported in Table 1.5. The Chen et al. (2013) return decompo-
sition (Panel A) and the Campbell and Shiller (1988) approach (Panel B) produce
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similar results. ICC measures reflect both the CFN and DRN. The coefficient es-
timates on DRN are positive and significant, while those on CFN are negative
and significant, which suggests that the positive discount rate news and the neg-
ative cash flow news are associated with higher ICC. For the CAPM estimate,
however, the coefficient estimates on both DRN and CFN are not significant.
Moreover, for the FFM estimates, the coefficient estimates on DRN are negative,
while those on CFN are positive.
Next, we examine if the cash flow component of factor model-based esti-
mates indeed drive investment/financing decisions. To this end, we follow
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) who develop the two-beta model in which
the CAPM beta is broken into two components, one reflecting news on the mar-
ket’s future cash flows (“bad beta”) and one reflecting news on the market’s dis-
count rate (“good beta”). Following their approach, we decompose the CAPM
estimate into two components in order to examine their respective effects on
investment and equity issuance. We also estimate cash flow and discount rate
betas for each of MKT, SMB, HML and UMD factors separately, and then use the
sum of the products of cash flow (discount rate) betas and corresponding fac-
tor premiums as the cash flow (discount rate) component of the FFM expected
returns.
The results in Table 1.6 show that investment and equity issuance are mainly
driven by the “bad beta” reflecting news about future cash flows. Similarly, for
the FFM estimates, the cash flow component is the main driver for their effect-
s on corporate investment and financing decisions. Thus, the positive effects
of the factor model-based estimates on investment and equity issuance appear
to be driven by the part of the expected return associated with the market’s
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cash flow news. These findings are consistent with previous studies showing
that stock returns and betas in factor models are associated with relatively more
cash flow news than discount rate news (Vuolteenaho (2002), Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004), Campbell et al. (2010), and Chen et al. (2013)).
In sum, the findings in this section suggest that the discount rate news and
cash flow news contained in the ICC and factor model-based estimates may ex-
plain their opposite effects on investment and equity issuance. We also observe
that both the discount rate and cash flow news have significant but opposite ef-
fects on some of the cost-of-equity proxies. Given that the discount rate and cash
flow components tend to move cyclically together (Abel and Blanchard (1986)),
it is possible that the cost-of-equity proxies spuriously appear to capture both
the discount rate and cash flow news when they in fact capture mainly one of
them. In order to test for this suspected channel in more controlled settings, we
examine their behavior around recessions and following exogenous events in
the next section.
1.2.4 Behavior of the Cost-of-Equity Estimates around Reces-
sions and Following Exogenous Events
Recessions are characterized by heightened uncertainty and risk aversion of in-
vestors (Gonza´lez-Hermosillo (2008), Coudert and Gex (2008), and Frank and
Goyal (2009)), which increases the risk premium and thereby the discount rate.
Firms may also face lower cash flows during recessions. If a cost-of-equity prox-
y captures the discount rate (cash flow) news, it will increase (decrease) prior to
recessions. Thus, we can examine whether the cost-of-equity estimates capture
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the discount rate news or the cash flow news by examining their movements
prior to recessions.
We first plot the time trends of the cost-of-equity proxies in Figure 1.1. IC-
C measures tend to increase prior to the highlighted recession periods, while
factor model-based estimates show the opposite trend. ICC measures appear
to reflect the discount rate news, while factor model-based estimates appear to
reflect the cash flow news stemming from the diminishing profitability during
recessions.
In table 1.7, we run panel regressions with firm and year-quarter fixed ef-
fects, to test if the ICC and factor model-based estimates indeed show opposite
movements prior to recessions. Our main interest is the coefficient estimate on
the dummy variable for the quarter prior to recession periods. The results clear-
ly show that the ICC increases significantly prior to recessions capturing the dis-
count rate shocks, whereas factor model-based estimates decrease significantly
prior to recessions capturing the cash flow shocks.
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA) and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Rec-
onciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) provide tax cuts in capital gains, raising the
effective after-tax return for equity investors and thereby increasing the supply
of equity capital. These legislations are likely to affect the cost of equity, in-
dependent of firms’ decisions. Moreover, these tax cuts are not likely to have
immediate impacts on firms’ cash flows. Accordingly, we use these tax cuts to
have a clean test whether the ICC and factor model-based estimates capture the
discount rate news or not. The effects of the tax cuts on the cost of equity will
depend on the elasticity of capital demand. With perfectly inelastic demand,
the cost of equity will be reduced by the tax cut. With perfectly elastic demand,
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the cost of equity will not change. Since financially constrained firms have low
demand elasticity of equity capital, they are expected to experience a larger re-
duction in the cost of equity following the tax cuts. Indeed, Dhaliwal et al.
(2007) and Dai et al. (2013) show that these tax cuts have reduced the cost of
equity particularly for financially constrained firms. Thus, we hypothesize that
the cost-of-equity estimates will capture the discount rate shocks for financially
constrained firms.
We test the hypothesis with the following difference-in-difference (DID) re-
gression:
Rei,t = α0 + α1Postt + α2HFCi + α3Postt × HFCi + εit, (1.11)
where Post is a dummy variable that takes 1 if it is the third quarter of 1997 or
2003, and 0 if it is the first quarter of 1997 or 2003 (skipping the announcement
quarter). HFC is a dummy variable which takes value of 1 if the firm is on the
top 30% of financial constraint (FC) at the beginning of the year, defined as in
Hadlock and Pierce (2010):5
FCi,t = 0.737 × Sizei,t+0.043 × Size2i,t−0.04 × Firmagei,t. (1.12)
where S ize is the log of total assets (replaced with log($4.5 billion) if the actual
value exceeds this threshold) and Firmage is the number of years since the firm’s
initial public offering (replaced with 37 if it exceeds 37).
Table 1.8 presents the estimation results of the DID regressions. The coeffi-
cient estimates on Post are negative and significant for all three ICC measures,
indicating that the cost of equity becomes lower following the discount rate
shocks. The significant and negative coefficient estimates on Post ∗ HFC also
5We also try the KZ index as an alternative measure of financial constraint. The results are
similar and not reported.
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suggest that after the adoption of TRA and JGTRRA, the cost of equity decreased
significantly more for financially constrained firms than for non-constrained
firms. For factor model-based estimates, however, the coefficient estimates on
Post and Post ∗ HFC are all significant and positive, suggesting that the cost of
equity is higher following the discount rate shocks and especially for financially
constrained firms.
The results in Table 1.8 verify that the ICC captures the discount rate shocks,
while factor model-based estimates capture the cash flow effects of the discount
rate shocks. In the next section, we try to understand whether and how such in-
formation flows from the stock market to managers who make investment and
financing decisions. More specifically, we want to see if the ICC contains firm-
specific information on the discount rate, while factor model-based estimates
contain market-wide information on cash flows from the stock market.
1.2.5 The Stock Market Information Channel
In the perfect market, q should be sufficient information for investment deci-
sion (Abel and Blanchard (1986)). In the presence of market frictions such as
information asymmetry and external financing constraints, however, manag-
er may look to additional information when making investment and financing
decisions. Given that the cost of equity essentially reflects the market’s assess-
ment of the firm-specific risk contained in the stock price, a cost-of-equity proxy
should inform managers about the market’s assessment of their firms’ risk or
discount rate when making investment and financing decisions. Consequently,
in this section, we seek to understand the information contained in the cost-of-
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equity proxies by investigating their effects on investment and equity issuance
in relation to such market frictions. In particular, we investigate if the effects
of alternative cost-of-equity proxies on investment and equity issuance can be
explained by the information channel from the stock market to managers.
Even though the stock price-investment link has been well documented, the
literature does not agree on its cause. On the one hand, Baker et al. (2003),
Gilchrist et al. (2005), and Polk and Sapienza (2009) show significant effects of
mis-pricing on investment. In particular, Baker et al. (2003) suggest that finan-
cially constrained or equity-dependent firms’ investment is especially sensitive
to mispricing in the stock market. On the other hand, Dow and Gorton (1997),
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), and Chen et al. (2007) suggest that such ef-
fects of stock price on corporate investment reflect private information as man-
agers are informed about their investments from the stock market. Moreover,
Bakke and Whited (2010) suggest that corporate investment does not respond
to stock-market mispricing nor private information but to legitimate informa-
tion (q) contained in stock price movement. Nonetheless, these studies agree at
least on the finding that the stock price-investment link is more pronounced for
equity dependent firms and private information firms.
Since the cost of equity is a critical input from the capital market for the
discount rate in the capital budgeting process, we expect that firms with more
private information than those with less private information show greater sen-
sitivity to the cost of capital for their investment and financing decisions. Simi-
larly, equity dependent firms’ investment and financing decisions are expected
to show greater sensitivity to the cost of equity than non-equity dependent firm-
s as equity dependent firms face financial constraints to fund their investment
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opportunities (Baker et al. (2003)). Accordingly, we examine if cost-of-equity
proxies capture these patterns of the stock price-investment link as they con-
tain information on the discount rate and cash flows from the stock market. In
particular, the ICC is to capture firm-specific information on the discount rate
by its design (Pastor et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2013)). Thus, we expect that
the ICC has negative effects on investment and equity issuance for firms with
more private information and equity dependence. Given our findings that fac-
tor model-based estimates capture cash flow news and the previous results that
they reflect market-wide information (Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) and
Campbell et al. (2010)), we do not expect such effects for factor model-based es-
timates. To the extent that the stock market informs managers of the economy-
wide cash flows, however, the positive effects of factor model-based estimates
on investment and equity issuance may be more pronounced for non-private
information and non-equity dependent firms.
Private Information
We measure the amount of private information by the price nonsynchronicity
calculated as one minus R-square from the time-series regression of daily stock
return on the market and 3-digit SIC industry portfolio returns over the fiscal
year.6 Chen et al. (2007) suggest that a weak correlation of a firm’s stock return
with the market and industry returns indicates more private information that is
useful for the firm’s investment decision. Based on the price nonsynchronicity
measure, we define the top 30% as large private information firms and the bot-
tom 30% as small private information firms. For the estimation of price nonsyn-
6This measure was first suggested by Roll (1988) and later developed by Morck et al. (2000),
Durnev et al. (2003), Durnev et al. (2004), and Chen et al. (2007).
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chronicity, we require that firms have at least 150 days of non-missing returns
during the given year.
Table 1.9 presents the results. For investment regressions on Panels A and
B, the coefficient estimates on ICC measures are all negative and significant for
firms with large private information, whereas the coefficient estimates on ICC
measures are all insignificant for firms with small private information. In con-
trast, the coefficient estimates on factor model-based estimates are all insignifi-
cant for firms with large private information, whereas they are all positive and
significant for firms with small private information. For net equity issuance re-
gressions on Panels C and D, ICC measures have significant and negative effects
for large private information firms, while they have insignificant or marginal ef-
fects for small private information firms. Factor model-based estimates, in con-
trast, show mostly insignificant effects for large private information firms, while
showing significant and positive effects for small private information firms.
The findings in this section suggest that a firm’s investment and equity is-
suance are particularly sensitive to the ICC when there is greater amount of
private information in the stock price. Thus, the ICC appears to contain infor-
mation about the market’s assessment of project risk beyond what is reflected
in q and cash flows. However, the results for factor model-based estimates sug-
gest that firms with less private information tend to be sensitive to the cash flow
shocks in the public information set. It is also notable that the results show sim-
ilar effects for equity issuance. Thus, the discount rate may inform managers of
not just the timing of investment but also the timing of equity issuance.
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Equity Dependence
Here, we compare the sensitivities of firms’ investment and equity issuance to
alternative cost-of-equity proxies between high and low equity-dependent firm-
s. Following Baker et al. (2003) and Bakke and Whited (2010), we use the KZ
index to measure equity dependence as follows:
KZi,t = −1.002CFi,t − 39.368DIVit − 1.315CASHi,t + 3.139LEVi,t. (1.13)
We define firms with the top 30% KZ index as high equity-dependent and firms
with the bottom 30% KZ index as low equity-dependent.
Table 1.10 presents the results. For high equity-dependent firms’ investment
on Panel A, we find that the coefficient estimates on ICC measures are all neg-
ative and highly significant, while those on factor model-based estimates are
all insignificant. For low equity-dependent firms’ investment on Panel B, the
coefficient estimates on ICC measure are insignificant, while those on factor
model-based estimates exhibit strong positive effects. For equity issuance on
Panels C and D, the results show that ICC measures have unequivocally sig-
nificant and negative effects for high equity-dependent firm, while having less
significant but still negative effects for low equity-dependent firms. The nega-
tive effect of the ICC on equity issuance but insignificant effect on investment
for low equity-dependent firms suggest that the low cost of equity may induce
managers to issue equity that is not necessarily linked to concurrent investment.
In contrast, factor model-based estimates show insignificant effects on equity is-
suance for high equity-dependent firms, while showing significant and positive
effects for low equity-dependent firms.
The results in Table 1.10 suggest that equity-dependent firms’ investment
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and equity issuance are particularly sensitive to the discount rate component
captured by the ICC. In contrast, factor model-based estimates show significant
and positive effects for non-equity-dependent firms, suggesting that financially
unconstrained firms’ investment and equity issuance are sensitive to the cash
flow news.
Overall, firms with greater private information and equity dependence ex-
hibit most sensitivities of their investment and equity issuance to the ICC. These
findings suggest that the discount rate component contained in the ICC is im-
portant private information that affects firms’ investment and equity issuance.
Moreover, the significant effects of the ICC for equity dependent firms sug-
gest that what drives the stock price-investment link is the discount rate news
in the stock price. In contrast, factor model-based estimates affect investment
and financing decisions for non-equity dependent and non-private information
firms, which suggests that factor model-based estimates contain information on
market-wide cash flows which in turn affects firms’ investment and financing
decisions.
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1.3 Robustness Checks
1.3.1 Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) and Research and De-
velopment (R&D)
Both theoretical and empirical studies suggest that M&As are significantly af-
fected by stock market valuation.7 The key component of these theoretical mod-
els is private information. Moreover, Daniel et al. (2016) argue that for non-
manufacturing firms R&D is more important investment than capital expendi-
tures, and M&As could substitute for capital expenditures and R&D. Brown
et al. (2009) also show that the supply of equity has a significant effect on R&D
expenditures. Consequently, we estimate our investment regressions with the
dependent variable broadly defined as the sum of capital expenditure (CAPX)
plus M&A and R&D scaled by beginning-of-the-year assets.
The results in Table 1.11 show that all coefficient estimates on ICC measures
remain negative and highly significant, whereas those on factor model-based
estimates are insignificant. To the extent that these broadly defined investments
are more sensitive to the discount rate shock and private information, these
findings suggest that firms’ investment decisions are particularly sensitive to
private information on the discount rate news captured by the ICC.
7Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004),Rhodes-Kropf et al.
(2005), and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) argue that M&As are driven by high
market valuation.
26
1.3.2 Error-in-Variable Consistent GMM
Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002, 2012) demonstrate that a regression of invest-
ment on q is seriously misspecified because of measurement error in q. Accord-
ingly, it is possible that our results are driven by measurement errors in q. It is
also possible that the cost-of-equity proxies are subject to the errors-in-variable
biases. Erickson et al. (2014) show that the high order linear cumulant estima-
tor is asymptotically equivalent to the high order moments estimator suggested
by Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002), but the former performs better in finite
samples. Accordingly, we follow Erickson et al. (2014) and Erickson et al. (2015)
to implement their measurement-error consistent GMM technique to correct for
measurement errors in q and the cost-of-equity estimates. Specifically, we treat
q and cost-of-equity proxies as misspecified variable and use fifth-order cumu-
lants. The results (Table A.2 in the Appendix) show that our findings remain
quantitatively and qualitatively the same. Thus, we rule out that the potential
effects of measurement errors in q and cost-of-equity proxies drive our results.
1.3.3 Utilizing Fundamentals-based q
Cummins et al. (2006) suggest that q constructed using analysts’ forecast earn-
ings better reflects fundamentals important for investment spending. In partic-
ular, using the analysts’ forecast earnings-based q rather than the stock price,
they find no evidence that investment is sensitive to cash flows. Their earnings-
based q is particularly interesting for our study because the ICC is also based
on the same earnings forecast from analysts. If the ICC indeed captures the dis-
count rate news embedded in the stock price beyond the information contained
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in q and cash flows, the effects of the ICC will remain significant. Thus, we
examine if our results are altered when the earnings-based q is used.
The results (in Table A.3 in the Appendix) show that all coefficient estimates
on ICC measures remain negative and highly significant, whereas those on fac-
tor model-based estimates are still positive and significant. The results are con-
sistent with our main finding that the ICC informs managers about the discount
rate, beyond q and cash flows.
1.3.4 Controlling for Other Firm Characteristics
We also investigate the effect of the cost-of-equity proxies on corporate invest-
ment while controlling for other firm characteristics, which should mitigate the
concern that our cost-of-equity proxies simply capture some firm characteristics
not reflected in q. For this exercise, we estimate regression (1.8) including the
following additional control variables: leverage (Lev), firm size (S ize), cash div-
idend (Div), fixed assets (FA), and cash holdings (Cash). Table 1.12 reports the
results. The signs and significance of all coefficient estimates for cost-of-equity
proxies remain the same as previously reported.
1.3.5 Non-Recession Periods
Given the opposite patterns of the ICC and factor-model-based estimates are
particularly conspicuous around recession periods as shown in Figure 1.1 and
Table 1.7, we check if the results are driven by recession periods. To this end,
we run regressions after excluding the years containing the recession periods.
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The results (in Table A.4 in the Appendix) based on non-recession periods
show that the coefficient estimates on ICC measures are significant and nega-
tive, whereas the coefficient estimates on factor model-based estimates are pos-
itive and mostly significant. Thus, the opposite effects of the ICC and factor
model-based estimates are not exclusively driven by their particular behavior
around recession periods.
1.3.6 Long-term Effects
Given that some capital projects involve long-term planning and implementa-
tion, there may be a time gap between the time of estimating the cost of equity
and the actual investment for a project. In order to check the potential effect of
this time gap, we try longer (up to two-year) lags of the cost of equity proxies.
The estimation results with the second-year lags of the cost-of-equity prox-
ies (in Table A.5 in the Appendix) show that the long-term effects are mostly in-
significant except for the two-year lagged 4-factor model-based estimate which
shows a positive and significant effect. Thus, our findings suggest that long-
term effects of the cost-of-equity proxies on investment are limited.
1.4 Summary and Conclusion
When the market assesses low risk for a firm’s investment opportunities, the
effective cost of equity becomes lower. As a result, the firm is likely to take on
more investment. One puzzling result from the empirical literature is the appar-
ent positive relation between investment and the cost of equity, as proxied by
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the CAPM and the Fama-French model (FFM). Furthermore, we find that factor
model-based estimates also have positive effects on equity issuance. We show
that such positive effects are resulting from the fact that factor model-based esti-
mates capture the cash flow news that has positive effects on investment and e-
quity issuance. In contrast, the ICC, reflecting discount rate news for given fore-
cast cash flows, show negative effects on investment and equity issuance. The
ICC increases prior to recession periods capturing the discount rate news, while
the factor model-based estimates decrease prior to recession periods capturing
the cash flow news. Moreover, the ICC decreases following positive supply
shocks in equity capital, while the factor model-based estimates show opposite
effects. The ICC exhibits stronger effects for firms with more equity dependence
and greater private information. In contrast, the factor model-based estimates,
capturing cash flow news contained in the public information set, show positive
effects on firms’ investment and equity issuance.
Our findings suggest that the ICC captures the firm-specific discount rate
that is contained in the stock price. It may be close to what managers come up
with after considering the market conditions as it shows direct effects on invest-
ment and financing decisions. Such consideration is particularly important for
more equity dependent firms that are more likely to face financial constraints
and firms with greater private information that are more likely to be sensitive to
the discount rate news for their investment and financing decisions. In contrast,
the factor model-based estimates capture the market-wide cash flow news and
positively predict corporate investment and equity issuance. The factor mod-
els seem to miss out the firm-specific discount rate news that are particularly
relevant for corporate investment and financing decisions.
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If we evaluate cost-of-capital proxies based on their ability to capture the
discount rate that can be used for capital budgeting decisions, our results sup-
port the ICC as an alternative to the traditional factor model-based estimates.
The main advantage of the ICC is that it captures the discount rate from the
forward-looking perspective. Such an advantage may be particularly important
in the presence of market frictions such as financing constraints and asymmetric
information.
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Figure 1.1: Times Series Patterns of the Cost-of-Equity Proxies
The figure shows the patterns of ICC and factor model-based expected return
estimates during recession and non-recession periods. The sample consists of
US firms from 1985 to 2013. ICC-LNS, ICC-GLS and ICC-CT are the implied
cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li et al. (2013), Claus and
Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt et al. (2001), respectively. CAPM, FF3, and FF4
are expected returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor and
four-factor models, respectively. The shaded regions are NBER recession peri-
ods.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Correlations
Panel A of the table provides the summary statistics for the variables used in the study. The sample consists of US firms
from 1985 to 2013. For each variable, we report the number of observations (N), mean (Mean), standard deviation (Std),
25th percentile, median and 75th percentile. Panel B provides Pearson correlation matrix of cost-of-equity proxies and
return components. ICC-LNS, ICC-GLS and ICC-CT are the implied cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li
et al. (2013), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt et al. (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM, Eret-FF3, and Eret-FF4 are
expected returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor and four-factor models, respectively. CFN-CDZ
(CFN-CS) and DRN-CDZ (DRN-CS) are cash flow news and discount rate news following the method of Chen et al.
(2013) (Campbell and Shiller (1988)). Eret-Cash Flow and Eret-Discount Rate are cash-flow and discount-rate expected
return components, respectively, where cash-flow beta and discount-rate beta are estimated following Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004)’s approach. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix B. ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Summary Statistics
N Mean S.D. Q25 Median Q75
CPAX 40053 0.068 0.071 0.024 0.046 0.084
CAPX+R&D 40053 0.109 0.098 0.041 0.081 0.144
Issuance 37929 0.112 0.332 -0.003 0.008 0.038
CF 40053 0.097 0.112 0.054 0.102 0.153
Q 40057 1.843 1.166 1.120 1.468 2.112
Real Q 36995 1.607 1.643 0.569 1.137 2.037
1-R2 40123 0.753 0.209 0.634 0.812 0.919
ICC-LNS 40123 0.140 0.071 0.093 0.120 0.170
ICC-GLS 40123 0.098 0.029 0.079 0.095 0.113
ICC-CT 40123 0.110 0.063 0.078 0.097 0.123
Eret-CAPM 40123 0.110 0.094 0.028 0.112 0.170
Eret-FF3 40123 0.121 0.098 0.054 0.114 0.181
Eret-FF4 40123 0.110 0.108 0.039 0.104 0.175
CFN-CDZ 39752 0.067 0.608 -0.390 0.090 0.584
CFN-CS 37751 0.045 0.613 -0.424 0.092 0.531
DRN-CDZ 39752 -0.027 0.626 -0.566 -0.048 0.498
DRN-CS 37751 -0.004 0.534 -0.224 0.019 0.178
Eret-MKTCF 40091 0.084 0.068 0.022 0.085 0.129
Eret-MKTDR 40091 0.038 0.027 0.012 0.039 0.059
Eret-SMBCF 40091 0.045 0.044 0.018 0.041 0.064
Eret-SMBDR 40091 0.036 0.029 0.014 0.040 0.054
Eret-HMLCF 40091 0.015 0.038 -0.003 0.016 0.042
Eret-HMLDR 40091 0.032 0.023 0.010 0.034 0.049
Eret-UMDCF 40091 0.026 0.076 -0.013 0.026 0.070
Eret-UMDDR 40091 0.040 0.029 0.013 0.045 0.060
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Panel B. Correlation
ICC-LNS ICC-GLS ICC-CT Eret-CAPM Eret-FF3 Eret-FF4 CFN-CDZ DRN-CDZ
ICC-LNS 1.00
ICC-GLS 0.50∗∗∗ 1.00
ICC-CT 0.57∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 1.00
Eret-CAPM 0.12∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 1.00
Eret-FF3 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 1.00
Eret-FF4 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 1.00
CFN-CDZ 0.15∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.00 0.00 1.00
DRN-CDZ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.00 0.84∗∗∗ 1.00
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Table 1.2: Estimation Results of Investment Regressions
This table provides estimation results from panel regressions. The sample consists of US firms from 1985 to 2013. The
dependent variables are capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (AT). ICC-LNS, ICC-GLS
and ICC-CT are the implied cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013), Claus
and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM, Eret-FF3, and Eret-FF4 are
expected returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor and four-factor models, respectively. All the
cost-of-equity proxies are measured at the beginning of the year. Q is Tobin’s q at the beginning of the year and CF
is concurrent free cash flow. All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Detailed definitions of variables are
provided in Appendix B. The robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. ***,
** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: CAPX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CF 0.102∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.036∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ICC-GLS -0.065∗∗∗
(0.02)
ICC-CT -0.012∗
(0.01)
Eret-CAPM 0.031∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Eret-FF3 0.012∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
Eret-FF4 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 40050 38093 38180 37503 37176 37176 37176 35420 35420 35420
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.162 0.161 0.161 0.155 0.155 0.155 0.163 0.163 0.163
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Table 1.3: Estimation Results of Net Equity Issuance Regressions
This table provides estimation results from panel regression. The sample consists of US firms from 1985 to 2013. The
dependent variable is Issuance, defined as the difference of log adjusted shares outstanding between fiscal year t and
t − 1. ICC-LNS, ICC-GLS and ICC-CT are the implied cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li, Ng, and
Swaminathan (2013), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM,
Eret-FF3, and Eret-FF4 are expected returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor and four-factor
models, respectively. All the cost-of-equity proxies are measured at the beginning of the year. Q is Tobin’s q at the
beginning of the year and CF is concurrent free cash flow. All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Detailed
definitions of variables are provided in Appendix B. The robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: ISSUANCE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CF 0.489∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Q 0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.182∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ICC-GLS -0.214∗∗
(0.09)
ICC-CT -0.046∗
(0.03)
Eret-CAPM 0.086∗ 0.100∗∗
(0.04) (0.05)
Eret-FF3 0.093∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Eret-FF4 0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 36103 36188 35563 35238 35238 35238 33606 33606 33606
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.066 0.067 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.067 0.067 0.067
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Table 1.4: Sensitivities of Investments and Net Equity Issuance to Cash Flow
and Discount Rate News
This table provides estimation results from panel regression. The sample consists of US firms from 1985 to 2013. The
dependent variables are capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (AT); and Issuance, de-
fined as the difference of log adjusted shares outstanding between fiscal year t and t − 1. CFN-CDZ and DRN-CDZ
are cash flow news and discount rate news, respectively, according to the Chen et al. (2013)’s approach. CFN-CS and
DRN-CS are cash flow news and discount rate news, respectively, according to Campbell and Shiller (1988) approach.
All the cost-of-equity proxies are measured at the beginning of the year. Q is Tobin’s q at the beginning of the year and
CF is concurrent free cash flow. All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Detailed definitions of variables are
provided in Appendix B. The robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. ***,
** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAPX ISSUANCE CAPX ISSUANCE
CF 0.105∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Q 0.006∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CFN-CDZ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
DRN-CDZ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
CFN-CS 0.014∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
DRN-CS -0.014∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 37774 35802 37698 35672
Adjusted R2 0.164 0.084 0.160 0.076
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Table 1.5: Sensitivities of Cost-of-Equity Proxies to Cash Flow News and Dis-
count Rate News
This table provides estimation results from Fama-Macbeth regression. The sample consists of US firms from 1985 to
2013. The dependent variables include implied cost of capital measures and factor model-based proxies. ICC-LNS, ICC-
GLS and ICC-CT are the implied cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li et al. (2013), Claus and Thomas
(2001), and Gebhardt et al. (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM, Eret-FF3, and Eret-FF4 are expected returns based on the
CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor and four-factor models, respectively. CFN-CDZ (CFN-CS) and DRN-CDZ
(DRN-CS) are cash flow news and discount rate news following the method of Chen et al. (2013) (Campbell and Shiller
(1988)). Detailed variable definitions are provided in the Appendix B. The reported R2 the the time-series average of R2
from cross-sectional regressions. The robust standard errors adjusted for autocorrelation up to 12 years are reported in
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Chen et al. (2013) Return Decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ICC-LNS ICC-GLS ICC-CT Eret-CAPM Eret-FF3 Eret-FF4
CFN-CDZ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ 0.000 0.004∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DRN-CDZ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 39752 39752 39752 39752 39752 39752
R2 0.047 0.027 0.012 0.009 0.003 0.003
Panel B. Campbell and Shiller (1988) Return Decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ICC-LNS ICC-GLS ICC-CT Eret-CAPM Eret-FF3 Eret-FF4
CFN-CS -0.024∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.003 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DRN-CS 0.024∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.007∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 37751 37751 37751 37751 37751 37751
R2 0.017 0.046 0.010 0.012 0.006 0.007
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Table 1.6: Sensitivities of Investments and Net Equity Issuance to Cash-Flow
and Discount-Rate Expected Return Components
This table provides estimation results from panel regression. The sample consists of US firms from 1985 to 2013. The
dependent variables are capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (AT); and Issuance, de-
fined as the difference of log adjusted shares outstanding between fiscal year t and t − 1. Cash flow and discount rate
component of expected returns for MKT, SMB, HML and UMD factor premium are calculated as cash-flow beta and
discount-rate beta times corresponding factor premium. The cash-flow beta and discount-rate beta is estimated for MK-
T, SMB, HML and UMD portfolio returns following Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). All the cost-of-equity proxies
are measured at the beginning of the year. Q is Tobin’s q at the beginning of the year and CF is concurrent free cash
flow. All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix B.
The robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
CAPX ISSUANCE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAPM FF3 FF4 CAPM FF3 FF4
CF 0.105∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Q 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Eret-Cash Flow 0.060∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.174∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Eret-Discount Rate -0.036 -0.047 -0.024 -0.142 -0.185 -0.101
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
Eret-SMBCF -0.023∗ -0.024∗ -0.111 -0.116
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.09)
Eret-SMBDR 0.035 0.023 0.731∗∗ 0.702∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.33) (0.34)
Eret-HMLCF 0.110∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.14)
Eret-HMLDR -0.229∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ -1.348∗∗∗ -1.374∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.37) (0.37)
Eret-UMDCF 0.014∗ 0.067
(0.01) (0.04)
Eret-UMDDR 0.032 0.045
(0.05) (0.28)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 37144 37144 37144 35206 35206 35206
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.157 0.157 0.064 0.066 0.066
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Table 1.7: Changes in Cost-of-Capital Estimates Prior to Recession Period
This table provides panel regression results of changes in cost-of-capital estimates on prior-to-recession dummy. The
cost-of-capital estimates including implied cost of capital measure proposed by Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013), Claus
and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001). Eret-CAPM, Eret-FF3, and Eret-FF4 are expected
returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor and four-factor models, respectively. Prior to Recession
Dummy is an indicator which takes value of one for the one quarter before NBER recession periods, and zero otherwise.
The sample is at firm-quarter level. The robust standard errors adjusted for firm clustering are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ICC-LNS ICC-GLS ICC-CT Eret-CAPM Eret-FF3 Eret-FF4
Prior to Recession Dummy 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year-Quater FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 78100 78100 78100 78100 78100 78100
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.035 0.019 0.542 0.402 0.383
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Table 1.8: Difference-in-Difference Estimation for Cost-of-Equity Proxies
This table provides estimation results of the difference-in-difference (DID) regression. The sample consists of US firms
in 1997 and 2003. The dependent variables are six cost-of-equity measures. ICC-LNS, ICC-GLS and ICC-CT are the
implied cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013), Claus and Thomas (2001),
and Gebhardt et al. (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM, Eret-FF3, and Eret-FF4 are expected returns based on the CAPM,
the Fama and French three-factor and four-factor models, respectively. We estimate the following DID regression:
Rei,t = α0 + α1Postt + α2HFCi + α3Postt × HFCi + εit ,
where Post is a dummy variable that takes 1 if it is the third quarter of 1997 or 2003, and 0 if it is the first quarter of 1997
or 2003. HFC is a dummy variable which takes value of 1 if the firm is on the top 30% of financial constraint in the last
year. The measure of financial constraint is defined as
FCi,t = Pr (Financial Constraint) = 1 − 11 + exp (β′Xi,t − 0.454)
and
β′Xi,t = 0.737 × Sizei,t+0.043 × Size2i,t−0.04 × Firmagei,t
Detailed variables definitions are provided in the Appendix B. The robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clus-
tering are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ICC-LNS ICC-GLS ICC-CT Eret-CAPM Eret-FF3 Eret-FF4
Post -0.004∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HFC 0.028∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Post*HFC -0.008∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 2638 2638 2638 2638 2638 2638
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.082 0.018 0.022 0.044 0.046
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Table 1.9: Price Informativeness and Investment/Financing Sensitivity
This table provides estimation results from panel regressions. The sample consists of US firms from 1985 to 2013. The
dependent variable is capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (AT) and equity issuance,
defined as the difference of log adjusted shares outstanding between fiscal year t and t − 1. Panel A and C include firms
with price nonsynchronicity measure in the top 30%, and Panel B and D include firms with price non-synchronicity
measure in the bottom 30%. The price nonsynchronicity is calculated as 1-R2, where R2 is the R-square of time-series
regression of daily stock returns on market and 3-digit SIC industry returns at year t. ICC-LNS, ICC-GLS and ICC-
CT are the implied cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li et al. (2013), Claus and Thomas (2001), and
Gebhardt et al. (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM, Eret-FF3, and Eret-FF4 are expected returns based on the CAPM, the
Fama and French three-factor and four-factor models, respectively. All the cost-of-equity proxies are measured at the
beginning of the year. Q is Tobin’s q at the beginning of the year, and CF is concurrent free cash flow. All regressions
include year and firm fixed effects. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix B. The robust standard
errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Investment for Large Private Information Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.110∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.039∗∗∗
(0.01)
ICC-GLS -0.065∗∗
(0.03)
ICC-CT -0.017∗
(0.01)
Eret-CAPM 0.020
(0.02)
Eret-FF3 0.008
(0.01)
Eret-FF4 0.013
(0.01)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 8471 8482 8263 8448 8448 8448
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.096 0.094 0.091 0.090 0.091
Panel B: Investment for Small Private Information Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.160∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.023
(0.01)
ICC-GLS 0.023
(0.04)
ICC-CT 0.006
(0.02)
Eret-CAPM 0.096∗∗∗
(0.02)
Eret-FF3 0.039∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-FF4 0.032∗∗∗
(0.01)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 8954 8991 8882 8514 8514 8514
Adjusted R2 0.209 0.207 0.207 0.208 0.204 0.204
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Panel C: Financing for Large Private Information Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.362∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Q 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.151∗∗∗
(0.04)
ICC-GLS -0.192∗∗
(0.08)
ICC-CT -0.056∗
(0.03)
Eret-CAPM -0.150∗∗
(0.07)
Eret-FF3 -0.046
(0.04)
Eret-FF4 -0.026
(0.04)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 7789 7802 7601 7775 7775 7775
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.034 0.034
Panel D: Financing for Small Private Information Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.586∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Q 0.043∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ICC-LNS -0.098
(0.07)
ICC-GLS 0.401∗
(0.24)
ICC-CT 0.019
(0.07)
Eret-CAPM 0.540∗∗∗
(0.10)
Eret-FF3 0.277∗∗∗
(0.07)
Eret-FF4 0.164∗∗∗
(0.06)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 8723 8756 8651 8293 8293 8293
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.102 0.101
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Table 1.10: Equity Dependence and Investment/Financing Sensitivity to COE
Proxies
This table provides estimation results from panel regression. The sample consists of US firms from 1985 to 2013. The
dependent variable is capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (AT) and equity issuance,
defined as the difference of log adjusted shares outstanding between fiscal year t and t − 1. Panel A and C include firms
with the top 30% of equity dependence, and Panel B and D include firms with the bottom 30% of equity dependence.
The equity dependence is measured by KZ index, defined as
KZi,t = −1.002CFi,t − 39.368DIVit − 1.315CASHi,t + 3.139LEVi,t .
ICC-LNS, ICC-GLS and ICC-CT are the implied cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li et al. (2013), Claus
and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt et al. (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM, Eret-FF3, and Eret-FF4 are expected returns
based on the CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor and four-factor models, respectively. CFN-Chen (CFN-CS) and
DRN-Chen (DRN-CS) are cash flow news and discount rate news following the method of Chen et al. (2013) (Campbell
and Shiller (1988)). All the cost-of-equity proxies are measured at the beginning of the year. Q is Tobin’s q at the
beginning of the year and CF is concurrent free cash flow. All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Detailed
definitions of variables are provided in Appendix B. The robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Investment for High Equity-dependent Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.121∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Q 0.022∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ICC-LNS -0.040∗∗∗
(0.01)
ICC-GLS -0.121∗∗∗
(0.04)
ICC-CT -0.023∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-CAPM 0.025
(0.02)
Eret-FF3 -0.003
(0.01)
Eret-FF4 -0.002
(0.01)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 10247 10234 10045 9850 9850 9850
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.155 0.154 0.152 0.151 0.151
Panel B: Investment for Low Equity-dependent Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.080∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.009
(0.01)
ICC-GLS 0.025
(0.03)
ICC-CT 0.012
(0.01)
Eret-CAPM 0.047∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-FF3 0.025∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-FF4 0.026∗∗∗
(0.01)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 9916 9954 9792 9725 9725 9725
Adjusted R2 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.165 0.164 0.165
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Panel C: Financing for High Equity-dependent Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.374∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Q 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ICC-LNS -0.193∗∗∗
(0.04)
ICC-GLS -0.357∗∗∗
(0.13)
ICC-CT -0.067∗
(0.04)
Eret-CAPM 0.034
(0.09)
Eret-FF3 -0.007
(0.05)
Eret-FF4 0.007
(0.04)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 9435 9425 9261 9074 9074 9074
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048
Panel D: Financing for Low Equity-dependent Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.507∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Q 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.171∗∗∗
(0.04)
ICC-GLS -0.174
(0.11)
ICC-CT -0.056∗
(0.03)
Eret-CAPM 0.097∗
(0.05)
Eret-FF3 0.113∗∗∗
(0.03)
Eret-FF4 0.101∗∗∗
(0.03)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 26618 26713 26251 26094 26094 26094
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.074 0.075 0.070 0.071 0.071
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Table 1.11: Estimation Results of Investment Regressions Including R&D and
M&A Expenses
This table provides estimation results from panel regressions. The sample consists of US firms from 1985 to 2013. The
dependent variable in Panel A is capital expenditures (CAPX) plus M&A expenses (AQC) scaled by beginning-of-year
total assets (AT). The dependent variable in Panel B is R&D expenses (XRD) and M&A expenses (AQC) scaled by
beginning-of-year total assets (AT). ICC-LNS, ICC-GLS and ICC-CT are the implied cost of equity estimates following
the methods of Li et al. (2013), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt et al. (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM, Eret-
FF3, and Eret-FF4 are expected returns based on the CAPM, the FF3M, and the FF4M. All the cost-of-equity proxies
are measured at the beginning of the year. Q is Tobin’s q at the beginning of the year, and CF is concurrent free cash
flow. All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix B.
The robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Dependent Variable: CAPX+M&A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.191∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.105∗∗∗
(0.01)
ICC-GLS -0.191∗∗∗
(0.03)
ICC-CT -0.060∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-CAPM -0.002
(0.02)
Eret-FF3 -0.005
(0.01)
Eret-FF4 0.005
(0.01)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 38093 38180 37503 37176 37176 37176
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.069 0.068 0.066 0.066 0.066
Panel B: Dependent Variable: CAPX+R&D+M&A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.189∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.093∗∗∗
(0.01)
ICC-GLS -0.156∗∗∗
(0.03)
ICC-CT -0.046∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-CAPM -0.005
(0.02)
Eret-FF3 -0.005
(0.01)
Eret-FF4 0.002
(0.01)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 38093 38180 37503 37176 37176 37176
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.082 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.080
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Table 1.12: Estimation Results of Investment/Financing Regressions with Ad-
ditional Controls
This table provides estimation results from panel regressions. The sample consists of US firmss from 1985 to 2013. The
dependent variable is capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (AT) and equity issuance,
defined as the difference of log adjusted shares outstanding between fiscal year t and t − 1. ICC-LNS, ICC-GLS and
ICC-CT are the implied cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013), Claus and
Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM, Eret-FF3, and Eret-FF4 are
expected returns based on the CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor and four-factor models, respectively. All the
cost-of-equity proxies are measured at the beginning of the year. Q is Tobin’s q at the beginning of the year, CF is
concurrent free cash flow. Additional control variables include: Lev = Book value of debt/ market value of asset, where
the book value of debt equals long-term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities(DLC) and the market value of asset
(MVA) equals total asset (AT) plus closing stock price (PRCC) times common shares outstanding(CSHO) minus common
equity(CEQ) minus deferred taxes(TXDB); S ize =Natural log of total assets, where total assets is inflated to 1996 dollars
using the GDP deflator; Div = Cash dividend divided by total assets; FA = Net plant, property, and equipment scaled
by total assets; and Cash = Cash and short-term investments over total assets. Detailed definitions of variables are
provided in Appendix B. The robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. ***,
** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.096∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lev -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Div -0.029∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.023∗ -0.023∗ -0.023∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FA 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cash 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.040∗∗∗
(0.01)
ICC-GLS -0.072∗∗∗
(0.02)
ICC-CT -0.019∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-CAPM 0.033∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-FF3 0.012∗∗
(0.00)
Eret-FF4 0.014∗∗∗
(0.00)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No No No No
Observations 37956 38042 37368 37012 37012 37012
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.181 0.181 0.171 0.170 0.171
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Panel B: Financing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.456∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Q 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Lev 0.008∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.006∗ 0.006∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size -0.040∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Div -0.293∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
FA 0.059∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.033∗ 0.033∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Cash 0.023∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ICC-LNS -0.203∗∗∗
(0.03)
ICC-GLS -0.246∗∗∗
(0.09)
ICC-CT -0.078∗∗∗
(0.03)
Eret-CAPM 0.092∗∗
(0.04)
Eret-FF3 0.088∗∗∗
(0.03)
Eret-FF4 0.078∗∗∗
(0.02)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No No No No
Observations 35976 36062 35439 35088 35088 35088
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.070 0.071 0.068 0.068 0.068
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CHAPTER 2
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF MUTUAL FUND ADVISORY
MISCONDUCT
2.1 Introduction
The impact of misconduct in the mutual fund industry has received wide at-
tention over the past decade. The number of misconduct cases peaked around
2003-2005, when a group of mutual fund advisors were alleged for late trad-
ing that breached fiduciary duties and violated securities laws. The late trading
scandals caused significant economic damage to investors, with average annu-
alized losses up to $400 million between 1998 and 2003 Zitzewitz (2006). The
academic literature on mutual funds shows that misconduct has significant neg-
ative effect on future fund flows Houge and Wellman (2005); Choi and Kahan
(2007); Potter and Schwarz (2012); Qian and Tanyeri (2017), and fund returns
McCabe (2009); Chapman-Davies et al. (2015). Given the large economic con-
sequences of misconduct for mutual funds, the SEC places great emphasis on
combating against misconduct of investment advisors. Therefore, understand-
ing the role of misconduct in mutual fund industry provides important policy
implications for financial regulation.
My paper is the first to conduct a comprehensive study on the impact of all
mutual fund misconduct events on fund flows. Prior academic literature mainly
focuses on late trading scandals around 2003-2005 with data from news media,
such as Wall Street Journal Choi and Kahan (2007); McCabe (2009); Qian and
Tanyeri (2017), so they miss a lot of other misconduct events. My paper covers a
broad set of mutual fund advisory misconduct cases collected from Form ADV,
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a novel database which has not been widely used in the mutual fund literature.
The Form ADV contains rich information of fund advisors in the United States,
including their historical misconduct record. To be clear, my paper includes all
types of mutual fund advisory misconduct, not limited to late trading scandal-
s. In addition to investigating fund investors’ response to misconduct, I also
examine post-misconduct changes in advisory contracting. The reactions from
mutual fund companies provide valuable insights for addressing agency issues
in mutual fund industry.
To do empirical analysis, I construct a monthly panel dataset containing
fund flows, misconduct indicator and several advisor characteristics. Form AD-
V has been used in prior studies to identify malfeasant hedge funds Brown et al.
(2008), to estimate the operational risk of hedge funds Brown et al. (2012), and
to predict fraud of investment managers Dimmock and Gerken (2012). My pa-
per is the first to look into each misconduct case with more detailed information
from the Regulatory Disclosure Reporting Page of Form ADV.1 The forms of
mutual fund advisory misconduct include, but are not limited to, undisclosed
compensation schemes from mutual fund companies, unlicensed employees or
branches, unsuitable investment advice and unauthorized trades. Among them,
the most prevalent form is market timing and late (after-hour) trading. To get
accurate fund flow data I merge Form ADV with N-SAR filings using a unique
advisor identifer. N-SAR filings are semi-annual reports for investment compa-
nies. The unique strength of this filing is that it includes monthly gross mutual
fund flow, which is a direct measure of dollar value of inflows and outflows for
each fund. Examining the effect of advisory misconduct on inflows and out-
1Although advisors may engage in misconduct associated with different products (equity,
insurance, options, etc), I focus exclusively on the mutual fund advisory misconduct, since we
have relatively rich information for the mutual funds industry.
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flows separately tells us how existing mutual fund shareholders and outside
investors respond to the misconduct.
My analysis begins with evaluating the impact of advisory misconduct on
advisors’ fund flows. I run panel regression using the full sample of mutual
fund advisory misconduct events from 2000-2013. Specifically, the dependent
variable, advisors’ cumulative netflows up to 24 months following misconduct,
is regressed on a misconduct indicator, along with other advisor characteristics.
The misconduct indicator equals one if an advisor commits at least one mutual
fund advisory misconduct in month t, and zero otherwise. The result shows that
misconduct is associated with a 5% abnormal reduction in flows per annum, or
about 40 million U.S. dollars for a median advisor. Moreover, I find that the
negative effect of misconduct is mainly driven by increased outflows rather than
reduced inflows. This implies that existing fund investors in general are “news
watchers” and respond to the innovation in misconduct information.
Although the baseline result estimates an average effect of advisory mis-
conduct on fund flows, it suffers from potential endogeneity problem, due to
endogenous nature of misconduct timing, as well as heterogeneity among advi-
sors with and without misconduct. To address these concerns, I corroborate the
baseline result with evidence concerning the causal effect of advisory miscon-
duct on fund flows. A mandate introduced by the SEC provides a quasi-natural
experiment that I use for this purpose.
On September 12, 2000, the SEC proposed an electronic filing mandate ef-
fective in January 2001, requiring investment advisors to file the Form ADV
electronically to the Investment Adviser Registration Depository (IARD).2 The
2The website address is https://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/default.aspx.
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SEC mandate aims to eliminate many costs advisers incur in filing their Form
ADV, improving disclosure procedure and facilitating information flows.3 As a
consequence, investors have much easier access to the information of advisors,
including historical misconduct in the past ten years. In comparison, before
the mandate people have to contact advisors or regulatory agencies to obtain
paper copies of disclosure documents to know advisors’ historical misconduct
information, and that is time-consuming and costly. This policy change offers
a quasi-natural experiment to examine the disclosure effect of advisory miscon-
duct in the mutual fund industry.
In the event study, I estimate the cumulative treatment effect around this
mandate with 12 months of pre- and post-event periods. The treatment group
is defined as advisors with at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct case
reported in Form ADV as of January 2001, while the control group includes ad-
visors without any mutual fund advisory misconduct case as of the same point
in time.4 I further match the two groups of advisors based on assets under man-
agement. The purpose of matching is to reduce the observable heterogeneity
among these two groups of advisors, since the exogenous shock from the man-
date only tackles exclusion restriction issues. My underlying assumption is that
if investors care about misconduct, then treated advisors will experience greater
outflows following the revelation of their historical misconduct cases. The result
corroborates the initial finding with much larger economic magnitude. The re-
gression based on the matched sample estimates a treatment effect of 18% in one
year following the mandate, suggesting a strong detrimental effect of advisory
misconduct on advisors’ aggregate flows. The result also lends strong support
3Detailed discussion on the cost-benefit analysis of the SEC electronic filing mandate can be
found at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-1897.htm.
4Note that Form ADV contains historical misconduct information in the past ten years, so
treatment advisors may have misconduct cases back to 1990s.
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for the importance of information transparency in fighting against misconduct.
In addition to investigating fund investors’ response to misconduct, I also
examine how mutual fund companies react to mitigate the adverse effect of mis-
conduct on flows. Kuhnen (2005) and Warner and Wu (2005) show that mutual
fund companies revise advisory contract terms based on past performance and
other non-performance characteristics. Therefore, I investigate whether mutu-
al fund companies change fees, incentives and investment policies to protect
themselves from misconduct. I find that following misconduct, mutual fund
companies raise marketing expenditures through increased 12b-1 fees, especial-
ly for payment to underwriters. This suggests an increase in marketing efforts
to alleviate damages to the firms’ image resulting from advisory misconduc-
t. I also find that there is a reduction in contractual incentives, measured by
Cole’s Incentive Rate and two other incentive variables, for funds managed by
malfeasant advisors. This reaction discourages advisors from taking excessive
risk. Finally, based on the investment policy in the N-SAR filings, I show that
investment restrictions on options, futures and foreign equities are more likely
to be lifted following misconduct.
The response of mutual fund companies to alleviate the negative impact of
advisory misconduct go beyond revising specific contract terms. It is a natural
extension to examine how advisory misconduct affects advising relationships
and advisor survival. This is because mutual fund companies may deem it nec-
essary to replace current malfeasant advisors with new ones, when the costs of
associating with malfeasant advisors outweigh the benefits. Therefore, I inves-
tigate whether malfeasant advisors face more uncertainty in maintaining advis-
ing relationship with mutual fund companies, and as a consequence, are more
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likely to be driven out of business in the end. Overall, I document an increased
likelihood of advisor replacement in the year subsequent to misconduct.5 It
demonstrates that by replacing malfeasant advisors, mutual fund companies are
able to shield themselves from on-going damage to funds flows. In the similar
vein, I find a significantly higher probability of business failure for malfeasant
advisors through takeovers, in forms of either M&A or succession. The mutual
fund investors suffer economically with 7% return under-performance over the
next two years following advisory misconduct, especially during market up-
turns. This suggests that the purpose of relaxing investment restrictions is more
likely to enable portfolio hedging activities, rather than levering up for higher
future returns.
My paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it is closely re-
lated to studies concerning misconduct in the mutual fund industry. For ex-
ample, prior literature focuses on 2003-2005 mutual fund trading scandals and
documents the negative impact on flows Houge and Wellman (2005); Zitzewitz
(2006); Choi and Kahan (2007); Qian and Tanyeri (2017). My paper extends ex-
isting research with a broad sample of misconduct cases, and highlights infor-
mation transparency as disciplinary forces against misconduct. My findings are
generally supportive of advisory oversight given widespread malfeasance in as-
set management industry Kwan et al. (2016); Egan et al. (2016). Second, it is also
related to studies on mutual fund advisory contracting. The tendency to reduce
contractual incentives for advisors following misconduct is in line with Massa
and Patgiri (2009) which relates high-incentive contracts to more risk-taking in-
vestments, and Warner and Wu (2011) which finds reduced compensation rate
5One such example is that Deutsche Investment Management Americas (the advisor) was
replaced by the Korea Fund, Inc. (the mutual fund company) in 2007 after being alleged for fail-
ure to disclose potential conflict of interest to the fund board and investors. The fund company
hired RCM Capital Management as its new advisor.
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for funds involved in market-timing scandals in 2004. My evidence of advisor
replacement is also consistent with Jenkinson et al. (2016) which highlights the
importance of soft factors in fund manager selection. Finally, my paper is com-
plement to several recent studies on how compromised trust affects asset flows
Gurun et al. (2017); Kostovetsky (2016). For instance, Gurun et al. (2017) exploits
a negative shock in trust among residents living in communities subject to Mad-
off Ponzi scheme, while Kostovetsky (2016) argues that ownership changes of
mutual fund companies lead to loss of clients’ trust and increased outflows. The
mutual fund advisory misconduct cases vary in the extent of severity, some of
which are not necessarily associated with trust busting.6 My paper contributes
to this strand of literature by showing how mutual fund companies respond to
mitigate the negative effects of misconduct.
2.2 Data and Summary Statistics
2.2.1 Data Sources
The data used in this paper come from two major sources: N-SAR filings and
Form ADV. I include all mutual funds covered in N-SAR filings from 2000-2013.
N-SAR filings are semi-annual reports for investment companies, which contain
fund and advisor identifications, monthly gross inflows and outflows, advisory
contract terms, fees, investment objectives, and financial statement items such
as income and expenses. The unique advantage of the N-SAR filing is that it has
monthly gross fund flow, which is a direct measure of dollar value of inflows
6For instance, minor violation in disclosure procedure can be treated as unprofessional or
incompetence.
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and outflows for each fund. I download N-SAR filings from EDGAR and use
natural language processing technique to extract all the data from original fil-
ings.7 Form N-SAR/A covers the first six months of fiscal year, while N-SAR/B
covers the full fiscal year. Therefore, I use data in N-SAR/B for mutual fund
characteristics, and both N-SAR/A and N-SAR/B for monthly flows.
Form ADV is Uniform Application for Investment Advisor Registration. All
investment advisors in the United States regulated by the Investment Advisor
Act of 1940 must file this form if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a)upon initial registration; (b)at the end of fiscal year; (c)whenever there is a
material change to business. It contains information for investment advisors
on several dimensions, including identification, business description, assets un-
der management, clientele, employees, ownership structure, and disciplinary
actions in the past ten years. In order to examine the impact of misconduct on
fund flows, I extend the methodology of Debaere and Evans (2015) and use a
two-step approach to merge Form ADV with N-SAR filings to get accurate fund
flow data. Specifically, in the first step I use advisor’s SEC number to unam-
biguously match the two datasets. The unique advisor identifier in both sources
facilitates the matching process. In the second step I match the remaining advi-
sors by their legal company names. The two-step matching process leaves with
about 83% (192,003 out of 229,288) of fund-year observations in N-SAR sample.
This mutual fund sample covers nearly 90% of aggregate mutual fund net assets
as of 2013.8
Figure 2.1 shows a typical organization structure of mutual fund advisory
7The original Python code was developed by Robert Parham. I revised
his code to expand variable coverage. My updated version is available at
http://www.kaiwufinance.com/datacode.html.
8The aggregate net assets of investment companies are obtained from Investment Company
Fact Book at http://www.icifactbook.org/ch1/17 fb ch1#investment.
56
business. A mutual fund family usually consists of several mutual fund com-
panies (trusts), each of which has numerous mutual funds. Mutual fund com-
panies file Form N-SAR to disclose information for each individual fund. They
delegate portfolio management to investment advisors and pay advisory fees.
Advisors have discretion to manage portfolios for single or multiple mutual
fund companies, and they file Form ADV to the SEC.9
2.2.2 Sample Construction
To investigate the effect of advisory misconduct on fund flows, I construct a
monthly panel dataset containing fund flows, misconduct indicator and other
control variables at the advisor level. Advisors’ monthly fund inflows, outflows
and netflows are constructed using N-SAR Item 28 and 75. N-SAR filings iden-
tify the total dollar amount of shares sold and redeemed in each month for indi-
vidual mutual fund. Following the methodology of Edelen (1999) and Frazzini
and Lamont (2008), I define advisor’s aggregate netflows as difference between
gross NAV of shares sold (Inflow) less gross NAV of shares redeemed (Outflow)
for all funds under management, scaled by gross fund TNA in month t:10
Net f lowi,t =
In f lowi,t − Out f lowi,t
TNAi,t
(2.1)
The reason of aggregating fund flows at advisor level is that mutual fund ad-
visors care about aggregate revenue from total assets under management, since
the reallocation of flows among funds under management has minor effect on
9For illustrative purpose, Figure A.1 presents examples of two advisors who manage mu-
tual funds belonging to the Vanguard family: Wellington Management Company and Mellon
Capital Management. It suggests that a fund family may employ multiple advisors in charge of
portfolio management service.
10N-SAR Item 75 reports the average fund TNA over the reporting period. I use this item as
the fund TNA for each month during the period.
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the total revenue. However, for robustness checks I also conduct analysis at
fund level, and the results remain quantitatively similar.11
Instead of obtaining fund returns from CRSP Mutual Fund Database, I cal-
culate fund returns from N-SAR directly to avoid loss of observations in the
matching process. Edelen et al. (2008) argues that prior studies are able to match
only 40-50% of fund-month observations.12 Therefore, all the fund-related vari-
ables are obtained directly from N-SAR filings. In particular, I follow the defi-
nition in Edelen et al. (2008) to calculate annual mutual fund returns using net
asset values (N-SAR Item 74-V1) and fund distributions (N-SAR Items 73-A1,73-
B, 73-C):
Returni,t =
NAVi,t + Payouti,t − NAVi,t−1
NAVi,t−1
(2.2)
Similarly, advisors’ returns are calculated as TNA-weighted average returns of
all funds under management.
The regulatory disclosure contains detailed history of disciplinary actions for
advisors and their affiliates, including case initiator, principal sanction, princi-
pal product, and resolutions.13 I define mutual fund advisory misconduct as
malfeasant behaviors on mutual funds that leads to disciplinary actions from
regulatory agencies. The main explanatory variable Mutual Fund Misconduct
Dummy equals one if an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory
misconduct.
I also add several advisor characteristics that are prominent in driving flows.
11The regression result at fund level is available upon request.
12Although using improved matching algorithm Chernenko and Sunderam (2016) reports a
70% matching rate in terms of fund-month observations and 80% in dollar terms, their method-
ology is not available to the public.
13Table A.7 provides some cases of mutual fund advisory misconduct during the sample pe-
riod.
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Larger funds are expected to attract more fund inflows Chevalier and Ellison
(1997); Sirri and Tufano (1998); Barber et al. (2005); Bhojraj et al. (2012), hence
advisor AUM is included as a control variable. I also control for firm age, which
has been taken into consideration in most of the mutual fund studies. I further
introduce three fee rates variables to capture the impact of cost on fund flows,
including expenses ratio, front-end load and redemption fees. Finally, to ac-
count for heterogeneity in fund investment styles, I calculate average flow to
fund styles as in Huang et al. (2007), where styles are categorized into domestic
equity (capital appreciation, growth and income, total return), domestic bond,
foreign equity, foreign bond, balanced, equity index, bond index and others
based on N-SAR investment style classification.
2.2.3 Summary Statistics
Figure 2.2 presents time-series frequency of mutual fund advisory misconduct
by case initiation date. There is a sharp increase in number of misconduct cases
from 2003-2005 with annual average over 150. This coincides with an episode
well known for prevalent mutual fund market timing and late trading scandals.
After that, the number gradually declines over time to around 20 cases in recent
years. It seems that mutual fund advisory misconduct doesn’t exhibit strong
intensity during 2008-2009 financial crisis. This may imply that poor market
performance is not the only trigger for advisors’ malfeasance. Nevertheless, the
declining trend of misconduct does not necessarily implies that the financial
regulation is no longer important. Combating against fraud and misconduct in
asset management industry is still among the top priorities of the SEC.14
14The financial deregulation following Dodd-Frank Act delegated oversight responsibility for
mid-size investment advisors ($25M-$100M in AUM) from the SEC to state-securities regulators.
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The breakdown of advisory misconduct is shown in Table A.6. Panel A re-
ports the percentage of misconduct cases by product types. There are altogether
18,276 advisory misconduct cases, of which 1,033 (6%) are associated with mu-
tual funds. The low percentage is consistent with the fact that mutual fund
advisors only account for 10% of all investment advisors.15 Panel B shows that
among all 1,033 mutual fund advisory misconduct cases, 39% are investigated
by state regulation authorities, 26% by the SEC and 23% by the Self-Regulatory
Organizations (SRO). In terms of sanction, Panel C reports that 47% of the mu-
tual fund advisory misconduct cases end up in civil/administrative penalties,
followed by 16% in cease and desist and 12% in censure. Panel D demonstrates
the percentage of cases by resolution. 24% of the cases are resolved by settle-
ment, followed by consent (21%) and acceptance, waiver & consent (19%). Pan-
el E shows that most of the cases are filed against firms as legal entities (46%) or
affiliates (46%). Finally, Panel F reports the percentage of misconduct events by
content of allegation. Since there is no explicit classification of misconduct by
allegation in the Form ADV, I manually review the allegation of each case and
categorize them into three broad types related to transaction, disclosure and
compliance. In particular, transaction-related misconduct refers to market tim-
ing/late trading scandals, or unauthorized trades; disclosure-related miscon-
duct is related to undisclosed material information; compliance-related miscon-
duct stands for violating relevant compliance requirement such as registration.
The result shows that about 70% of the misconduct is related to compliance,
followed by transaction (18%) and disclosure (13%).
Summary statistics of main variables are presented in Table 2.1. Panel A
Kwan, Charoenwong, and Umar (2016) shows that following Dodd-Frank Act, state regulators
are less able to detect misconduct than the SEC.
15However, they employ a large proportion of finance professionals and manage over 50% of
AUM in asset management industry.
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reports summary statistics at the fund level. The average monthly netflows
is 0.79%, with inflows (outflows) of 6.55% (5.89%). The mean of annual fund
return is 2.74%, with large standard deviation of 24.49%. Average fund total net
assets is 1.28 billion dollars, and average fund age is 5.2 years. Similarly, Panel
B reports summary statistics at the advisor level. The mean aggregate netflows
and returns are almost identical to those at fund level. On average, advisors
have 20.33 billion dollars of assets under management, 220 employees, 3,180
clients, 19,780 accounts, and 2.62 firm branches.16 The investment style variables
in Panel B are percentage of net assets belonging to particular investment style
in aggregate net assets managed by an advisor. It shows that nearly 50% of the
assets belong to equity funds, followed by bonds funds (22%).
2.3 Empirical Results
2.3.1 Predicting Mutual Fund Advisory Misconduct
Before examining the economic consequences of advisory misconduct, I begin
by exploring the determinants of advisory misconduct with a predictive mod-
el. While Dimmock and Gerken (2012) examines predictability for all types of
advisory misconduct, I focus exclusively on predicting mutual fund advisory
misconduct. However, their methodology serves as reasonable benchmark for
my study. Therefore, I extend their model by accounting for another important
factor: the regional fraud culture. Specifically, following Shumway (2001) and
Rahaman (2014), I run following Logit regression with advisor-year observa-
16The large standard deviation of clients and accounts indicates that some mutual fund advi-
sors also provide advisory service for a large number of individual clients.
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tions from 2000-2013:17
Pr{Misconducti,t+1} = α + β1PastMisconducti,t + β2PastRegulatoryi,t
+ β3RegionalMisconductIntensity j,t + γXi,t + θt + i,t
(2.3)
In addition, to facilitate coefficient interpretation I also estimate a linear proba-
bility model.
The main explanatory variables are divided into two categories. First, I con-
sider historical advisory misconduct, including past mutual fund advisory mis-
conduct (Past Mutual Fund Misconduct) and past misconduct of all products (Past
Regulatory). These measures capture the advisors’ tendency to commit similar
misconduct in the future given their historical behaviors. Another explanatory
variable that is absent in Dimmock and Gerken (2012) is Regional Misconduct
Intensity, defined as total number of historical mutual fund advisory miscon-
duct cases scaled by the population in a Zipcode region. It stems from the idea
that fraud culture has been recognized as one of the most important driving
forces for corporate misconduct Liu (2016). Parsons et al. (2016) finds that mis-
conduct rates of neighboring firms increase a firm’s likelihood of committing
financial misconduct. I also include year fixed effects to account for general
business cycles during the sample period.
Table 2.2 provides result of linear probability and Logit model for predict-
ing mutual fund advisory misconduct. Consistent with Dimmock and Gerken
(2012), past regulatory action and civil/criminal penalties are strong predic-
tors for mutual fund advisory misconduct. The coefficient of Past Regulatory
is 0.0338, with t-statistics over 4 in Column (1). It suggests that mutual fund
advisors with misconduct records are associated with 3.4% higher probabili-
17Shumway (2001) proves that under certain regularity conditions, a multi-period Logit mod-
el is equivalent to the discrete-time hazard model, when log of firm age is added along with
other covariates.
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ty to commit mutual fund advisory misconduct in the next year. The effect of
civil/criminal penalties is also large and significant. One possible explanation
is that malfeasant advisors are more willing to employ investment representa-
tives with misconduct background Egan et al. (2016). I add a measure of region-
al fraud culture in Column (2) and (4), which is regional misconduct intensity,
and find that it is positive and highly significant. The coefficient of Regional
Misconduct Intensity in Column (2) is 0.0148 (t-statistics=2.27), suggesting that
other things equal, one additional historical mutual fund advisory misconduct
case per 1,000 people in the Zipcode region as of year t is associated with 1.4%
higher probability of misconduct for the advisor in the following year.
In terms of control variables, past flows are insignificant at any conventional
level, although the sign of coefficient is consistent with expectation that higher
netflows would alleviate the propensity to engage in misconduct. Addition-
ally, probability of misconduct increases in firm size and decreases in average
account size, indicating that misconduct activities are concentrated in large ad-
visory firms with small account size.
2.3.2 Panel Regression
I conduct the analysis for the effect of misconduct on fund flows using a broad
set of mutual fund advisory misconduct cases. The sample consists of advisor-
month observations from 2000-2013. The baseline panel regression framework
is formulated as follows:
Flowsi,t+n =α + βMutual Fund Misconduct Dummyi,t + γXi,t + ηt + i,t (2.4)
where the dependent variable Flowsi,t+n denotes cumulative aggregate netflows
of advisor i from month t up to month t+n, n=1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 18 and 24 months. The
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primary explanatory variable Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy equals one if
an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct in month t,
and zero otherwise. The control variables include past flows, returns, fee rates,
AUM, and firm age. I also include average flow to fund styles to account for
heterogeneity in advisors’ exposure to different investment styles.18 The regres-
sion also includes month fixed effects and the robust t-statistics are clustered by
advisor and month. In line with the hypothesis, if mutual fund advisory mis-
conduct adversely affects advisors’ aggregate flows, I would expect to find a
significant and negative coefficient β. Similary, to examine differential effect of
misconduct on flows, I also run separate regressions for inflows and outflows.
The result of panel regressions are presented in Table 2.3. Panel A shows that
mutual fund advisory misconduct is associated with a significant reduction in
netflows over the subsequent periods. To be specific, the coefficient of Mutu-
al Fund Misconduct Dummy is -0.0482 for the cumulative aggregate netflows up
to month t + 12, suggesting that an advisor who commits mutual fund adviso-
ry misconduct in month t is going to have 5% lower cumulative netflows over
the next year. Since the median gross TNA is 830 million, this translates to
about 40 million dollars for a median advisor. By decomposing netflows into
inflows and outflows, Panel B and Panel C demonstrates that the reduced net-
flows are primarily driven by increased outflows rather than reduced inflows,
as the coefficient of Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy in Panel C is positive and
highly significant at 5% level. It indicates that existing fund investors pay at-
tention to the innovation in misconduct information and withdraw assets out
of funds managed by malfeasant advisors. Similarly, Figure 2.3 plots the aver-
18Specifically, it is calculated as weighted average of flows to fund style for an advisor, where
the flow to fund style is average netflow of funds with the same investment style, and the weight
is proportion of TNA with a particular style in total TNA managed by an advisor.
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age netflows and the 95% confidence interval over the subsequent 24 months.
The figures clearly show that the impact of misconduct on advisors’ aggregate
cumulative netflows is large and persistent, with deteriorating cumulative net-
flows over time. Furthermore, I find that the negative impact mainly comes
from outflows following misconduct, while there are almost no changes in in-
flows. My findings are consistent with Chapman-Davies et al. (2015) and Qian
and Tanyeri (2017) which document similar reductions in fund flows following
advisory misconduct. In sum, I find strong evidence in support of the negative
effect of mutual fund advisory misconduct on fund flows. The effect is statisti-
cally significant and economically sizable, mainly driven by increased outflows.
2.3.3 Event Study
Although the baseline result shows the negative effect of advisory misconduc-
t on fund flows, it is subject to potential endogeneity problem. There are two
major sources of confoundedness. First, the timing of misconduct is under dis-
cretion of fund advisors, as we expect that they are more likely to be engaged
in malfeasant behaviors when past performance is low, or fund is experiencing
outflows. Second, there is heterogeneity between advisors with and without
misconduct. The systematic difference in size, age, and clientele all possibly
drive the result in the baseline regression.
To address these concerns, I conduct a quasi-natural experiment using the
SEC electronic filing mandate effective in January 2001. The mandate requires
the SEC-registered investment advisors to file Form ADV electronically on the
Investment Adviser Registration Depository (IARD). It generates an exogenous
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shock to the misconduct disclosure requirement, leading to increase in infor-
mation transparency in the asset management industry. Along with reduced
barrier to information transmission, fund investors have much easier access to
the advisors’ historical misconduct records. Therefore, I hypothesize that when
past misconduct is suddenly revealed to the public following the SEC mandate,
there will be a reduction in fund flows to malfeasant advisors.
I define January 2001 as the event date with 12 months of pre- and post-
event periods. The treatment group is defined as advisors who have at least one
mutual fund advisory misconduct case reported in the Form ADV as of January
2001, while control group includes advisors without any mutual fund advisory
misconduct case as of the same point in time.19 The regression framework is
formulated as follows:
Flowsi,t = α + δTreatmenti,t +
4∑
t=−4
{βtQtrt × Treatmenti,t + γtQtrt} + Xi,t + i,t (2.5)
where Flowsi,t is cumulative aggregate netflows of advisor i from quarter t=-
4 up to quarter t, and Qtrt is dummy variable for quarter t. The event month
is set to be the base period and thus is omitted. Vector X includes a series of
advisor characteristics, such as log of advisor’s total AUM, log of firm age, log
of past monetary fine, average fund returns and average flows to fund style. The
standard errors are clustered by advisor and month. The coefficients βt estimate
the cumulative treatment effect over time.
Although the policy shock from the SEC mandate is considered exogenous,
the treatment and control advisors are not randomly selected. The difference
in characteristics between treatment and control advisors makes regression re-
sult vulnerable to omitted variable bias, as the treatment effect may be driven
19The emphasis here is that the misconduct events can take place before 2001. What we care
about is the existence of historical misconduct cases reported on the Form ADV as of January
2001 when the electronic filling mandate became effective.
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by heterogeneity in advisors’ observable or unobservable attributes. To address
this concern, I employ one-to-five nearest neighbourhood matching based on
advisors’ AUM in 2000. Altogether there are 19 treatment and 79 control advi-
sors.20
Figure 2.4 reports advisors’ cumulative aggregate netflows for treatment and
control advisors around the SEC electronic filing mandate. Panel A shows re-
sult for the unmatched sample. Although cumulative flows grow steadily, the
parallel trend assumption is not strictly satisfied prior to the event. The result
for the matched sample is shown in Panel B. It demonstrates a parallel trend for
the flows of two groups of advisors prior to 2001. In particular, I find a large
treatment effect of the SEC mandate, as the cumulative netflows to the treated
advisors are much lower than control advisors, whose flows continue to grow
after the mandate became effective. Panel C reports the cumulative treatment
effect and the 95% confidence interval over the 12-month window. I find that
the cumulative treatment effect is not statistically different from zero before the
mandate. However, it quickly drops below zero following the mandate, and is
highly significant at 5% level during most of the post-event period. The cumu-
lative treatment effect amounts to 18% in one year after the mandate.
Table 2.4 provides result of cumulative treatment effect around the SEC elec-
tronic filing mandate. Panel A reports the result for the unmatched sample. It
shows that the cumulative treatment effect is significantly positive prior to the
event after controlling for advisor characteristics, and it turns to be significantly
negative following event date. Although the result indicates a significant treat-
ment effect of the mandate, the significant treatment effect in the pre-treatment
20I choose a caliper of 0.3 in propensity score matching. The reason to apply multiple neigh-
bourhood matching is due to the small sample of treatment advisors. I also use one-to-three
matching and the result is qualitatively similar.
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period indicates possible bias due to firm heterogeneity. I repeat the analysis
based on the matched sample and the result is shown in Panel B. I find that
the cumulative treatment effect for the matched sample is insignificant in the
pre-treatment period, and becomes significantly negative following the man-
date, with coefficient of Post*Qtr(+3,+4) in Column (1)-(2) ranging from -0.126
to -0.176, both of which are significant at 1% level. The economic magnitude
of the treatment effect is sizable as well, suggesting 13%-18% reduction in cu-
mulative aggregate netflows in the fourth quarter following the mandate. This
is more than twice the magnitude in Kostovetsky (2016), which finds around
7% decline of fund flows within one year following ownership changes of mu-
tual fund companies. In addition, by decomposing netflows into inflows and
outflows, I examine the effect of misconduct for each component in Column (3)-
(6). I find significant treatment effect for inflows and outflows separately, and
there is larger magnitude of increase in outflows. The result also suggests that
increase in information transparency could serve as disciplinary forces against
malfeasant advisors in the mutual fund industry.
To check whether the treatment and control advisors are similar in observ-
able attributes after matching process, Panel C reports result for testing covari-
ates balance. It shows that all the selected major observable attributes are not
statistically different from each other after matching. Finally, as a falsification
test, Panel D reports result of a placebo test which arbitrarily sets January 1998
as event date. This placebo test aims to ensure that the observed change is most-
ly due to the SEC mandate, as opposed to some alternative shocks. I find that
the cumulative treatment effect in the placebo test is not significant around the
artificial event date, indicating that the treatment effect is unlikely to be driven
by other events other than the SEC mandate effective in early 2001.
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2.3.4 Robustness Checks
Excluding 2003-2005 Market Timing/Late Trading Scandals
As is shown in Figure 2.2, mutual fund advisory misconduct cases were clus-
tered around 2003-2005, during which time mutual fund market timing and
late trading scandals were prevalent Chapman-Davies et al. (2015); Qian and
Tanyeri (2017). Therefore, the primary result may be driven by the misconduct
during this period. To rule out this possibility, it is critical to check whether the
main findings remain intact when partial sample is excluded from the analysis.
As a result, I replicate the regressions in Table 2.3 by excluding observations
from 2003-2005.
Table 2.5 presents the regression results. Overall, I find that the negative
effect of advisory misconduct on advisors’ aggregate cumulative netflows re-
mains qualitatively similar without 2003-2005 episode of market timing and
late trading scandals. Specifically, the variable of interest Mutual Fund Miscon-
duct Dummy is still negative and highly significant at the 5% level in most of the
specifications over the next 24 months. It suggests that the main findings are not
likely to be driven by a subset of misconduct events occurred within a certain
short period of time.
Quarterly Flows
In the panel regression I use the exact month of ADV filing date to construct
mutual fund misconduct indicator. However, there might be time lags in infor-
mation disclosure and transmission, creating uncertainty for the timing of mis-
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conduct. To address this concern, I evaluate the effect of mutual fund advisory
misconduct on advisors’ aggregate netflows at quarterly frequency. To be spe-
cific, I estimate similar panel regression as Equation 2.4, where the dependent
variable is advisors’ cumulative aggregate netflows for the next eight quarters.
Correspondingly, the main explanatory variable Mutual Fund Misconduct Dum-
my is an indicator equals one if at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct
case occurs in quarter t.
Table 2.6 presents the result of panel regressions at quarterly frequency. Con-
sistent with previous findings with advisor-month observations, I find that Mu-
tual Fund Misconduct Dummy is negative and highly significant in most of the
specifications. In particular, advisors who commits mutual fund advisory mis-
conduct in the current quarter t experience 2% (3%) reduction in cumulative
aggregate netflows up to next 4(8) quarters. Although statistically significant,
the economic magnitude is smaller than those in monthly regression. This is
due to the conservative nature of the estimate provided by the quarterly regres-
sion, because we would miss the first two months of flows if the misconduct
event occurs at the beginning of the quarter.
Omitted Variable Bias
So far my examinations address endogeneity issue in the baseline result. How-
ever, my finding may still suffer from unobservable firm characteristics that is
omitted in the panel regressions. To address the potential omitted variable bias,
I further include advisor fixed effects in the panel regression to account for time-
invariant unobservable firm characteristics that affect fund flows.
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Table 2.7 reports the result of panel regressions with advisor fixed effects.
I find that introducing advisor fixed effects reduces both statistical significance
and economic magnitude of the main explanatory variable Mutual Fund Miscon-
duct Dummy. The result shows a reduction of 1.4% in aggregate flows over the
next 6 months following misconduct. It indicates that under rather strict condi-
tions, the negative effect of misconduct on flows is still statistically significant
over a short-term period.
In sum, the result of robustness checks confirms the finding that mutual fund
advisory misconduct plays a significant part in affecting fund flows, and the
relationship holds even after excluding 2003-2005 market timing/late trading
scandals. The negative impact remains qualitatively similar when the analysis
is conducted at quarterly frequency, and when omitted variable bias is partially
addressed with advisor fixed effects.
2.4 Further Discussions
2.4.1 Fees and Contractual Incentives
The economic consequences of mutual fund advisory misconduct are not limit-
ed to fund flows. Additional analysis on the changes in advisory contracting is
of paramount interest as well. As a usual business practice, mutual fund com-
panies negotiate with advisors on specific contract terms for fees and incentives,
which in turn has profound implications for advisors’ investment decisions.
The bargaining process between the two parties gives rise to several testable
hypothesis. First, as a counteracting measure to reduce outflows, we expect
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to find increased marketing expenditures. In other words, mutual fund com-
panies are going to allocate more resources to marketing activities, leading to
increased 12b-1 fees. Second, contractual incentives are expected to decrease af-
ter advisory misconduct in order to discourage advisors from inflating portfolio
returns through misconduct, such as inappropriate investments with excessive
risk. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Massa and Patgiri (2009) find that funds
with high-incentive contracts deliver persistently higher risk-adjusted return-
s, and high-incentive contracts induce advisors to take excessive risk and put
funds’ survival in peril. Warner and Wu (2011) also documents compensation
reductions by fund families involved in 2003-2005 market timing scandals.
To measure contractual incentives, I follow the definition in Massa and
Patgiri (2009) for Cole’s Incentive Rate (Cole’s IR), Weighted Incentive Rate
(Weighed IR) and Dollar Incentive Rate (Dollar IR). These incentive measures
capture the shape, in particular, the concavity of the compensation contract.
First, Cole’s IR is calculated as difference between the last and first fee rates (N-
SAR Item 48) over the effective fee rate.21 It equals zero for funds with linear
compensation rates and is negative for funds with concave inventive contracts.
Second, Weighted IR is calculated as asset-weighted average of the fee rate di-
vided by the first applicable fee rate. It equals one for a linearly compensated
contract and less than one for a concave incentive contract. Finally, Dollar IR is
calculated as difference between the last and the first fee rate multiplied by total
net assets of the fund times the flow-performance sensitivity of mutual funds
belonging to the same investment style in a given year. It measure the absolute
dollar value advisors receive from fund flows resulting from a 1% increase in
21The first and last fee rates stand for the fee rate for the first and last asset bracket in the Item
48. Effective fee rate is effective marginal compensation rate based on current net assets of the
fund, calculated as actual gross advisory fee advisor receives scaled by total net assets.
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portfolio returns. All three contractual incentive variables increase along with
incentive schemes.22
Table 2.8 provides regression result of changes in fees and contractual in-
centives following mutual fund advisory misconduct. The analysis is done at
fund-year level, because the decision to revise the contract terms are made by
the mutual fund companies for each fund, thus aggregating these outcome mea-
sures at advisor level would reduce a lot of variations. I add fund and year fixed
effects to account for time-invariant firm characteristics and general pattern of
business cycles.
Column (1)-(3) of Table 2.8 report the effect of mutual fund advisory miscon-
duct on fees, in particular, the marketing expenditures. The result shows that
mutual fund companies tend to raise marketing expenditures for funds man-
aged by malfeasant advisors, through increased 12b-1 fees. Specifically, funds
managed by malfeasant advisors have a 0.3 percentage point increase in 12b-
1 fee. This may be a reaction aimed to neutralize reputation damage to the
mutual fund companies. Further decomposition of 12b-1 fee in Column (2)-(3)
shows that the increase in marketing effort is attributed to higher payment to
underwriters. The proportion of 12b-1 fee paid to underwriters increases by 0.7
percentage point, with t-statistics of 4, while proportion paid to broker/dealer
declines by 0.2 percentage point.23 The result from changes in fees demonstrates
the capabilities of marketing efforts in mitigating adverse impact of advisory
misconduct.
22The mean of Cole’s IR, Weighted IR, and Dollar IR is -0.08, 0.96 and -5.75 respectively, quan-
titatively similar to Massa and Patgiri (2009).
23Underwriters act as representatives between mutual funds and third parties selling funds.
Apart from payments to underwriters and brokers/dealers, I find no significant changes in
other parts of 12b-1 fees, including fees paid for advertising, sales personnel and others.
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In Column (4)-(6), for all three incentive ratios, I find a significant reduction
in contractual incentives following advisory misconduct. For instance, advisors
committing advisory misconduct in year t experience nearly 6% reduction in
Cole’s IR for funds under management in the subsequent year, indicating a large
effect of misconduct on incentive schemes. In similar vein, result in Column (5)-
(6) shows that there is a 0.18% (15%) reduction in Weighted (Dollar) Incentive
Rate in the year following misconduct. The result of changes in contractual
incentives lends support to the significant and sizable effect of mutual fund
advisory misconduct on funds’ incentive schemes.
2.4.2 Investment Restrictions
Next, I examine how investment restrictions change and how various invest-
ment vehicles are actually used following advisory misconduct. Primarily there
are two competing hypotheses concerning investment restrictions. On one
hand, the disciplinary hypothesis postulates that mutual fund companies gener-
ally impose stricter investment restrictions to restrain portfolio managers from
excessive speculation following misconduct. In this case, there is higher likeli-
hood of explicit restrictions on derivative products in their investment policies.
On the other hand, the hedging hypothesis proposes that mutual fund compa-
nies would allow for more freedom on the use of complex vehicles following
misconduct, because derivatives help hedge against unfavorable price impact
due to potential asset fire sales. Under hedging hypothesis, mutual fund com-
panies tend to relax investment restrictions to allow for trading derivative prod-
ucts.
To test these two competing hypotheses, I estimate the following linear prob-
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ability model with fund-year observations from 2000-2013:24
Restrictioni, j,t+1 =α + βMutual Fund Misconduct Dummyi,t + γXi,t + δs + θt + i,t
Usagei, j,t+1 =α + βMutual Fund Misconduct Dummyi,t + γXi,t + δs + θt + i,t
(2.6)
where the dependent variable Restrictioni, j,t+1 and Usagei, j,t+1 denotes prohibition
and actual usage of investment vehicle j for fund i in year t+1, respectively. The
investment vehicles include options, futures, and foreign equities. I obtain the
information of investment restrictions and actual usage from N-SAR Item 70.
Both models include fund style and year fixed effects. If mutual fund advisory
misconduct leads to prohibiting investment restrictions and actual investment
in vehicle j, we expect to find a positive and significant β.
Table 2.9 provides result of linear probability model of investment restric-
tions and actual usage of investment vehicles on mutual fund advisory miscon-
duct. From Column (1)-(3), I find that following advisory misconduct there is
a reduction in probability of investment restrictions on option, futures and for-
eign equities. It suggests that mutual fund companies tend to relax investment
restrictions on some investment vehicles to enable hedging activities. This is in
line with the findings of Natter et al. (2016) and Evans, Ferreira, and Porras Pra-
do (2017a), which contend that less restrictive investment policies help reduce
portfolio risk and expand feasible investment space for fund managers. Simi-
larly, Column (4)-(6) shows that there is higher likelihood of actual investment
in options and foreign equities following misconduct. It suggests that these ve-
hicles are more likely to be used to realize the hedging purpose.25
24The result of Logit model is quantitatively similar and is available upon request.
25There are several prior studies concerning the effect of derivative usage on mutual fund per-
formance. Although Clifford et al. (2014) finds that using complex investment vehicles does not
necessarily lead to higher mutual fund performance, Natter et al. (2016) demonstrates that bond
funds using options have higher risk-adjusted returns, mainly due to superior investment ca-
pabilities. Besides, Almazan et al. (2004) argues that investment restrictions are more prevalent
when it is difficult or less economically feasible to monitor managerial behaviors directly.
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2.4.3 Advising Relationships
The responses of mutual fund companies to alleviate the negative impact of
advisory misconduct are not limited to revising specific contract terms. It has
been shown that the advisory misconduct imposes a significant negative impact
on fund flows, resulting in pressure on the revenues of mutual fund compa-
nies as it reduces fund’s total net assets. Therefore, it is a natural extension to
examine how misconduct affects advising relationships between advisors and
mutual fund companies. More specifically, when the costs of associating with
malfeasant advisors outweigh the benefits, mutual fund companies will go be-
yond changing contract terms. Instead, they would replace the current advisors
with new ones in order to restore profitability. To test this hypothesis, I estimate
the following linear probability/Logit model with fund-year observations from
2000-2013:
Replacementi,t+1 =α + βMutual Fund Misconduct Dummyi,t + γXi,t + δs + θt + i,t (2.7)
where the dependent variable Replacementi,t+1 is an indicator equal to one if the
current fund advisor for fund i is replaced by a new advisor in year t + 1. The
model includes fund style and year fixed effects. If mutual fund advisory mis-
conduct is associated with higher likelihood of advisor replacement, we would
expect to find a positive and significant coefficient β.
Table 2.10 provides the result of linear probability and Lgoit model of ad-
visor replacement on mutual fund advisory misconduct. The coefficient of the
main explanatory variable Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy in Column (1)-(2)
is about 0.013, with t-statistics over 3. It suggests that advisors who commit-
s mutual fund advisory misconduct in year t are associated with 1.3% higher
probability of being replaced in year t + 1. Therefore, the result is supportive of
the hypothesis that mutual fund companies protect themselves by disassociat-
ing with malfeasant advisors.
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2.4.4 Advisor Survival
Since mutual fund companies tend to replace malfeasant advisors following
misconduct, advisors thus face greater uncertainty in maintaining current ad-
vising relationships, making it more difficult to provide investment advisory
services and sustain profitability in the future. Therefore, I hypothesize that ad-
visors with recent advisory misconduct are more likely to go out of business.
To test this hypothesis, I estimate the following linear probability/Logit model
with advisor-year observations from 2000-2013:
Exiti,t+1 = α + βMutual Fund Misconduct Dummyi,t + γXi,t + θt + i,t (2.8)
where the dependent variable Exiti,t+1 takes two forms: business closure and
takeover. Form ADV-W contains detailed de-registration information for in-
vestment advisors, including the reason for withdrawal from SEC registration.
I define Closure as an indicator equals one if the withdrawal reason is “firm no
longer in business or closing business”, and zero otherwise; and Takeover as an
indicator equals one if the reason for de-registration is “firm sold, acquired, or
merged with another investment adviser firm” or “withdrawing due to a suc-
cession”, and zero otherwise.26 The model includes year fixed effects.
Table 2.11 reports result of linear probability and Logit model of advisors’
business failure on mutual fund advisory misconduct. I find significantly high-
er probability of business failure for malfeasant advisors, through either M&A
or succession, with coefficient of 0.0302 in Column (2), which is statistically sig-
nificant at 10% level. Similar finding can be found in Column (4), in which the
coefficient is highly significant at 1% level. In terms of economic magnitude, it
indicates that mutual fund advisory misconduct in year t leads to 3% increase
26After October 2009, Form ADV-W adopts a new form version which classifies the reason
for withdrawn in 14 categories. However, prior to October 2009 Form ADV doesn’t have check
boxes for withdrawn reason. Thus I use textual analysis to classify the open-ended responses
into the same 14 categories to keep consistent over time.
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in probability of acquisition (succession) in year t + 1. The economic magnitude
demonstrates a large negative effect of advisory misconduct on advisors’ firm
survival. Interestingly, I find no significant effect of misconduct on the probabil-
ity of business closure, literally the physical shutdown of the firm. It suggests
that absorbing malfeasant advisors with fading brand names becomes popular
in the mutual fund industry. A possible explanation is that the malfeasant advi-
sors are potential targets of M&A/succession, as their client networks and other
facilities are still valuable to other competitors.
2.4.5 Advisor Performance
The previous section has shown that advisory misconduct is followed by sig-
nificant reduction in fund netflows. In this section I examine whether advisory
misconduct adversely affect advisors’ performance. The effect of advisory mis-
conduct on portfolio performance is partially due to asset fire sales, liquidating
securities on short notice at unfavorable prices. The significant outflows follow-
ing misconduct create greater redemption pressure, forcing portfolio managers
to sell a portion of assets beyond the cash reserve to meet liquidity needs, result-
ing in higher transaction cost and lower portfolio returns. It is also due to loss
of talented fund managers, as those involved in the misconduct will be fired
quickly Egan et al. (2016).
Table 2.12 reports regression result of advisors’ future aggregate returns on
mutual fund advisory misconduct. I find that mutual fund advisory miscon-
duct is associated with 3.8% lower advisors’ returns in the next year, which is
significant at 10% level. The effect grows even larger with 8.3% reduction in
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cumulative returns in the next two years following misconduct. It indicates that
advisory misconduct not only damages advisors’ revenue by reducing the size
of assets under management, but also causes economic losses for fund investors
through lower fund returns.27 Moreover, I split the sample into market upturns
and downturns, where the market upturn is defined as period from 2003-2006
and 2009-2013, while the market downturn is defined as period from 2000-2002
and 2007-2008. I find that the return underperformance of malfeasant advi-
sors mostly occurs during market upturn, which is consistent with the previous
finding that mutual fund companies tend to relax investment restrictions to en-
able portfolio hedging activities, thus imposing limit on the upside potential for
portfolio returns in a up-trending market.
Overall, I find that to mitigate the negative effect of mutual fund adviso-
ry misconduct on fund flows, mutual fund companies tend to raise marketing
expenditures, reduce contractual incentives and relax investment restrictions in
the subsequent years. Advisory misconduct also adversely affects advising rela-
tionships and advisor survival. Fund investors suffer economically from lower
fund returns following misconduct.
2.5 Conclusion
Financial misconduct has been widely recognized as one of the important issues
in the asset management industry. I comprehensively evaluates the economic
consequences of advisory misconduct by estimating the effect of publicly dis-
27I do not use TNA-weighted average of fund alpha because it involves rolling estimation
using monthly fund returns from CRSP Mutual Fund Database. To address this concern, I also
test the hypothesis using fund-year observations with fund style-year fixed effects, and the
result is quantitative similar.
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closed regulatory actions of mutual fund advisors on fund flows. A novel Form
ADV database is used to collect a broad set of mutual fund advisory misconduc-
t cases, which includes other types of misconduct not covered by the previous
literature. In addition to investigating investors’ response to misconduct, I al-
so examine how mutual fund companies react to mitigate the adverse effect of
misconduct on flows. To address the potential endogeneity of misconduct, I
conduct an event study around the SEC electronic filing mandate that signifi-
cantly increased the transparency of advisory misconduct.
I find a significant negative effect of mutual fund advisory misconduct on
fund flows. The full-sample panel regression shows a 5% reduction in fund
flows to malfeasant advisors in one year following the misconduct. The effect
is economically sizeable and statistically significant, and is also persistent over
the subsequent 24 months, mainly through increased outflows. In addition,
event study using the SEC electronic filing mandate offers new evidence on the
causal effect of advisory misconduct on fund flows. The SEC mandate effective
in January 2001 creates a positive shock to the information transparency for reg-
istered investment advisors. Based on a matched sample, I find that advisors
with historical misconduct records witness an 18% reduction in flows in one
year following the mandate. This is the first paper that uses such a policy shock
in the quasi-natural experiment setting. It also demonstrates the significance of
information disclosure in fighting against misconduct.
Apart from investors’ response to mutual fund advisory misconduct, I also
examine how mutual fund companies react to mitigate the adverse effect of mis-
conduct on flows. In particular, I find that following misconduct, mutual fund
companies tend to raise marketing expenditures, reduce contractual incentives
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and relax investment restrictions for investment vehicles such as options, fu-
tures and foreign equities. The malfeasant advisors face more vulnerable advis-
ing relationships and higher likelihood of business failure. Investors also suffer
economically from lower portfolio returns as a result of misconduct. Overall,
my paper highlights the significant impact of misconduct on fund flows and
advisory contracting in the mutual fund industry.
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Figure 2.1: Organization Structure of Mutual Fund Advisory Business
This figure shows a typical organization structure of mutual fund advisory business. Note that mutual fund advisor
may provide portfolio management for single or multiple mutual fund companies.
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Figure 2.2: Mutual Fund Advisory Misconduct Cases Over Time
This figure reports time-series frequency of mutual fund advisory misconduct cases from 2001 to 2013 by case initi-
ation date. The mutual fund advisory misconduct is defined as malfeasant behaviors on mutual funds that leads to
disciplinary actions from regulatory agencies. The detailed misconduct information is obtained from the Regulatory
Disclosure Reporting Page of Form ADV.
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(c) Outflows
Figure 2.3: Effect of Mutual Fund Advisory Misconduct on Flows
This figure reports the coefficient estimates of Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy (solid) and the 95% confidence interval
(dash) in Table 2.3 from month t=1 to 24, where month t=0 denotes the time when mutual fund advisory misconduct
case occurs. Panel A-Panel C shows result for netflows, inflows and outflows, respectively.
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(c) Treatment Effect
Figure 2.4: Advisors’ Cumulative Aggregate Flows Around The Mandate
This figure shows cumulative average advisors’ aggregate netflows around the SEC electronic filing mandate effective
in January 2001. The treatment group is defined as advisors with at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct case
reported in the Form ADV as of January 2001, while control group includes advisors without any mutual fund advisory
misconduct case as of the same point in time. Panel A plots cumulative average advisors’ aggregate netflows for the
unmatched sample, Panel B plots cumulative average advisors’ aggregate netflows for the matched sample, and Panel
C plots coefficient estimates (solid) and the 95% confidence interval (dash) of interaction terms Montht × Treatmenti,t in
the following regression:
Flowsi,t =α + δTreatmenti,t +
12∑
t=−12
{βtMontht × Treatmenti,t + γtMontht} + i,t
where Flowsi,t is cumulative aggregate netflows of advisor i from month t =-12 up to month t. Event date t=0 is set to
be the base period and thus is omitted. The regression is estimated based on the matched sample. Standard errors are
clustered by advisor and month.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the variables from 2000 to 2013. Annual N-SAR filings of all mutual funds
are matched with Form ADV based on SEC number and advisor name. Netflow is monthly total NAV of shares sold
less total NAV of shares redeemed (N-SAR Item 28), scaled by total net assets (N-SAR Item 75). Inflow is monthly total
NAV of shares sold scaled by total net assets, and Outflow is monthly total NAV of shares redeemed scaled by total net
assets. Return is annual mutual fund return calculated using NAV and distributions. Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy
equals one if an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct case in month t, and zero otherwise.
Ln(Fund TNA) is log of fund’s total net assets. Ln(Fund Age) is log of years since fund’s inception in N-SAR. Expense
Ratio is the percentage of total expenses (N-SAR Item 72-X) over total net assets. Front-End Load is percentage of total
front-end sales loads collected from sales over total net assets. Redemption Fee is percentage of total amount deferred or
contingent deferred sales loads and redemption fees over total net assets. Ln(Fund Family TNA) is log of total net assets
of fund family, where fund family identifiers are obtained from N-SAR Item 19. Investment style variables in Panel A
are dummy variables corresponding to each investment style, while in Panel B they are percentage of fund net assets
belonging to certain investment style in aggregate net assets managed by an advisor. Detailed variable definitions are
shown in the Appendix A.8.
Panel A: Fund Level
N Mean S.D. Q10 Q25 Median Q75 Q90
Netflow % 1176555 0.79 7.72 -3.01 -1.14 0.00 1.38 5.08
Inflow % 1176555 6.55 16.18 0.00 0.53 1.72 4.55 14.45
Outflow % 1176555 5.89 14.85 0.00 0.81 1.77 3.53 11.36
Return % 721024 2.74 24.50 -24.83 -4.77 1.88 13.53 28.12
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy 1176555 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fund TNA (Billion $) 1161735 1.28 5.04 0.02 0.06 0.21 0.74 2.36
Fund Age 1176555 5.16 4.15 1.00 2.00 4.00 7.00 11.00
Expense Ratio % 1155263 1.17 1.07 0.27 0.60 0.95 1.39 2.09
Front-End Load % 1155263 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
Redemption Fee % 1155263 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Fund Family TNA (Billion $) 1172200 145.86 315.90 0.11 2.93 34.35 115.88 318.08
Domestic Bond 1176555 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Equity-Capital Appr’n 1176555 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Equity-Growth and Income 1176555 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Equity-Total Return % 1176555 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Balanced 1176555 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Equity Index 1176555 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bond Index 1176555 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign Equity 1176555 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign Bond 1176555 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Others 1176555 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Panel B: Advisor Level
N Mean S.D. Q10 Q25 Median Q75 Q90
Netflow % 92398 0.71 5.02 -2.22 -0.68 0.00 1.12 3.69
Inflow % 92398 6.59 13.79 0.00 0.56 2.18 5.38 16.14
Outflow % 92398 5.92 12.76 0.00 0.69 1.96 4.24 14.30
Return % 75592 2.69 21.23 -22.64 -5.73 3.46 13.04 24.04
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy 92398 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total TNA (Billion $) 92398 20.34 84.16 0.02 0.10 0.83 6.86 40.91
Total Employees (1,000) 92206 0.22 1.08 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.38
Total Clients (1,000) 91973 3.18 29.36 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.38 2.00
Total Accounts (1,000) 92046 19.79 1461.58 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.45 2.66
Firm Branches 92398 2.63 15.35 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00
Firm Age 92398 6.89 3.78 2.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 12.00
Domestic Bond 92398 0.22 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.83
Equity-Capital Appr’n 92398 0.24 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 1.00
Equity-Growth and Income 92398 0.18 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.93
Equity-Total Return 92398 0.06 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12
Balanced 92398 0.04 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
Equity Index 92398 0.09 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.27
Bond Index 92398 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign Equity 92398 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Foreign Bond 92398 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Others 92398 0.12 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.45
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Table 2.2: Predicting Mutual Fund Advisory Misconduct
This table provides result of linear probability and Logit model for predicting mutual fund advisory misconduct. The
sample consists of advisor-year observations from 2000 to 2013. The dependent variable is an indicator equals to one if
an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct case in year t + 1. The explanatory variables include
Past Mutual Fund Misconduct, a dummy variable equals one if an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory
misconduct in year t; Past Affiliated Mutual Fund Misconduct, a dummy variable equals one if the mutual fund advisory
misconduct is committed by an advisor affiliate in year t; Past Regulatory, a dummy variable equals one if an advisor
files a regulatory disclosure reporting page (DRP) in year t; Past Civil or Criminal, a dummy variable equals one if an
advisor files a criminal or civil DRP in year t; Regional Misconduct Intensity, defined as total number of historical mutual
fund advisory misconduct as of year t scaled by the population in a Zipcode region. Detailed definitions of other control
variables are provided in Appendix A.8. Both models include year fixed effects, and report original coefficient estimates.
The R2 for LPM is adjusted R2, while the R2 for Logit model is pseudo R2. The robust t-statistics clustered by advisor
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
LPM Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Past Mutual Fund Misconduct 0.0225 0.0138 0.4123 0.4667
(0.660) (0.379) (0.772) (0.714)
Past Affiliated Mutual Fund Misconduct -0.0364 -0.0421 -0.7463 -1.2452
(-0.717) (-0.682) (-0.643) (-0.660)
Past Regulatory 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.0340∗∗∗ 1.8696∗∗∗ 1.8234∗∗∗
(4.884) (4.483) (5.512) (5.263)
Past Civil or Criminal 0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0349∗∗ 0.7613∗∗∗ 0.8903∗∗∗
(2.701) (2.551) (2.745) (3.121)
Regional Misconduct Intensity 0.0149∗∗ 0.1532
(2.281) (1.132)
Lagged Returns 0.0051 0.0093 0.4946 0.8086
(0.522) (0.885) (0.637) (1.045)
Lagged Flows -0.0215 -0.0194 -1.3966 -1.4386
(-0.547) (-0.476) (-0.654) (-0.620)
Interest in Transaction -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0351 0.0007
(-0.181) (-0.178) (0.103) (0.002)
Referral Fees 0.0011 0.0024 0.2134 0.3329
(0.248) (0.532) (0.685) (1.019)
Soft Dollars 0.0007 0.0010 0.0725 0.0507
(0.177) (0.233) (0.153) (0.106)
Broker in Firm 0.0022 0.0035 0.6354 0.7658
(0.720) (1.138) (1.416) (1.566)
Custody 0.0071 0.0081 0.2962 0.3780
(1.093) (1.220) (0.947) (1.106)
Ln(Total AUM) 0.0035∗∗ 0.0027∗ 0.2253∗∗∗ 0.2043∗∗
(2.224) (1.758) (2.649) (2.406)
Ln(Avg. Acc. Size) -0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0635 -0.0484
(-1.144) (-0.894) (-0.833) (-0.616)
Percent Client Agents 0.0001 0.0001 0.0071 0.0072
(1.422) (1.220) (1.313) (1.273)
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0062 -0.0055 -0.4063 -0.2708
(-1.052) (-0.875) (-0.819) (-0.445)
Avg. Flows to Fund Style -0.0453 -0.0271 -1.2348 -0.0629
(-1.291) (-0.754) (-0.659) (-0.033)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 4598 4178 4598 4178
Number of Advisors 786 732 786 732
R2 0.04 0.04 0.22 0.23
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Table 2.3: Mutual Fund Advisory Misconduct and Advisors’ Aggregate Flows
This table provides panel regression result of advisors’ cumulative monthly aggregate flows on mutual fund advisory
misconduct. The sample consists of advisor-month observations from 2000 to 2013. The dependent variable in Panel
A is cumulative aggregate advisors’ netflows from month t up to month t + n (n=1,2,3,6,12,18,24), where the aggregate
advisors’ netflows are defined as the gross netflows over gross TNA of mutual funds managed by a particular advisor.
The dependent variable in Panel B and C is inflows and outflows, respectively. The main explanatory variable Mutual
Fund Misconduct Dummy equals one if an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct case in month
t, and zero otherwise. Ln(Past Monetary Fine) is log of monetary fine associated with all misconduct of an advisor as of
month t. Lagged Returns is TNA-weighted average returns of all funds managed by an advisor in last year. Lagged Flows is
aggregate netflows of an advisor in month t. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.8. All regressions
include month fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered by advisor and month are reported in parentheses. ***, **
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Netflows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
t+1 (t+1,t+2) (t+1,t+3) (t+1,t+6) (t+1,t+12) (t+1,t+18) (t+1,t+24)
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy -0.0036∗ -0.0094∗∗ -0.0162∗∗∗ -0.0269∗∗∗ -0.0477∗∗∗ -0.0650∗∗∗ -0.0603∗∗
(-1.67) (-2.55) (-3.49) (-3.47) (-3.21) (-3.01) (-2.14)
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0025
(-0.94) (-1.01) (-1.03) (-1.11) (-1.02) (-0.93) (-1.05)
Lagged Returns 0.0021 0.0046 0.0073 0.0181∗ 0.0341 0.0212 0.0149
(1.36) (1.46) (1.49) (1.69) (1.52) (0.66) (0.34)
Lagged Flows 0.4859∗∗∗ 0.9145∗∗∗ 1.3220∗∗∗ 2.3851∗∗∗ 4.3020∗∗∗ 6.0046∗∗∗ 7.5396∗∗∗
(8.12) (7.27) (6.81) (5.68) (4.64) (4.10) (3.72)
Expense Ratio -0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0036∗∗∗ -0.0071∗∗∗ -0.0120∗∗ -0.0186∗∗ -0.0283∗∗
(-4.04) (-4.16) (-4.16) (-3.67) (-2.27) (-2.42) (-2.56)
Front-End Load 0.0061∗∗ 0.0123∗ 0.0180∗ 0.0328 0.0572 0.0680 0.0704
(2.03) (1.93) (1.84) (1.57) (1.20) (0.91) (0.71)
Redemption Fee 0.0140 0.0275 0.0354 0.0403 -0.0087 0.0094 -0.1316
(1.05) (0.96) (0.79) (0.42) (-0.04) (0.03) (-0.31)
Ln(Total AUM) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0006
(-0.30) (-0.35) (-0.38) (-0.22) (-0.06) (-0.03) (0.07)
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0045∗∗∗ -0.0094∗∗∗ -0.0149∗∗∗ -0.0309∗∗∗ -0.0648∗∗∗ -0.1003∗∗∗ -0.1329∗∗∗
(-3.78) (-3.66) (-3.72) (-3.65) (-3.28) (-3.53) (-3.41)
Avg. Flows to Fund Style 0.1491∗∗∗ 0.2985∗∗ 0.4180∗∗ 0.5973 0.9902 0.9754 0.4198
(2.61) (2.50) (2.28) (1.54) (1.11) (0.70) (0.21)
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 74236 73130 72032 68808 62573 57232 52062
Number of Advisors 1023 1021 1012 1000 872 857 759
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.28
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Panel B: Inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
t+1 (t+1,t+2) (t+1,t+3) (t+1,t+6) (t+1,t+12) (t+1,t+18) (t+1,t+24)
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy -0.0020 -0.0081 -0.0152∗ -0.0244∗ -0.0364 -0.0388 -0.0129
(-0.68) (-1.24) (-1.94) (-1.91) (-1.25) (-0.89) (-0.21)
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0026 -0.0043
(-0.57) (-0.84) (-0.94) (-1.11) (-1.05) (-1.17) (-1.35)
Lagged Returns 0.0007 0.0025 0.0050 0.0150 0.0350 0.0240 0.0288
(0.32) (0.53) (0.66) (0.90) (1.13) (0.51) (0.43)
Lagged Flows 0.4742∗∗∗ 0.7776∗∗∗ 1.0169∗∗∗ 1.4862∗∗∗ 2.3227∗∗∗ 2.9280∗∗∗ 3.3241∗∗
(11.68) (7.89) (6.35) (4.39) (3.35) (2.81) (2.44)
Expense Ratio -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0034∗∗∗ -0.0053∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗ -0.0247∗∗ -0.0361∗∗
(-4.54) (-4.34) (-4.25) (-3.65) (-2.30) (-2.38) (-2.45)
Front-End Load 0.0069∗∗ 0.0164∗∗ 0.0271∗∗ 0.0573∗∗ 0.1095∗ 0.1510 0.1852
(2.20) (2.23) (2.28) (2.13) (1.77) (1.58) (1.47)
Redemption Fee 0.0127 0.0288 0.0409 0.0571 0.0032 0.0236 -0.1023
(0.98) (0.93) (0.81) (0.50) (0.01) (0.06) (-0.19)
Ln(Total AUM) -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0029 -0.0038 -0.0039
(-0.09) (-0.44) (-0.64) (-0.69) (-0.58) (-0.45) (-0.31)
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0047∗∗∗ -0.0108∗∗∗ -0.0180∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ -0.0890∗∗∗ -0.1320∗∗∗ -0.1639∗∗∗
(-3.39) (-3.34) (-3.42) (-3.44) (-3.10) (-3.45) (-3.23)
Avg. Flows to Fund Style 0.2710∗∗∗ 0.5774∗∗∗ 0.8820∗∗∗ 1.5656∗∗∗ 2.5287∗∗ 2.8908∗ 2.4415
(4.74) (4.44) (4.16) (3.32) (2.29) (1.67) (1.02)
Contemporaneous Outflows 0.5266∗∗∗ 0.6210∗∗∗ 0.6771∗∗∗ 0.7771∗∗∗ 0.8365∗∗∗ 0.8690∗∗∗ 0.8958∗∗∗
(12.92) (12.31) (12.23) (13.09) (13.71) (14.16) (14.98)
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 74236 73130 72032 68808 62573 57232 52062
Number of Advisors 1023 1021 1012 1000 872 857 759
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95
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Panel C: Outflows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
t+1 (t+1,t+2) (t+1,t+3) (t+1,t+6) (t+1,t+12) (t+1,t+18) (t+1,t+24)
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy 0.0053 0.0152∗ 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0910∗∗ 0.1002∗∗ 0.0811
(1.33) (1.88) (2.64) (2.67) (2.60) (2.06) (1.32)
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) 0.0002∗∗ 0.0003∗∗ 0.0005∗∗ 0.0012∗∗ 0.0026∗ 0.0043∗ 0.0065∗
(2.08) (2.03) (1.99) (2.09) (1.88) (1.87) (1.88)
Lagged Returns -0.0039∗∗ -0.0087∗∗ -0.0142∗∗ -0.0334∗∗ -0.0674∗∗ -0.0762∗ -0.0900
(-2.03) (-2.04) (-2.14) (-2.48) (-2.53) (-1.92) (-1.61)
Lagged Flows 0.4477∗∗∗ 0.7809∗∗∗ 1.0867∗∗∗ 1.8073∗∗∗ 2.9985∗∗∗ 3.8810∗∗∗ 4.5497∗∗∗
(12.44) (9.06) (7.68) (5.85) (4.56) (3.90) (3.50)
Expense Ratio 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0105∗ 0.0152∗ 0.0224∗
(2.64) (2.64) (2.80) (2.63) (1.76) (1.73) (1.79)
Front-End Load -0.0117∗∗∗ -0.0237∗∗∗ -0.0364∗∗∗ -0.0732∗∗∗ -0.1490∗∗∗ -0.2078∗∗∗ -0.2493∗∗
(-3.84) (-3.40) (-3.46) (-3.26) (-2.99) (-2.69) (-2.43)
Redemption Fee -0.0217∗ -0.0449∗ -0.0664 -0.1044 -0.1605 -0.2413 -0.2435
(-1.87) (-1.72) (-1.63) (-1.17) (-0.82) (-0.81) (-0.62)
Ln(Total AUM) 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗ 0.0079∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0158∗∗
(2.66) (2.63) (2.62) (2.43) (2.29) (2.20) (2.04)
Ln(Firm Age) 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.0739∗∗∗ 0.1097∗∗∗ 0.1370∗∗∗
(3.53) (3.27) (3.34) (3.33) (3.04) (3.28) (3.03)
Avg. Flows to Fund Style -0.2586∗∗∗ -0.5610∗∗∗ -0.8506∗∗∗ -1.5472∗∗∗ -2.8672∗∗∗ -3.9189∗∗ -4.4379∗∗
(-3.86) (-4.09) (-4.10) (-3.49) (-2.81) (-2.48) (-2.07)
Contemporaneous Inflows 0.4878∗∗∗ 0.5426∗∗∗ 0.5708∗∗∗ 0.6310∗∗∗ 0.6812∗∗∗ 0.7138∗∗∗ 0.7398∗∗∗
(12.89) (11.86) (11.34) (11.25) (11.09) (11.19) (11.56)
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 74236 73130 72032 68808 62573 57232 52062
Number of Advisors 1023 1021 1012 1000 872 857 759
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95
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Table 2.4: Aggregate Fund Flows Around The SEC Electronic Filing Mandate
This table provides estimate of cumulative treatment effect for the SEC electronic filing mandate. The sample consists of
advisor-month observations from 2000-2001. The dependent variable is advisors’ cumulative aggregate netflows from
month t = −12 up to month t. The main explanatory variables Treatment*Qtr is interaction terms between Treatment, a
dummy variable equals one for an advisor with at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct case in Form ADV as of
January 2001, and zero otherwise; and a series of quarter dummies from quarter -4 to +4. The Panel A reports result for
the unmatched sample, while Panel B reports result for the matched sample, where each treatment advisor is matched
to multiple control advisors based on assets under management. Panel C reports result for testing covariates balance
before and after the match. Panel D reports result of a placebo test for the matched sample in which the event date is set
to be January 1998. All regressions include quarter dummy variables. The additional controls include log of advisor’s
total AUM, log of firm age, log of past monetary fine, average fund returns and average flows to fund style, and are not
reported. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.8. The robust t-statistics clustered by advisor and
month are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Unmatched Sample
Netflow Inflow Outflow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -0.0763∗ -0.1706∗ 1.2425∗∗ 0.8205∗ 1.3119∗∗∗ 0.9142∗
(-1.96) (-1.79) (2.65) (1.75) (2.90) (2.03)
Treatment*Qtr(-4,-3) 0.0371 0.2033∗∗ -0.9823∗∗∗ -0.7324∗∗ -1.0222∗∗∗ -0.8774∗∗
(1.53) (2.24) (-2.82) (-2.13) (-2.95) (-2.56)
Treatment*Qtr(-3,-2) -0.0214 0.1639∗ -0.6142∗∗∗ -0.2875 -0.5969∗∗∗ -0.3980∗
(-1.03) (1.92) (-3.41) (-1.27) (-3.37) (-1.80)
Treatment*Qtr(-2,-1) -0.0346∗∗ 0.1451∗ -0.3266∗∗∗ 0.0040 -0.2955∗∗∗ -0.0877
(-2.39) (1.86) (-5.28) (0.03) (-4.60) (-0.57)
Treatment*Qtr(-1,0) -0.0377∗∗∗ 0.1427∗ -0.1263∗∗∗ 0.2261∗ -0.0932∗∗∗ 0.1338
(-3.06) (1.93) (-3.45) (1.91) (-2.91) (1.11)
Treatment*Qtr(0,+1) -0.0302∗∗∗ -0.0251 0.1391 0.1045 0.1711 0.1340
(-2.93) (-1.26) (1.10) (0.71) (1.39) (0.95)
Treatment*Qtr(+1,+2) -0.0796∗∗∗ -0.0567∗∗ 0.3520∗ 0.3367 0.4293∗∗ 0.3959∗
(-4.09) (-2.40) (1.88) (1.70) (2.34) (2.04)
Treatment*Qtr(+2,+3) -0.1096∗∗∗ -0.0926∗∗∗ 0.5019∗∗ 0.4404∗ 0.6060∗∗ 0.5341∗∗
(-4.39) (-3.39) (2.16) (1.86) (2.64) (2.26)
Treatment*Qtr(+3,+4) -0.1341∗∗∗ -0.1037∗∗∗ 0.7561∗∗ 0.7703∗∗ 0.8744∗∗∗ 0.8681∗∗∗
(-5.29) (-3.96) (2.64) (2.62) (3.09) (2.97)
Quarter Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Controls N Y N Y N Y
Observations 12473 9859 12473 9859 12473 9859
Number of Advisors 598 537 598 537 598 537
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.14
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Panel B: Matched Sample
Netflow Inflow Outflow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -0.0344 0.0398 1.0693∗∗ 0.7457 1.0756∗∗ 0.6859
(-0.68) (0.70) (2.18) (1.65) (2.27) (1.59)
Treatment*Qtr(-4,-3) 0.0265 0.0241 -0.8397∗∗ -0.4580 -0.8455∗∗ -0.4530
(0.79) (0.52) (-2.31) (-1.27) (-2.34) (-1.28)
Treatment*Qtr(-3,-2) -0.0057 0.0083 -0.5038∗∗ -0.0555 -0.4824∗∗ -0.0429
(-0.21) (0.19) (-2.63) (-0.20) (-2.58) (-0.16)
Treatment*Qtr(-2,-1) -0.0134 -0.0073 -0.2516∗∗∗ 0.2313 -0.2305∗∗∗ 0.2460
(-0.60) (-0.20) (-3.79) (0.94) (-3.37) (1.00)
Treatment*Qtr(-1,0) -0.0032 0.0042 -0.0789∗ 0.4336 -0.0780∗∗ 0.4251
(-0.16) (0.12) (-2.06) (1.70) (-2.32) (1.66)
Treatment*Qtr(0,+1) -0.0396∗∗∗ -0.0308 0.0910 0.1023 0.1174 0.1209
(-3.24) (-1.10) (0.70) (0.58) (0.92) (0.71)
Treatment*Qtr(+1,+2) -0.0867∗∗∗ -0.0563∗ 0.2492 0.2486 0.3030 0.2788
(-2.92) (-1.81) (1.27) (1.17) (1.57) (1.33)
Treatment*Qtr(+2,+3) -0.1116∗∗ -0.0566∗∗ 0.3826 0.3700 0.4636∗ 0.4113
(-2.53) (-2.12) (1.56) (1.50) (1.91) (1.68)
Treatment*Qtr(+3,+4) -0.1369∗∗ -0.0930∗∗∗ 0.5603∗ 0.5668∗ 0.6531∗∗ 0.6300∗∗
(-2.58) (-3.92) (1.85) (1.96) (2.18) (2.18)
Quarter Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Controls N Y N Y N Y
Observations 2124 1897 2124 1897 2124 1897
Number of Advisors 97 94 97 94 97 94
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.21
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Panel C: Balance Test of Covariates
Sample Control Treatment Diff T-stats
Ln(Total AUM) Full 21.08 23.99 -2.91 -6.79
Matched 23.82 23.99 -0.17 -0.37
Ln(Total Employees) Full 3.35 5.10 -1.75 -3.47
Matched 4.96 5.10 -0.13 -0.24
Ln(Total Clients) Full 4.15 5.74 -1.59 -2.63
Matched 5.17 5.74 -0.56 -0.86
Ln(Total Accounts) Full 4.07 5.50 -1.43 -2.22
Matched 5.36 5.50 -0.13 -0.19
Ln(Firm Branches) Full 0.35 0.87 -0.52 -1.58
Matched 0.73 0.87 -0.14 -0.41
Ln(Firm Age) Full 0.64 0.71 -0.08 -3.39
Matched 0.66 0.71 -0.05 -1.68
Expense Ratio Full 1.62 0.91 0.71 6.24
Matched 1.05 0.91 0.14 0.90
Front-End Load Full 0.04 0.02 0.02 1.87
Matched 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.46
Redemption Fee Full 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.32
Matched 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.75
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Panel D: Placebo Test
Netflow Inflow Outflow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.0917 0.1188 0.5306 0.6275 0.3698 0.4355
(0.57) (0.76) (1.08) (1.29) (0.86) (1.04)
Treatment*Qtr(-4,-3) -0.0212 -0.0716 -0.2268 -0.4430 -0.2031 -0.3019
(-0.30) (-0.67) (-0.63) (-0.95) (-0.65) (-0.77)
Treatment*Qtr(-3,-2) 0.0203 -0.0319 -0.0038 -0.3470 -0.0396 -0.2484
(0.91) (-0.35) (-0.01) (-0.85) (-0.19) (-0.78)
Treatment*Qtr(-2,-1) 0.0630∗ -0.0247 0.2114 -0.2564 0.1261 -0.1656
(1.87) (-0.28) (0.80) (-0.70) (0.64) (-0.65)
Treatment*Qtr(-1,0) 0.0732 0.0141 0.3526 0.0650 0.2503 0.0685
(1.49) (0.25) (1.23) (0.22) (1.12) (0.36)
Treatment*Qtr(0,+1) 0.0621 0.0877 0.6430∗ 0.6606 0.5303 0.4906
(0.81) (0.82) (1.75) (1.53) (1.64) (1.29)
Treatment*Qtr(+1,+2) 0.0558 0.0811 0.8536∗ 0.8195 0.7366∗ 0.6362
(0.66) (0.71) (1.96) (1.59) (1.81) (1.32)
Treatment*Qtr(+2,+3) 0.0715 0.0923 0.9662∗ 0.9493 0.8250∗ 0.7424
(0.85) (0.78) (1.99) (1.65) (1.78) (1.35)
Treatment*Qtr(+3,+4) 0.0924 0.1070 1.1033∗∗ 1.0036∗ 0.9413∗ 0.8004
(1.16) (1.07) (2.30) (1.88) (2.04) (1.56)
Quarter Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Controls N Y N Y N Y
Observations 2043 1709 2043 1709 2043 1709
Number of Advisors 88 81 88 81 88 81
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.27 0.12 0.22
94
Table 2.5: Robustness Checks: Excluding 2003-2005 Market Timing/Late Trad-
ing Scandals
This table provides regression result of advisors’ cumulative monthly aggregate flows on mutual fund advisory mis-
conduct. The sample consists of advisor-month observations from 2000 to 2013, excluding 2003-2005 episode of market
timing and late trading scandals. The dependent variable is cumulative aggregate advisors’ netflows from month t up
to month t + n (n=1,2,3,6,12,18,24), where the aggregate advisors’ netflows are defined as the gross netflows over gross
TNA of mutual funds managed by a particular advisor. The main explanatory variable Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy
equals one if an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct case in month t, and zero otherwise.
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) is log of monetary fine associated with all misconduct of an advisor as of month t. Lagged Returns
is TNA-weighted average returns of all funds managed by an advisor in last year. Lagged Flows is aggregate netflows
of an advisor in month t. Detailed definitions of other control variables are provided in Appendix A.8. All regressions
include month fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered by advisor and month are reported in parentheses. ***, **
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
t+1 (t+1,t+2) (t+1,t+3) (t+1,t+6) (t+1,t+12) (t+1,t+18) (t+1,t+24)
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy -0.0025 -0.0078∗ -0.0149∗∗∗ -0.0217∗∗∗ -0.0390∗∗ -0.0483∗∗ -0.0301
(-0.98) (-1.89) (-2.88) (-2.73) (-2.42) (-2.15) (-1.09)
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0017
(-0.45) (-0.48) (-0.53) (-0.64) (-0.55) (-0.51) (-0.73)
Lagged Returns 0.0018 0.0042 0.0068 0.0174 0.0390∗ 0.0358 0.0417
(1.16) (1.30) (1.32) (1.58) (1.78) (1.23) (1.10)
Lagged Flows 0.4829∗∗∗ 0.8986∗∗∗ 1.2849∗∗∗ 2.2604∗∗∗ 3.9750∗∗∗ 5.3818∗∗∗ 6.5437∗∗∗
(9.36) (8.31) (7.69) (6.28) (5.01) (4.33) (3.83)
Expense Ratio -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗∗ -0.0042∗∗∗ -0.0086∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗ -0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0254∗∗
(-4.96) (-5.08) (-4.99) (-4.60) (-3.41) (-2.81) (-2.34)
Front-End Load 0.0046 0.0089 0.0125 0.0202 0.0282 0.0237 0.0187
(1.52) (1.36) (1.25) (0.92) (0.57) (0.31) (0.19)
Redemption Fee 0.0128 0.0257 0.0374 0.0599 0.0846 0.1854 0.0367
(1.01) (0.93) (0.87) (0.63) (0.39) (0.54) (0.08)
Ln(Total AUM) -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0025 -0.0045 -0.0062
(-0.58) (-0.70) (-0.76) (-0.68) (-0.79) (-0.86) (-0.80)
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0047∗∗∗ -0.0099∗∗∗ -0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0341∗∗∗ -0.0733∗∗∗ -0.1105∗∗∗ -0.1395∗∗∗
(-3.81) (-3.68) (-3.76) (-3.76) (-3.44) (-3.59) (-3.29)
Avg. Flows to Fund Style 0.1371∗∗∗ 0.2830∗∗ 0.3895∗∗ 0.5058 0.8490 0.8420 0.6223
(2.66) (2.60) (2.33) (1.42) (1.03) (0.67) (0.36)
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 57799 56854 55916 53169 47820 43282 38881
Number of Advisors 986 984 974 963 838 824 732
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.25
95
Table 2.6: Robustness Checks: Quarterly Flows
This table provides regression result of advisors’ cumulative quarterly aggregate flows on mutual fund advisory mis-
conduct. The sample consists of advisor-quarter observations from 2000 to 2013. The dependent variable is cumulative
aggregate advisors’ netflows from quarter t up to quarter t+n (n=1,2,3,4,6,8), where the aggregate advisors’ netflows are
defined as the gross netflows over gross TNA of mutual funds managed by a particular advisor. The main explanatory
variable Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy equals one if an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory miscon-
duct case in quarter t, and zero otherwise. Ln(Past Monetary Fine) is log of monetary fine associated with all misconduct
of an advisor as of quarter t. Lagged Returns is TNA-weighted average returns of all funds managed by an advisor in
last year. Lagged Flows is aggregate netflows of an advisor in quarter t. Detailed definitions of other control variables are
provided in Appendix A.8. All regressions include quarter fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered by advisor and
quarter are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
t+1 (t+1,t+2) (t+1,t+3) (t+1,t+4) (t+1,t+6) (t+1,t+8)
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy -0.0039 -0.0079∗∗ -0.0173∗∗∗ -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.0242∗∗∗ -0.0288∗∗
(-1.56) (-2.31) (-4.34) (-3.49) (-3.24) (-2.63)
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0007
(-0.88) (-1.06) (-0.94) (-0.85) (-0.70) (-0.86)
Lagged Returns 0.0033∗ 0.0068∗ 0.0087 0.0100 0.0055 0.0077
(1.89) (1.71) (1.49) (1.24) (0.48) (0.49)
Lagged Flows 0.4133∗∗∗ 0.7585∗∗∗ 1.0792∗∗∗ 1.4013∗∗∗ 1.9742∗∗∗ 2.5030∗∗∗
(5.78) (5.07) (4.62) (4.37) (3.94) (3.63)
Expense Ratio -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0029∗∗∗ -0.0040∗∗∗ -0.0049∗∗ -0.0071∗∗ -0.0091∗∗
(-3.46) (-3.16) (-2.79) (-2.27) (-2.35) (-2.11)
Front-End Load 0.0048 0.0083 0.0137 0.0192 0.0240 0.0288
(1.54) (1.20) (1.17) (1.12) (0.90) (0.82)
Redemption Fee 0.0112 0.0135 0.0120 0.0078 0.0318 -0.0212
(0.72) (0.37) (0.21) (0.10) (0.29) (-0.14)
Ln(Total AUM) -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0008
(-0.93) (-0.66) (-0.59) (-0.52) (-0.47) (-0.27)
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0066∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗ -0.0238∗∗∗ -0.0356∗∗∗ -0.0436∗∗∗
(-3.80) (-3.93) (-3.70) (-3.24) (-3.38) (-2.83)
Avg. Flows to Fund Style 0.0827∗∗∗ 0.1244∗∗ 0.1726∗ 0.2387∗ 0.2414 0.2114
(2.92) (2.13) (1.83) (1.77) (1.19) (0.77)
Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 24124 23049 21995 20964 19185 17453
Number of Advisors 1014 1002 988 875 860 760
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.24
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Table 2.7: Robustness Checks: Omitted Variable Bias
This table provides regression result of advisors’ cumulative monthly aggregate flows on mutual fund advisory mis-
conduct with advisor fixed effects to address potential omitted variable bias. The sample consists of advisor-month
observations from 2000 to 2013. The dependent variable is cumulative aggregate advisors’ netflows from month t up
to month t + n (n=1,2,3,6,12,18,24), where the aggregate advisors’ netflows are defined as the gross netflows over gross
TNA of mutual funds managed by a particular advisor. The main explanatory variable Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy
equals one if an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct case in month t, and zero otherwise.
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) is log of monetary fine associated with all misconduct of an advisor as of month t. Lagged Returns
is TNA-weighted average returns of all funds managed by an advisor in last year. Lagged Flows is aggregate netflows
of an advisor in month t. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.8. All regressions include advisor
and month fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered by advisor and month are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
t+1 (t+1,t+2) (t+1,t+3) (t+1,t+6) (t+1,t+12) (t+1,t+18) (t+1,t+24)
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy -0.0017 -0.0052 -0.0098∗∗ -0.0134∗ -0.0181 -0.0171 -0.0077
(-0.79) (-1.43) (-2.13) (-1.67) (-1.14) (-0.67) (-0.21)
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0022
(0.27) (0.16) (0.10) (-0.03) (-0.14) (-0.16) (-0.26)
Lagged Returns 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗ 0.0642∗∗ 0.0698∗
(3.14) (3.02) (3.00) (2.83) (2.43) (2.06) (1.71)
Lagged Flows 0.3638∗∗∗ 0.6545∗∗∗ 0.9176∗∗∗ 1.5134∗∗∗ 2.4133∗∗∗ 3.0437∗∗∗ 3.4313∗∗∗
(7.77) (6.81) (6.34) (5.03) (3.87) (3.29) (2.91)
Expense Ratio 0.0003 0.0008 0.0013 0.0029 0.0088 0.0176 0.0226
(0.44) (0.52) (0.58) (0.64) (0.91) (1.23) (1.11)
Front-End Load 0.0093∗ 0.0190∗ 0.0276∗ 0.0518 0.0927 0.0931 0.0531
(1.97) (1.92) (1.84) (1.58) (1.19) (0.75) (0.31)
Redemption Fee 0.0293∗ 0.0582 0.0811 0.1194 0.1127 0.2170 0.0774
(1.66) (1.50) (1.34) (0.96) (0.43) (0.56) (0.15)
Ln(Total AUM) -0.0030∗∗∗ -0.0064∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗∗ -0.0219∗∗∗ -0.0472∗∗∗ -0.0735∗∗∗ -0.0997∗∗∗
(-4.16) (-4.26) (-4.35) (-4.41) (-4.42) (-4.60) (-4.58)
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0014 -0.0021 -0.0033 -0.0015 0.0003 -0.0104 -0.0477
(-0.52) (-0.37) (-0.38) (-0.08) (0.01) (-0.17) (-0.54)
Avg. Flows to Fund Style 0.1095∗∗ 0.2073∗∗ 0.2584∗ 0.1958 -0.0591 -0.7342 -1.7104
(2.10) (2.07) (1.74) (0.67) (-0.09) (-0.71) (-1.14)
Advisor FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 74234 73122 72027 68807 62573 57232 52062
Number of Advisors 1021 1013 1007 999 872 857 759
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.38 0.43 0.49 0.55 0.58 0.60
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Table 2.8: Post-Misconduct Changes in Fees and Contractual Incentives
This table provides regression result of fees and contractual incentives on mutual fund advisory misconduct. The
sample consists of fund-year observations from 2000 to 2013. The dependent variables of fees in year t+ 1 include 12b-1
fee, and among them, fee paid to underwriter and broker-dealer, scaled by total net assets. The dependent variables
of contractual incentives in year t + 1 include Cole’s Incentive Ratio (Cole’s IR), Weighted Incentive Ratio (Weighted
IR) and Dollar Incentive Ratio (Dollar IR). The main explanatory variable Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy equals one
if an advisor commits at least one advisory misconduct case in year t. Ln(Past Monetary Fine) is log of monetary fine
associated with all misconduct of an advisor as of year t. Lagged Fund Returns is funds’ annual returns in year t. Lagged
Fund Flows is funds’ netflows in year t. Detailed definitions of other control variables are provided in Appendix A.8.
All regressions include fund and year fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered by fund are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Fee Contractual Incentive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
12b-1 Fee Underwriter Broker-Dealer Coles’s IR Weighted IR Dollar IR
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy 0.0030∗ 0.0069∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗ -0.0044∗∗∗ -0.0017∗ -0.7177∗∗
(1.88) (4.07) (-2.26) (-2.90) (-1.87) (-2.22)
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0002 0.0002 0.0826∗∗∗
(-3.53) (-3.95) (1.83) (1.04) (1.47) (3.42)
Lagged Fund Returns 0.0010 0.0036∗∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗ -0.0013 -0.0000 0.0340
(0.59) (2.99) (-3.87) (-1.06) (-0.02) (0.13)
Lagged Fund Flows -0.0630∗∗∗ -0.0234∗∗ -0.0156∗∗ -0.0070 -0.0037 -5.7490∗∗∗
(-4.33) (-2.42) (-2.09) (-0.41) (-0.40) (-3.42)
Ln(Fund TNA) 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ -0.0085∗∗∗ -0.0038∗∗∗ -2.4574∗∗∗
(9.16) (5.68) (4.54) (-7.60) (-6.70) (-11.12)
Ln(Fund Age) 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0001 -0.0187∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗∗ -1.5286∗∗∗
(2.76) (5.46) (0.05) (-6.50) (-6.12) (-3.78)
Expense Ratio -0.0026∗∗ 0.0017∗∗ -0.0020∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.6647∗∗∗
(-2.01) (2.29) (-2.88) (-2.75) (-2.86) (-6.16)
Front-End Load 0.0329∗∗ 0.0108 0.0081 0.0042 0.0025 -4.8776∗∗∗
(2.08) (0.96) (0.84) (0.62) (0.75) (-4.04)
Redemption Fee 0.4192∗∗∗ 0.2334∗∗∗ 0.1057∗∗∗ 0.0271 0.0025 -2.0279
(8.30) (6.42) (4.61) (1.38) (0.21) (-0.73)
Ln(Fund Family TNA) 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.2215∗∗∗
(0.96) (0.72) (1.27) (-1.25) (-1.25) (-3.65)
Flow to Fund Style 0.0121 0.0592 -0.0571 -0.0572 -0.0187 -1.0e+02∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.97) (-1.23) (-0.79) (-0.50) (-7.04)
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 50728 50728 50728 52659 52659 52105
Number of Funds 11350 11350 11350 11824 11824 11696
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.88 0.80 0.85 0.84 0.44
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Table 2.9: Post-Misconduct Changes in Investment Restrictions
This table provides result of linear probability model of investment restrictions and actual usage of investment vehicles
on mutual fund advisory misconduct. The sample consists of fund-year observations from 2000 to 2013. The dependent
variables for investment restrictions are indicators equal to one if a certain type of investment vehicle is prohibited by
investment policies in year t+ 1; The dependent variables for actual usage are indicators equal to one if a certain type of
investment vehicle is actually used in year t + 1. The main explanatory variable Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy equals
one if an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct case in year t, and zero otherwise. Ln(Past
Monetary Fine) is log of monetary fine associated with all misconduct of an advisor as of year t. Lagged Fund Returns
is funds’ annual returns in year t. Lagged Fund Flows is funds’ netflows in year t. Detailed definitions of other control
variables are provided in Appendix A.8. All regressions include fund style and year fixed effects. The robust t-statistics
clustered by fund are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Investment Restriction Actual Usage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Options Futures Foreign Stock Options Futures Foreign Stock
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy -0.0067∗∗∗ -0.0045∗∗∗ -0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗ -0.0113 0.0245∗∗∗
(-4.19) (-2.58) (-4.26) (3.57) (-1.33) (2.84)
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0002 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗
(-4.33) (-4.51) (-5.18) (-0.57) (5.66) (7.74)
Lagged Fund Returns -0.0039∗ -0.0049∗∗ -0.0056∗∗ -0.0020 -0.0127∗ 0.0526∗∗∗
(-1.76) (-2.12) (-2.41) (-0.35) (-1.78) (6.43)
Lagged Fund Flows -0.0157 -0.0263∗ -0.0179 0.0564∗ -0.2098∗∗∗ -0.1793∗∗∗
(-1.06) (-1.80) (-1.12) (1.65) (-5.02) (-2.83)
Ln(Fund TNA) -0.0005 -0.0006∗∗ -0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0181∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0518∗∗∗
(-1.48) (-1.96) (-3.13) (12.41) (4.91) (21.60)
Ln(Fund Age) -0.0033∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗ -0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0030
(-4.03) (-4.66) (-4.79) (-2.74) (2.98) (0.55)
Expense Ratio -0.0017∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0390∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0712∗∗∗
(-2.31) (-0.48) (-2.80) (13.87) (4.56) (16.41)
Front-End Load 0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0130∗∗ -0.0265 -0.0425∗ -0.1875∗∗∗
(0.04) (-0.11) (-2.21) (-1.40) (-1.95) (-5.92)
Redemption Fee 0.0178 0.0101 0.0133 -0.0254 -0.0195 0.1380
(0.79) (0.46) (0.61) (-0.40) (-0.26) (1.39)
Ln(Fund Family TNA) -0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0004∗ -0.0001 -0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0015
(-4.49) (-1.89) (-0.62) (-4.26) (11.27) (0.99)
Flow to Fund Style 0.3603∗∗∗ 0.2909∗∗ 0.5072∗∗∗ 0.2693 1.8977∗∗∗ 0.9818∗∗
(3.12) (2.56) (4.81) (1.01) (5.63) (2.57)
Fund Style FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 57718 57718 57718 57718 57718 57718
Number of Funds 16883 16883 16883 16883 16883 16883
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.21
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Table 2.10: Misconduct and Advisor Replacement
This table provides result of linear probability and Lgoit model of advisor replacement on mutual fund advisory mis-
conduct. The sample consists of fund-year observations from 2000 to 2013. The dependent variable is an indicator
equals to one if the current advisor is replaced in year t + 1. The main explanatory variable Mutual Fund Misconduct
Dummy equals one if an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct case in year t, and zero other-
wise. Ln(Past Monetary Fine) is log of monetary fine associated with all misconduct of an advisor as of year t. Lagged
Fund Returns is funds’ annual returns in year t. Lagged Fund Flows is funds’ netflows in year t. Detailed definitions of
other control variables are provided in Appendix A.8. Both models include year and fund style fixed effects, and report
original coefficient estimates. The R2 for LPM is adjusted R2, while the R2 for Logit model is pseudo R2. The robust
t-statistics clustered by fund are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
LPM Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.4112∗∗∗ 0.4310∗∗∗
(3.50) (3.62) (3.92) (4.10)
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) 0.0001 0.0002∗ 0.0030 0.0073∗
(0.76) (1.81) (0.79) (1.83)
Lagged Fund Returns -0.0012 0.0001 -0.0539 -0.0079
(-0.43) (0.03) (-0.53) (-0.08)
Lagged Fund Flows -0.0065 0.0130 -0.2471 0.4899
(-0.34) (0.65) (-0.34) (0.68)
Ln(Fund TNA) 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0674∗∗∗
(3.92) (3.89)
Ln(Fund Age) 0.0049∗∗∗ 0.1943∗∗∗
(4.30) (4.40)
Expense Ratio 0.0022∗∗ 0.0814∗∗∗
(2.44) (2.72)
Front-End Load -0.0013 -0.0560
(-0.18) (-0.23)
Redemption Fee 0.0737∗∗∗ 2.0829∗∗∗
(2.63) (3.03)
Ln(Fund Family TNA) -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0488∗∗∗
(-4.19) (-4.35)
Flow to Fund Style 0.1373 3.6292
(0.94) (0.83)
Fund Style FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 57815 57726 57815 57726
Number of Funds 16907 16884 16907 16884
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
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Table 2.11: Misconduct and Advisor Survival
This table provides result of linear probability and Logit model of advisors’ business failure on mutual fund advisory
misconduct. The sample consists of advisor-year observations from 2000 to 2013. The dependent variables are Closure,
an indicator equals one if an advisor closes advisory business in year t + 1; and Takeover, an indicator equals one if the
advisor is acquired or succeed in year t + 1. The main explanatory variable Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy equals
one if an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct case in year t, and zero otherwise. Ln(Past
Monetary Fine) is log of monetary fine associated with all kinds of misconduct of an advisor as of year t. Lagged Returns
is TNA-weighted average returns of all funds managed by an advisor in year t. Lagged Flows is aggregate netflows of
an advisor in year t. Detailed definitions of other control variables are provided in Appendix A.8. Both models include
year fixed effects, and report original coefficient estimates. The R2 for LPM is adjusted R2, while the R2 for Logit model
is pseudo R2. The robust t-statistics clustered by advisor are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
LPM Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Closure Takeover Closure Takeover
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy 0.0033 0.0302∗ 0.2532 1.4179∗∗∗
(0.32) (1.83) (0.32) (2.77)
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) 0.0007∗∗ -0.0000 0.0461∗ -0.0004
(2.40) (-0.07) (1.93) (-0.02)
Lagged Returns 0.0060 -0.0119∗∗ 0.4092 -1.1552∗∗
(0.67) (-2.37) (0.92) (-2.57)
Lagged Flows -0.0076 -0.0243 -0.7039 -2.9452
(-0.27) (-1.30) (-0.36) (-1.03)
Front-End Load -0.0158 0.0002 -0.8107 0.0448
(-1.07) (0.01) (-0.89) (0.03)
Expense Ratio 0.0048∗ -0.0012 0.0879 -0.1476
(1.84) (-1.12) (1.49) (-0.99)
Redemption Fee -0.0863 0.0650 -3.6922 4.1261∗
(-1.62) (1.34) (-0.89) (1.79)
Ln(Total AUM) -0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0001 -0.2706∗∗∗ 0.0052
(-4.45) (0.15) (-7.01) (0.12)
Ln(Firm Age) -0.0309∗∗∗ -0.0043 -1.0399∗∗∗ -0.3866
(-3.09) (-0.67) (-3.70) (-0.69)
Avg. Flows to Fund Style -0.0169 -0.0220 -1.3326 -2.0894
(-0.80) (-1.13) (-0.84) (-1.08)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 6534 7023 6534 7023
Number of Advisors 1100 1142 1100 1142
R2 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.04
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Table 2.12: Misconduct and Advisor Performance
This table provides regression result of advisors’ future aggregate returns on mutual fund advisory misconduct. The
sample consists of advisor-year observations from 2000 to 2013. The dependent variable is cumulative aggregate advi-
sors’ returns from year t up to year t + n (n=1,2), where aggregate advisors’ returns are calculated as the TNA-weighed
average of returns of mutual funds managed by a particular advisor. The main explanatory variable Mutual Fund Mis-
conduct Dummy equals one if an advisor commits at least one mutual fund advisory misconduct case in year t, and
zero otherwise. Ln(Past Monetary Fine) is log of monetary fine associated with all misconduct of an advisor as of year
t. Lagged Returns is TNA-average return of the funds managed by the advisor in year t. Lagged Flows is aggregate net-
flows of an advisor in year t. Detailed definitions of other control variables are provided in Appendix A.8. The robust
t-statistics clustered by advisor are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
Full Sample Upturn Downturn
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t+1 (t+1,t+2) (t+1,t+2) (t+1,t+2)
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy -0.0383∗∗ -0.0771∗∗∗ -0.0960∗∗ -0.0401
(-2.20) (-2.59) (-2.33) (-1.09)
Ln(Past Monetary Fine) 0.0013∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0014 0.0024
(2.56) (2.71) (1.28) (1.55)
Lagged Returns -0.0195 -0.2130∗∗∗ -0.1002∗∗ -0.6785∗∗∗
(-1.09) (-7.69) (-2.33) (-14.72)
Lagged Flows -0.0290 -0.0070 0.0651 0.1651
(-0.60) (-0.10) (0.71) (1.55)
Expense Ratio 0.0060 0.0064 0.0025 -0.0058
(1.31) (0.68) (0.24) (-0.54)
Front-End Load -0.0469 -0.0701 0.0448 -0.0858
(-1.17) (-0.98) (0.71) (-0.77)
Redemption Fee 0.1995 0.3308 0.4413 0.4158
(0.94) (0.84) (1.02) (0.90)
Ln(Total AUM) 0.0005 -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0040
(0.41) (-1.41) (-1.28) (-1.15)
Ln(Firm Age) 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗ 0.0066 0.0034
(3.03) (2.39) (1.00) (0.35)
Observations 5295 4223 2543 1680
Number of Advisors 890 754 650 619
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.19
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CHAPTER 3
ARE INTERFUND LENDING PROGRAMS EFFECTIVE?
3.1 Introduction
The cross-subsidization and internal capital market in the fund family has at-
tracted increasing academic attentions over the past decades. Gaspar et al.
(2006), for example, shows the evidence of strategic cross-subsidization for
“high family value” funds (i.e., high fees or high past performers) at the cost
of “low value” funds, and the performance gap is partly driven by favourable
trades for those high value funds. The cross-trades between funds affiliated
to the same institution are used either to opportunistically reallocate perfor-
mance among trading funds or to reduce transaction costs for both counterpar-
ties, and generate greater mis-pricing in favor of “star” funds Eisele et al. (2017).
Goncalves-Pinto and Schmidt (2013) shows that the off-exchange cross-trades
are mainly the outcome of coordinated strategies at the fund manager level.
In addition to the general discussion of the cross-subsidization among mutual
funds, there have been emerging studies investigating the function of internal
capital market within the fund family. Bhattacharya et al. (2013), among others,
discovers the role of insurance pool against temporary liquidity shocks to other
funds in the family for affiliated funds of mutual funds (AFoMFs). Goncalves-
Pinto and Sotes-Paladino (2016) also finds that internal markets of fund families
play a key role in inducing member funds to engage in risk-shifting trades with
other funds in the family, leading to deviation excessively from their investment
mandates.
While most of the existing literature highlights the role of internal capital
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market in cross-subsidization and point to the potential negative consequences
for fund investors due to conflict of interest, another channel of liquidity pro-
vision under severe distress events has received relatively little attention until
recently. Agarwal and Zhao (2017), for the first time, documents the incentive
of fund families to apply for regulatory exemptions to participate in Interfund
Lending Programs, the economic consequences of the Interfund Lending Pro-
grams on portfolio holdings, and its mitigating role in stock fire sales following
investor outflows.1 The Interfund Lending Programs serve as a alternative way
of short-term liquidity provision between borrowing and lending funds in the
fund family. It is designed in such a mechanism that the borrowing (lending)
rate associated with Interfund Lending Programs should be lower (higher) than
market rate, thus creating mutual benefits for the two counterparties involved
in the deals. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence concerning the the
effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs in the mutual fund industry. In
this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs by ex-
amining how they benefit both borrowing and lending funds during distress
time.
To test my hypothesis, we construct a weekly panel dataset using N-SAR fil-
ings and CRSP Mutual Fund Database. Weekly fund returns are calculate from
daily fund-share class returns from CRSP, and aggregated at fund level. We
then merge CRSP Mutual Fund Database with N-SAR fillings to obtain fund
characteristics, including family affiliation for each funds. The strength of N-
SAR filings is that it contains the precise information of fund family affiliation,
with a unique family identifier. The exact date of ILP application and approval
1The consequences of asset fire sales on equity prices have been studied extensively. Two
recent works on the asset fire sales in mutual fund industry include Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim
(2012) and Jotikasthira et al. (2012).
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for each fund family after 2008 is collected from the SEC public disclosure. We
manually search Federal Register using key words ‘interfund lending’ and ‘ex-
emptive order’ to get the same information prior to 2008.
We begin our analysis with baseline regression where the fund’s week-
ly returns are regressed on a ILP indicator along with the interaction term
Distress×ILP. The distress events are defined in the sense that the funds belong-
ing to a specific investment style suffer from large negative shock in weekly re-
turns. The definition suggests that the distress events are most likely exogenous
to fund characteristics, and thus not subject to endogeneity concern that tremen-
dous under-performance is driven by poor investment skills of managers. The
distress events are defined at alternative magnitudes, namely, TNA-weighted
weekly returns of funds with the same investment style are below the bottom
3rd, 2nd, 1th, 0.5th and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns dur-
ing the whole sample period. These distress events capture negative return
shocks in increasing magnitude order. We find that the funds with Interfund
Lending Programs have 0.33% higher returns than non-ILP funds in the week
following the distress with most strict definition. This suggests a positive role
of Interfund Lending Programs in providing short-term liquidity to funds in
distress, thus avoiding asset fire sales at the cost of fund investors. In the mean-
while, we do not find empirical evidence concerning the benefit of Interfund
Lending Programs for lending funds. Lending funds with Interfund Lending
Programs do not have significantly higher returns than non-ILP funds follow-
ing distress events. This indicates that lending funds might not benefit from
Interfund Lending Programs through short-term lending to borrowing funds in
distress.
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The benefit of Interfund Lending Programs for borrowing and lending fund-
s might be related to other factors are haven’t been considered in our baseline
regressions. For instance, fund liquidity plays a key role in the effectiveness of
Interfund Lending Programs for both parties. This is because illiquid funds fac-
ing distress have more difficulties in meeting redemption needs. Thus they tend
to borrow money through Interfund Lending Programs to circumvent potential
costly asset fire sales. Similarly, the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs
for borrowing funds are more pronounced during period of high external fund-
ing cost, which is recognized as indicator of low credit availability in the market.
Lastly, the diversity of intra-family investment styles are also important in af-
fecting the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs, since more diversified
fund family have greater flexibility in the timing of liquidity supply, especially
when the distress events are considered exogenous to the fundamentals of mu-
tual funds. We re-examine our hypothesis with sub-samples that are condition-
al on these attributes and find results that are consistent with our predictions.
Overall, the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for borrowing funds
are predominant for more illiquid funds, during period of high external funding
cost, and for funds affiliated with families having diversified investment styles.
However, we find limited evidence concerning the role of these factors in the ef-
fectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for lending funds. For example, the
benefit of Interfund Lending Programs for lending funds are larger for liquid
funds, but credit market liquidity and family diversity does not play a role in
affecting the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs.
Our baseline regression might fail to consider the heterogeneity among
funds that with and without Interfund Lending Programs. Note that the de-
cision of applying for Interfund Lending Programs can be endogenous, since
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it is dependent on the fund characteristics in the family. To address the po-
tential concern for the fund heterogeneity issue in the baseline regressions, we
conduct our analysis based on a matched sample around a particular period of
time, known as extreme market downside, around the September 2008 follow-
ing the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The reason for focusing on this specific
period is that most of the distress events are concentrated in the third week in
September 2008, and they are recognized as financial market turmoil not related
to fund-specific characteristics. We define treatment funds as funds in the fam-
ilies that have Interfund Lending Programs, and define control funds as those
do not have Interfund Lending Programs. We further match treatment and con-
trol funds based on fund size, age, expense ratio, front-end load and redemption
fees. We also require that treatment and control funds should have the same CR-
SP 4-digit style code. Our results of the matched sample confirms our primary
findings, and show that the borrowing funds have 0.30% higher returns than
non-ILP funds during the crisis episode and the most strict definition of distress
events is used. It suggests that our findings remain quantitatively similar when
heterogeneity among treatment and control funds has been addressed.
We also conduct a series of robustness checks to ensure that our findings are
robust to alternative variable definition, sample period and additional control-
s. First, we use two alternative definitions of distress events. Instead of using
original CRSP 4-digit style code, we define our distress events using the first
two digit of CRSP style code. The first two digit of the style code reflect board
investment styles which capture negative shock in returns for a much larger
number of funds within the style. Alternatively, instead of using bottom per-
centile of style returns, we apply fixed return thresholds, from -2% up to -6%
of weekly returns, to define distress events. This method imposes fixed cutof-
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f points for all styles, and will lead to different number of distress events for
each investment style, given the riskiness of their portfolios and returns volatil-
ities. In general, our results demonstrate that the borrowing funds through In-
terfund Lending Programs have greater capability of dealing with outflows and
redemption pressure from fund investors. They have 0.13%-0.35% higher re-
turns in the week following extreme distress. While the benefit of Interfund
Lending Programs for borrowing funds are economically sizeable, it has little
effect for lending funds, partly because there is cross-subsidization among fund
family, and lending funds does not have enough benefit that outweigh the costs.
In addition, we also check the robustness of our findings by excluding 2008-2009
financial crisis, using exact date of SEC exemptive order for Interfund Lending
Programs, and including additional fund-level controls. All our results remain
quantitatively the same.
Our paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it is closely relat-
ed to prior studies on the cross-subsidization among mutual funds in the same
family. Gaspar et al. (2006), Bhattacharya et al. (2013), and Goncalves-Pinto and
Schmidt (2013), among others, demonstrate the existence of cross-subsidization
within fund family in favor of partial set of funds at the cost of fund investors.
The cross-subsidization usually takes form of cross-trading the securities, or off-
exchange transactions associated with high degree of mispricings Eisele et al.
(2016); Goncalves-Pinto and Sotes-Paladino (2016). Our paper shows one addi-
tional channel of cross-subsidization that is mutually beneficial for two parities
involved in the deal: the interfund lending facilities which provides necessary
liquidity to funds under extreme distress.
Our paper also contribute to the studies on the liquidity management in mu-
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tual funds. For example, Chernenko and Sunderam (2016) finds that mutual
funds hold substantial amounts of cash to accommodate inflows and outflows,
especially for funds with illiquid assets and at times of low market liquidity.
Similarly, Ben-Rephael (2017) and Rzeznik (2017) demonstrates an increase in
the liquidity of funds’ portfolio under extreme market uncertainty, known as
flight-to-liquidity. These studies are extension of findings in Coval and Stafford
(2007) and Dong, Krystyniak, and Peng (2016), which documents possible trad-
ing strategy following liquidity shocks.2
Finally, our paper is complement to Eisele et al. (2013) and Evans et al.
(2017b), which document behavioral difference among competitive and coop-
erative fund managers within fund families. While Eisele et al. (2013) suggests
that fund managers front-run their distressed peers under coordination of the
family, our results seem to be in line with the hypothesis in support of the posi-
tive role of lending funds. Our result that cooperative managers are more likely
engaged in interfund lending facilities is consistent with Evans et al. (2017b),
which suggests more intensive cross-subsidization for families with more coop-
erative incentives.
2Honkanen and Schmidt (2017) find that such profitability spills over onto the stock returns
of economic peers.
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3.2 Data and Methodology
3.2.1 Data
We collect the data from three major sources. First, fund returns and invest-
ment style code are obtained from CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund
Database. Weekly fund returns are calcualted as TNA-weighed average of daily
returns if funds have multiple share classes. The second data source is Form
N-SAR. The Form N-SAR is semi-annual report for registered investment com-
panies, which includes identification, gross flows, advisory contract terms, and
accounting information. We match CRSP Mutual Fund Database with N-SAR
filings by names of funds and investment companies. The matching takes two
rounds. In the first round, we match by exact name of funds and investment
companies. In the second round, we apply fuzzy match on names while requir-
ing less than 5% deviation in total net assets. The two-round procedure matches
over 75% of the CRSP fund-share identifiers.3 The unique strength of N-SAR fil-
ing is that it provides fund family affiliation for each fund, while CRSP Mutual
Fund Database lacks such critical information.
Finally, we manually collect application and approval date of SEC exemptive
order for Interfund Lending Programs from Investment Company Act Notices
and Orders Category Listing on the SEC website.4 Each notice filing contains
full context of SEC exemptive order, which specify the fund family and its affil-
iated mutual funds that applied for the Interfund Lending Program. We match
3The name of funds in CRSP Mutual Fund Database has three components: fund name, trust
name and share-class name, with question mark in between. We use this pattern to split the
name into three components and match them with N-SAR.
4https://www.sec.gov/rules/icreleases.shtml#interfundlending.
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these fund families with family identifier in N-SAR filings (N-SAR Item 19).
However, the SEC public disclosure of application and exemptive order date
only covers period following 2008. Therefore, we complement with exact ap-
plication date for Interfund Lending Programs by manually searching Federal
Register using keywords such as “interfund lending” and “exemptive order”.5
To fill in missing approval data prior to 2008, we use the average time interval
between application and order after 2008, which is approximately 350 days. Ta-
ble A.10 show the date of application and exemptive order for each Interfund
Lending Program.
3.2.2 Methodology
Our empirical methodology applies two sets of panel regressions to examine the
effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for borrowing and lending fund-
s within the fund family. Specifically, on the borrowing side, we test whether
funds that are eligible for Interfund Lending Programs suffer less from extreme-
ly negative return shocks than those ineligible for Interfund Lending Programs.
On the lending side, we examine whether funds with Interfund Lending Pro-
grams have higher returns than non-ILP funds when there are distress funds in
the families. Our definition of style-wide distress involves several thresholds.
We define distress in the sense that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds
with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th, 0.5th and 0.25th
percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period,
respectively. The smaller the threshold, the fewer distress events and stronger
liquidity needs for funds. We regard the extreme negative returns shock as dis-
5https://www.federalregister.gov/
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tress because it leads to large flow outflows, creating redemption pressure and
liquidity shortage. To avoid endogenous problem, we define distress at invest-
ment style level rather than individual fund level. This is out of concern fund’s
distress might be correlated with managerial investment skills, and thus driven
by individual fund characteristics.
Effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for Borrowing Funds
On the borrowing side, we evaluate the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Pro-
grams for borrowing funds with following regression:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t (3.1)
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment
style k in week t + 1. We include fund fixed effect θi to account for managerial
skills, or any time-invariant fund characteristics. We also control for style-time
fixed effect δk,t to address the heterogeneity of investment styles. The style-wide
distress indicator Distressk,t is a dummy variable equals one if average weekly
return of funds with investment style k is below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th, 0.5th
and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sam-
ple period, respectively. ILP j,t is a dummy variable equals one the time period
after SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund family j. The
standard errors are clustered by fund family and time.
When funds are in exogenous distress, they face great liquidity needs. The
Interfund Lending Programs can act as short-term liquidity provider for bor-
rowing funds, contributing to less price pressure from asset fire sales. Therefore,
we hypothesize that ILP-funds suffer less than non ILP-funds following distress
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events. In other words, the coefficient of interest β should be significantly posi-
tive.
Effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for Lending Funds
Similarly, on the lending side, we examine the effectiveness of Interfund Lend-
ing Programs for lending funds with the following regression:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t (3.2)
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment
style k in week t + 1. We also control for fund and style-time fixed effects, as
Equation 3.1. ILP j,t is a dummy variable equals one the time period after SEC
exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund family j. A slight vari-
ation is for the definition of Distress 6k, j,t−1, which is a dummy variable equals one
if funds with investment style other than k experiences distress. The standard
errors are clustered by fund family and time.
Since The lending funds can benefit from Interfund Lending Programs by
earning interest income higher than market rate, we postulate that funds with
Interfund Lending Programs have higher returns than non ILP-funds when
there are distressed funds in the families. Therefore, we would find positive
and significant coefficient β.
3.2.3 Summary Statistics
Figure 3.1 presents number of distressed funds over time for different thresh-
olds in distress definition. Most of the distressed events are clustered around
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September 2008 during financial crisis. Panel D of 3.1 shows that this pattern
becomes even more pronounced when mutual funds experience extremely low
style-wide negative return shocks, which are below the bottom 0.25 percentile
of the same funds’ weekly returns over the entire sample period. In addition to
2008 financial crisis. other major distress events take place at Internet bubbles
around 2000-2001.
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of style-wide distress events. The
distress events are defined in the sense that the TNA-weighted weekly return-
s of funds with investment style k are below the bottom 0.5 percentile of the
same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period. The result shows
that the probability of distressed funds are very close to the pre-specified 0.5th
percentile return threshold. The average weekly returns for distressed funds is
below -15% for equity funds, and mostly are below -3% for bond funds. The
return distribution suggests that distressed funds face extremely low perfor-
mance, leading to potential outflows.
Summary statistics of main variables are presented in Table 3.2. The sam-
ple consists of fund-week observations from 1998 to 2014. First, about 30% of
fund-week observations are from funds that are eligible for Interfund Lending
Programs. The mean (median) weekly fund returns are 0.12% (0.08%), with s-
tandard deviation of 2.21%. In addition, average fund TNA is 1.85 billion U.S.
dollars, and average fund age is 5.35 years. In terms of investment style, 42%
of the fund-week observations are from funds that invest in domestic equities,
followed by 13% investing in foreign equities and 11% in municipal bonds.
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3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Baseline Regression
We start with estimating the baseline regressions as specification 3.1 and 3.2
for borrowing and lending funds separately. Table 3.3 reports the baseline re-
gression results. Column (1)-(5) show the effectiveness of Interfund Lending
Programs for borrowing funds. Our main variable of interest, interaction term
Distress×ILP increases in both economic magnitude and t-statistics along with
the severity of distress. To be specific, the coefficient increases from 0.0005 in
Column (1) to 0.0032 in Column (5), and the t-statistics also increase from 1.63
to 5.63. For example, for distress defined at bottom 0.25th percentile, the fund-
s that are eligible for Interfund Lending Programs have 0.32% higher returns
than non-ILP funds in the week immediately following distress events, and the
positive effect is highly significant at 1% level. This is consistent with the notion
that Interfund Lending Programs will be more effective in providing necessary
short-term liquidity to distressed funds when those funds have high liquidity
needs under severe distress. The Interfund Lending Programs is helpful for re-
ducing adverse price impact for borrowing funds resulted from asset fire sales
following distress.
The effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for lending funds is report-
ed in Column (6)-(10) of Table 3.3. We find that Interfund Lending Programs do
not have positive effect for lending funds in the families. The primary variable
of interest Distress×ILP, the interaction term between ILP indicator and distress
dummy is significantly negative for distress events defined at bottom 3rd, 2nd
and 1st return threshold, and become insignificant for extreme distress events
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defined at 0.5th or 0.25th percentile level. It suggests that although lending
funds provide short-term liquidity to distressed funds and earn interest income,
they do not have significantly higher returns than non-ILP funds which are not
eligible for lending. The evidence suggests that the benefits of Interfund Lend-
ing Programs for lending funds doesn’t outweigh the potential costs. It also
indicates that there might be cross-subsidization within fund families.
To examine the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for both bor-
rowing and lending funds in the relatively short term following distress events,
we regress the cumulative fund returns over the next 8 weeks from t + 1 up to
t + 8, on the interaction term Distress×ILP and ILP indicator ILP, controlling for
fund and style-time fixed effects. The coefficient and its 95% confidence inter-
val is shown in Figure 3.3. Panel A of Figure 3.3 shows that the positive effect
of Interfund Lending Programs for borrowing funds is persistent over the next
two months following distress events, with significant 0.3% higher cumulative
fund returns at the end of the eighth week. This suggests that the positive effect
of Interfund Lending Programs for borrowing funds is more than contempora-
neous. In contrast, we find no evidence of effectiveness of Interfund Lending
Programs for lending funds, as the coefficient of Distress×ILP in Panel B is not
significantly different from zero.
3.3.2 Sub-Sample Analysis
Broad Investment Style
To evaluate the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for each asset class,
we run the baseline regression by board investment styles. The broad invest-
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ment style is classified using the first 2 digits of CRSP investment style code.
These broad investment styles reflect the riskiness and liquidity of their portfo-
lio holdings. They include domestic equities (ED), foreign equities (EF), corpo-
rate fixed income (IC), foreign fixed income (IF), government fixed income (IG),
money market fixed income (IM), municipal fixed income (IU) and balanced
funds (M). We also control for style-time and fund fixed effects, and cluster s-
tandard error by fund.6
Panel A of Table 3.4 presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs on
fund returns following exogenous negative return shocks for each board in-
vestment style. We find that the positive effect of Interfund Lending Programs
for borrowing funds are mostly concentrated in equity (ED and EF) and mu-
nicipal funds (IU), as indicated by the positive and significant interaction ter-
m Distress×ILP. For instance, on average domestic equity funds have 0.53%
higher returns in the week following extreme distress defined at bottom 0.25th
percentile level, followed by foreign equity funds (0.39%) and municipal fund-
s (0.18%). All these coefficients are highly significant at 1% level. Figure 3.4
reports the coefficient of interaction term Distressk,t × ILP j,t (solid) and its 95%
confidence interval (dash) for each broad investment style over the next two
months following distress events. The positive effect of Interfund Lending Pro-
grams on fund returns persists for the following two months for domestic equity
funds, while the effect for municipal funds lasts for about two weeks.
Panel B of Table 3.4 shows the result for lending funds. In general, we find
that funds investing in foreign equities and government bond benefit from the
Interfund Lending Programs, as their returns are higher than non-ILP funds in
6We find that clustering standard errors by fund family will lead to extremely large t-statistics
due to non-semidefinite variance-covariance matrix.
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the following week after distress events. The effect is statistically significan-
t and economically sizeable, as these two groups of funds have 0.16%-0.18%
higher returns than non-ILP funds, with large t-statistics over 4. For domestic
equity funds and money market funds, though statistically significant, the eco-
nomic magnitude is relative small and negligible. The result for lending funds
is consistent with the hypothesis that Interfund Lending Programs are more ef-
fective for lending funds that hold liquid assets, since they have the flexibility
in providing short-term liquidity to distressed funds in the families. Figure 3.5
reports the coefficient of Distress6k, j,t × ILP j,t (solid) and its 95% confidence in-
terval (dash) for each broad investment style over the following eight weeks
following distress events. We confirm the finding that the positive effect of In-
terfund Lending Programs on fund returns remain statistically significant over
two months for money market funds, while it lasts for four to five weeks for
government and foreign equity funds.
Credit Market Liquidity
The Interfund Lending Program is designed as lending facility in fund families.
They are substitute to external funding sources such as banks and other finan-
cial institutions. According to the mechanism of the program, borrowing funds
benefit from the lending facilities that provide valuable short-term liquidity at
lower cost, while lending funds also charge interest rate higher than federal
fund rate. As a consequence, the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Program-
s for both parties is associated with overall credit market liquidity, measured
by TED spread. On one hand, the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs
for borrowing funds is more pronounced during illiquid credit market, as time
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period with high TED spread is usually considered as credit constraint in the
financial market. On the other hand, external funding cost is not as important
for lending funds, since what really matters is the spread between designated
interfund lending rate and federal fund rate.
Table 3.5 reports the result of sub-sample analysis conditional on credit mar-
ket liquidity. Illiquid period is defined as time period when TED rate is above
the sample median. Panel A of Table 3.5 shows that consistent with our expecta-
tion, the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for borrowing funds are
more pronounced during illiquid period. It suggests that when overall cred-
it market is illiquid, the Interfund Lending Programs play a significant role in
helping distressed funds meet redemption needs, since it is difficult to obtain
external funding from banks or financial institutions. The positive effect of In-
terfund Lending Programs becomes secondary during low-TED spread period,
indicating that distressed funds have easier access to external sources of fund-
ing.
Panel B of Table 3.5 shows the result sub-sample analysis for lending funds.
Our result shows that the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for lend-
ing funds are not driven by credit market liquidity. We find that the Interfund
Lending Programs do not have positive effect in both liquid and illiquid period-
s, as indicated by insignificant or negative interaction term Distress×ILP under
alternative distress definitions. Therefore, the general credit market liquidity
condition has no effect on the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for
lending funds.
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Intra-Family Style Diversity
The Interfund Lending Programs serve as internal capital market in fund fam-
ilies. Its role in liquidity provision depends on the existence of liquidity
providers. Goncalves-Pinto and Sotes-Paladino (2016) shows that investment
style diversity within fund family plays a positive role in offsetting trades across
funds. A fund family having funds with various investment styles create more
potential sources of liquidity providers. As a result, higher intra-family style
diversity in fund families leads to more effective functioning of Interfund Lend-
ing Programs. In this section we examine our baseline findings conditional on
style diversity within fund family. We hypothesize that the benefit of Interfund
Lending Programs for both borrowing funds will be larger if the fund families
have more diversified investment styles. But the style diversity does not matter
for lending funds. Specifically, high-diversity fund families are defined as hav-
ing above-median Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of fund total net assets,
where the HHI is calculated as summation of squared proportion of TNA be-
longing to the CRSP 4-digit style codes within families. Lower HHI of the fund
family indicates more diversified investment styles.
Table 3.6 reports the result of sub-sample analysis conditional on intra-
family style diversity. Panel A of Table 3.6 reports the result for borrowing fund-
s. We find that the positive effect of Interfund Lending Programs for borrowing
funds is mostly driven by fund families with diversified investment styles. For
example, the interaction term Distress×ILP are positive and highly significant
under extreme distress defined at bottom 0.25th percentile. Specifically, in the
week immediately following distress event, funds with Interfund Lending Pro-
grams in high style diversity families have 0.4% higher returns than non-ILP
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funds. It demonstrates that Interfund Lending Program is more effective for
fund families with high style diversity under exogenous negative return shocks.
One possible explanation is that high-style diversity families usually have larg-
er number of fund investment styles. The diversity in portfolio holdings and
distress timing in fund families contributes to more efficient functioning of in-
ternal capital market, creating greater capacity to provide necessary short-term
liquidity among funds over time.
Panel B of Table 3.6 reports the result for lending funds. In contrast to the re-
sult for borrowers, we find that the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs
for lending funds is not related to intra-family style diversity. The interaction
term Distress×ILP is significantly negative or insignificant in both sub-samples.
Therefore, we find no evidence on the role of intra-family style diversity associ-
ated with the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for lending funds.
3.3.3 Competitive VS. Cooperative Fund Managers
The mutual fund family applies for Interfund Lending Programs that cover all
of the funds within family. The effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs
is somehow dependent on the intra-family manager cooperation. Evans et al.
(2017b) and Eisele et al. (2013) discuss two types of managers, namely, com-
petitive and cooperative fund managers. They find evidence consistent with
a separating equilibrium, where some fund families encourage cooperation a-
mong their managers, while other fund families encourage competition. Funds
in families with more cooperative incentives are more likely to engage in cross-
subsidization through cross-holding and cross-trading, while funds in families
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with more competitive incentives are less likely to do so. In the current con-
text, we examine whether the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs are
associated with the degree of intra-family manager cooperation.
To measure level of manager competition in a fund family, we merge N-
SAR with CRSP Mutual Fund Database to obtain fund managers for each fund.
Following Evans et al. (2017b), we construct a simplified version of competi-
tive index, which consists of six components. The first five indicator variables
are directly obtained from N-SAR fund advisory contract items. First, We in-
clude an indicator variable of whether or not the funds advisory fee grows in
a linear way with size (Item 48). We hypothesize that managers of funds with
a linear percentage advisory fee that remains constant as the fund size grows,
have more competitive incentives relative to managers of funds with a concave
fee structure, where the fee decreases as fund assets grow. Massa and Patgiri
(2009) compares the performance and risk-taking behavior of fund manager-
s with linear vs. concave fund management fee schedules and find evidence
of higher performance and risk, consistent with stronger incentives to compete
for funds with linear contracts. In addition, We hypothesize that managers of
funds rewarded based on that fund’s income (Item 49), income or assets (Item
50), or performance (Item 51), are incentivized to be more competitive. The fi-
nal variable is an indicator which equals one if the fund is managed by a single
manager. In the decision to allocate managers across funds, assigning teams of
managers to jointly manage multiple funds would naturally encourage cooper-
ation relative to assigning each manager to their own fund. We sum up these
six variables for each fund, and take average across all funds in the family in
each year. We then divide the sample into two parts using the median value of
competitive index.
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Table 3.7 presents results of effect of Interfund Lending Programs for the
returns of borrowing funds with competitive VS. cooperative fund manager-
s. We find that the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for borrow-
ing funds can be found only for fund families with cooperative managers. The
interaction term is positive and significant in most of the specifications. For
instance, for distress events defined at bottom 0.25th percentile, funds with In-
terfund Lending Programs have 0.27% higher returns than non-ILP funds in
the week following distress event. It suggests that fund families with more co-
operative managers are more willing to provide short-term liquidity through
Interfund Lending Programs to the borrowing funds which are facing distress.
The aligned interests among fund managers lead to increase availability and
timeliness of liquidity provision.
3.3.4 Matched Sample
Although our baseline regression use full-sample data from 1998-2014, it may
fail to account for the heterogeneity among funds that are and aren’t eligible for
Interfund Lending Programs. Therefore our primary findings might be biased
might by driven by the difference in fund characteristics that are associated with
the application for Interfund Lending Programs. To address this concern, we fo-
cus exclusively on a particular sample period when most of the distress events
take place. September 2008 is well known for tremendous financial market tur-
moil. We denote the third week of September 2008 as an exogenous negative
return shock that leads to wide-spread distress for mutual funds. The treat-
ment group is eligible for Interfund Lending Program, while control group is
ineligible. The event window uses 10 weeks of pre- and post-event period. We
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use one-to-one nearest neighborhood matching technique to match treatment
and control funds based on fund size, fund age, expense ratio, front-end load,
redemption fee, past two weeks’ return and investment style.7
Panel A of Table 3.8 reports the result for unmatched sample. Consistent
with our primary findings, we find that the effect of Interfund Lending Pro-
grams are positive and highly significant for for distressed funds. Specifically,
for the most strict form of distress defined at bottom 0.25th percentile level, the
funds with Interfund Lending Programs are associated with 0.35% higher re-
turns than non-ILP funds in the week following distress event, with t-statistics
over 3. We find no effect of Interfund Lending Programs for lending funds. Pan-
el B of Table 3.8 reports the result for matched sample. Although the sample size
is reduced in half, the variable of interest Distress×ILP remains statistically sig-
nificant at 5% level, although the economic magnitude is relatively smaller. To
be specific, Column (5) shows that for distress events defined at bottom 0.25th
percentile level, funds with Interfund Lending Programs on average have 0.19%
higher returns than non-ILP funds in one week after distress. Panel C demon-
strates the balance test of covariate used for matching. All the covariates except
firm age are not significantly different from each other for treatment and control
funds after matching, suggesting that the matching has addressed firm hetero-
geneity problem among funds with and without Interfund Lending Programs.
To examine the effect of Interfund Lending Program for matched sample
over time, we regress the cumulative fund returns from week t + 1 up to
t + 8 on ILP indicator and interaction term Distress×ILP. The the coefficient of
Distress×ILP and its 95% confidence interval is presented in Figure 3.6. Panel A
of Figure 3.6 shows that the effect of Interfund Lending Programs for borrowing
7The matching has caliper of 0.2 and satisfies common support requirement.
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funds remains positive and highly significant over the next two months follow-
ing distress events. The cumulative fund returns amount to 0.5% at the end of
the next two months. It indicates that the positive effect of Interfund Lending
Programs for borrowing funds is more than contemporaneous, but rather per-
sistent in short term. On the contrary, we find no significant effect of Interfund
Lending Programs for lending funds, as the interaction term Distress×ILP in
Panel B of Figure 3.6 is not significantly different from zero. In sum, our results
from matched sample support the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs
for borrowing funds after controlling for firm heterogeneity.
3.3.5 Robustness Checks
In this section we conduct a series of robustness checks to our main findings
to ensure that our results are not driven by specific variable definition, sample
period, or model specifications.
Distress Definitions
In the empirical analysis we defines style-wide distress events based on CRSP
4-digit style code. The CRSP style code consists of over 50 categories. With such
detailed classification there are small sample of funds for some specific styles.
To ensure that our result is robust to alternative distress definitions, other style
classifications are applied. First, we use broad CRSP investment styles defined
as the first 2 digits of CRSP style code. The broad investment styles represent
more general asset classes and thus increase number of funds in each style.
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Table 3.9 presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) on fund
returns following distress defined using board investment styles. We find
that effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for borrowing funds remain
qualitatively the same, as shown by positive and significant interaction term
Distress×ILP in most of the specifications from Column (1)-(5). For distress de-
fined at bottom 0.25th percentile level, the coefficient Distress×ILP amounts to
0.0033 (t-statistics=5.12), indicating that facing extreme negative return shocks,
ILP-funds are more resilient than non-ILP funds in obtaining short-term liquid-
ity. We find no effect of Interfund Lending Programs for lending funds.
Second, we use the style classification contained in N-SAR filings. The Item
61-70 in Form N-SAR are check-box survey questions that provide guidelines to
create style categories. Specifically, we classify the sample broadly into equity,
bond, balanced, and index funds. Within each broad style, we further classify
them into sub-categories based on the interactions of N-SAR items, resulting in
altogether 24 styles. We repeat the baseline regression using distress defined at
N-SAR investment style level.
Table 3.10 shows the result. We confirm the finding in baseline regression
that borrowing funds with Interfund Lending Programs have higher returns
than non-ILP funds following distress, especially under extreme distress at bot-
tom 0.25th percentile. Column (5) shows that ILP-funds through have 0.22%
higher weekly returns, which is highly significant at 1% level. In terms of lend-
ing funds, although Column (10) reports significantly positive interaction term,
its economic magnitude is very small and thus the effectiveness is limited.
Finally, we define distress events using fixed thresholds instead of rela-
tive measures. The idea stems from the proposition that investors only care
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about absolute fund performance, ignoring the difference among investmen-
t styles. Following this argument, we define distress events in the sense that
TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with the same investment style are be-
low -2%, -3%, -4%, -5% and -6%, respectively. The uniform standard of return
thresholds applying to all CRSP 4-digit style code leads to large variation in the
number of distress funds across styles.
Table 3.11 shows that the effect of Interfund Lending Programs for borrow-
ing funds remains quantitatively similar, as indicated by positive and significant
interaction term Distress×ILP under alternative absolute return thresholds. In
particular, ILP-funds have 0.07%-0.17% higher returns than non-LIP funds in
the week following distress events, with t-statistics all over 2. In contrast, we
find no positive effect of Interfund Lending Programs for lending funds in gen-
eral, as ILP-funds’ returns are not significantly different from non-ILP funds if
there are other distressed funds in the families.
Excluding Financial Crisis
Figure 3.1 shows that the number of distressed funds peaks around 2008-2009
financial crisis. For example, when distress events are defined under extreme
condition, i.e. bottom 0.25th percentile, over 70% of the distress funds are clus-
tered in September 2008. Therefore, our primary result might be driven by dis-
tress events during specific sample period. To alleviate this concern, we re-
examine the baseline results by excluding observations from 2008-2009.
Table 3.12 reports the result of robustness check with non-crisis period. The
baseline result remains intact when we exclude observations during financial
127
crisis. Specifically, on the borrowing side, the funds with Interfund lending Pro-
grams have 0.19% and 0.41% higher returns than non-ILP funds under severe
distress, defined at bottom 0.5th and 0.25th percentile in Column (4)-(5), respec-
tively. The interaction term Distress×ILP is highly significant with t-statistics
greater than 2. The robustness check confirms that the baseline finding is not
driven by distress events concentrated during financial crisis period. On the
lending side, we find no evidence concerning the effectiveness of Interfund
Lending Programs for lending funds.
ILP Application
In our empirical analysis we construct ILP indicator using the date of SEC ex-
emptive order for Interfund Lending Programs. After submitting applications
to the SEC, the regular procedure for obtaining approval of Interfund Lending
Programs involves several rounds of hearings if necessary. Finally SEC will is-
sue an exemptive order to approve the application. After that, fund families are
eligible to use Interfund Lending Programs to mitigate liquidity constraints for
some of the affiliated funds. Therefore, there is time interval between applica-
tion and final approval. We check the robustness of our baseline result using
the application date, since the approval date is not fully available prior to 2008.
To account for the missing approval date before 2008, we instead construct ILP
indicator using the application date and repeat the regression regression.
Table 3.13 presents the result of robustness check when application date of
Interfund Lending Programs is used to construct ILP indicator. We find that
our result for borrowing funds remains quantitatively similar. In particular,
for distress events defined under extreme conditions, the funds with Interfund
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Lending Programs have significantly higher returns than non-ILP funds. The
economic magnitude increases from 0.05% to 0.33% of returns in the week im-
mediately following distress events. The t-statistics also increases from 1.62 to
nearly 5.64, indicating high statistical significance for the interaction terms un-
der various distress definitions. However, similar to previous findings, we find
no strong empirical evidence for the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Pro-
grams for lenders within fund families.
Additional Controls
In this robustness check we further include several fund characteristics as con-
trols in the regression. The control variables include lagged fund return in the
past two weeks, fund TNA, fund age, and expense ratio. These controls have
been widely used in the mutual fund literature.
Table 3.14 shows the result of robustness check controlling for additional
fund characteristics. We find that our main findings remain intact by intro-
ducing additional controls. On one hand, ILP-funds have significantly high-
er returns than non-ILP funds in the week following distress. For example,
Column (5) shows a coefficient of 0.28% for interaction term Distress×ILP (t-
statistics=3.62) when distress events are defined at bottom 0.25th percentile lev-
el. It indicates that the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs remain eco-
nomically sizable and statistically significant for borrowing funds. On the other
hand, we find no evidence supporting the positive role of Interfund Lending
Programs for lending funds, as the interaction term Distress×ILP remains in-
significant, or even negative under alternative distress definitions.
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3.4 Further Discussions
3.4.1 Comparison of Alternative Borrowing Channels
There are multiple channels for mutual funds to get short-term liquidity to meet
redemption needs. They could either borrow internally from peer funds with-
in the fund families through Interfund Lending Programs, or borrow external-
ly from banks / other financial institutions, or both at the same time. Disen-
tangling multiple borrowing channels and examine their effectiveness requires
empirical work. Therefore, we estimate the following regression to compare the
effectiveness of the two borrowing channels:
ri, j,k,t+1 =β1Distressk,t × ILP j,t + β2Distressk,t × External Borrowingi,t + γ1ILP j,t
+ γ2External Borrowingi,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
(3.3)
where ILP j,t is a dummy variable equals one for the time period after
SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund family j, and
External Borrowingi,t is a dummy variable equals one if funds have any amount
of bank overdraft / bank loan, or engaged in money borrowing activities in year
t.
Figure 3.2 presents the external borrowing activities. Panel A reports the
number of external borrowing funds that are in distress from 1998-2014. The dis-
tress event is defined using bottom 0.25th percentile return threshold. It shows
that the frequency distribution of external borrowing funds is quite similar to
that of distressed funds in Figure 3.1. Most of the external borrowing activities
are concentrated during 2008 financial crisis. Panel B of Figure 3.2 reports the
number of distressed funds and external borrowing funds among them for each
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broad investment style. The broad investment styles are defined using the first 2
digits of CRSP investment style code. About 1/4-1/2 of distressed funds engage
in external borrowing activities during the whole sample period. The informa-
tion in Figure 3.2 demonstrates that mutual funds generally have multiple ways
to acquire short-term liquidity.
Table 3.16 compare the effect of Interfund Lending Programs and exter-
nal borrowing on fund returns following exogenous negative return shock-
s. The result shows that both sources of funding are effective in providing
emergent liquidity to distressed funds. Specifically, the variables of interest
Distress×ILP and Distress×External Borrowing in Column (3)-(5) are both posi-
tive and highly significant when distress is defined below bottom 1th percentile.
Moreover, the economic magnitude of Distress×ILP (0.0033) is almost twice of
Distress×External Borrowing (0.0017) under extreme distress, both are highly
significant at 1% level. In sum, the comparison of alternative funding sources-
interfund lending facilities and external borrowing-suggests that both channels
are effective in providing short-term liquidity to distressed funds and reducing
adverse price impact following distress. Evidence also indicates that Interfund
Lending Programs have larger impact on fund returns following distress events.
3.4.2 Liquidity Management and External Borrowing Needs
The Interfund Lending Programs provide short-term liquidity to the borrow-
ing funds when they are in distress. Chernenko and Sunderam (2016), Zeng
(2017) and Ben-Rephael (2017) show that mutual funds engage in substantial
liquidity management. They hold substantial amounts of cash, which is used
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to accommodate redemption requests rather than transacting in the underlying
portfolio assets. If cash reserve is not sufficient, then part of portfolio holdings
must be liquidated to meet potential redemption needs following distress. With
the existence of the Interfund Lending Program, distressed funds could obtain
necessary liquidity beyond their cash reserves. Another possible funding chan-
nel is to borrow externally from banks or other financial institutions. Usually
they obtain credit line from banks for emergency purpose. Therefore, Interfund
Lending Programs facilitate liquidity management for the borrowing funds. We
hypothesize that there will be smaller magnitude of change in cash reserve for
ILP-funds than non-ILP funds following distress events. Similarly, due to less
demand for short-term liquidity, borrowing funds with Interfund Lending Pro-
grams are also less likely to borrower externally from banks or other sources.
To test these two hypotheses, we construct a panel dataset with fund-year
observations from 1998-2015, and estimate the following regressions:
∆Cashi, j,k,t = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δt + i,t
ExternalBorrowingi, j,k,t = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δt + i,t
(3.4)
where ∆Cashi, j,k,t is the change of cash holding of fund i in fund family j
with investment objective k from year t − 1 to year t. The cash holding is
calculated as sum of cash (N-SAR Item 74-A and 74-B), short-term debt (N-
SAR Item 74-C) and other investments (N-SAR Item 74-I) over TNA in year
t. ExternalBorrowingi, j,k,t is an indicator which equals one if the fund has over-
drafts (N-SAR Item 55-A) or bank loans (N-SAR Item 55-B) in year t. Distress
indicator Distressk,t is a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment
style k is in distress in year t. Funds with investment style k is in distress if the
TNA-weighted average weekly returns are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th, 0.5th
and 0.25th percentile within the same investment style during the entire sample
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period. ILP indicator ILP j,t is a dummy variable equals one for the time period
after SEC exemptive order of ILP for fund family j. The investment styles are
based on CRSP 4-digit investment style code.
Table 3.15 presents the implication of Interfund Lending Programs for liq-
uidity management and external borrowing. The change in cash holdings are
larger for borrowing funds with Interfund Lending Programs than non-ILP
funds in the year following distress events. On average, borrowing funds with
Interfund Lending Programs have 1.28% higher change in cash positions under
extreme distress defined at bottom 0.25th percentile, with t-statistics above 3.
The coefficient could be interpreted as suffering less from the reduction in cash
positions with Interfund Lending Programs, as it provides additional liquidity
to meet the potential outflows following distress. It suggests that funds with
Interfund Lending Programs are less likely to dispose their cash reserves, and
therefore larger changes in cash positions (may be smaller in absolute magni-
tude). This is consistent with the expectation that Interfund Lending Programs
play significant role in liquidity management for the borrowing funds in dis-
tress.
In terms of external borrowing behavior, I find that borrowing funds with
Interfund Lending Programs are significantly less likely to engage in external
borrowing from banks or other sources than non-ILP funds under some spec-
ifications. For instance, borrowing funds with Interfund Lending Programs is
associated with 3% smaller probability of external borrowing. The effect is s-
tatistically significant at 1% level for distress events defined at bottom 1th and
0.5th percentile of all weekly returns for funds with specific investment style.
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3.5 Conclusion
The Interfund Lending Program is one of the most important lending facilities
for mutual funds to as cushion extreme fund outflows. The mechanism allows
funds facing large redemption pressure to obtain short-term liquidity from oth-
er funds within family, thus alleviating adverse price movement due to asset
fire sales. The effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for distressed funds
lies in the flexibility of lending arrangement and lower-than-market loan rate.
The Interfund Lending Programs create an efficient internal capital market for
mutual funds and offers an convenient channel for short-term lending facility.
Our paper examines the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for
borrowing and lending parties in fund families. We consider how Interfund
Lending Programs affect fund returns following distress, measured by extreme-
ly low returns for a particular investment style. This kind of distress can be
regarded as exogenous shock to the fund flows, possibly leading to liquidity
shortage. As a consequence, such distress would trigger interfund lending ac-
tivities for funds eligible for the Interfund Lending Programs. We are especially
interested in the difference in short-term returns between ILP-funds and non-
ILP funds following the distress. Overall, we find strong empirical evidences in
support of the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for borrowing fund-
s. In general funds eligible for Interfund Lending Programs have 0.32% higher
returns in the week following the distress, and the positive effect is persistent for
at least two months. In addition, we show that the positive effect for distressed
funds are pronounced when the credit market liquidity is low, if they belong to
fund families with diversified investment styles, and if fund managers are co-
operative in the families. However, we find limited, if any, evidence concerning
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the effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for lending parties. Our pri-
mary findings are robust to alternative variable definitions, sample period and
model specification. Moreover, we demonstrate that Interfund Lending Pro-
grams facilitate liquidity management and reduced external borrowing needs.
Overall, our paper highlights the positive role of Interfund Lending Programs
in liquidity provision and internal capital market in fund families.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Distressed Funds
This figure reports the number of distressed funds under alternative distress definitions. The distress is defined in the
sense that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with the same investment objective are below the bottom 2nd,
1th, 0.5th and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period.
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Figure 3.2: Number of ILP and External Borrowing Funds in Distress
This figure describes external borrowing activities. Panel A reports the number of distressed funds that utilize ILP or
borrow externally from 1998-2014. Panel B reports the aggregate numbers for each broad investment style. Mutual
funds’ actual utilization of Interfund lending Programs are obtained from N-CSR and N-30D filings. ILP funds are
defined as having borrowed through Interfund lending Program in year t. External borrowing activities are defined
as having any amount of bank overdraft (N-SAR Item 55-A) / bank loan (N-SAR Item 55-B), or engaged in borrowing
activities (N-SAR Item 77-O) in year t. We use bottom 0.25th percentile return threshold in the definition of distress.
Broad investment styles include domestic equity (ED), foreign equity (EF), general fixed income (I), corporate bond (IC),
foreign fixed income (IF), government bond (IG), money market (IM), municipal bond (IU) and balanced (M).
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Figure 3.3: Effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs
This figure reports coefficient of interaction term Distress×ILP (solid) and its 95% confidence interval (dash) in the
baseline regression:
T∑
t=1
ri, j,k,T = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t T = 1, 2, ...8
T∑
t=1
ri, j,k,T = βDistress6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t T = 1, 2, ...8
The dependent variable is the cumulative fund returns from week t + 1 up to t + 8, where t = 0 stands for distress week.
The robust standard errors are clustered by fund family and time.
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Figure 3.4: Effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for Borrowers
This figure reports coefficient of interaction term Distress×ILP (solid) and its 95% confidence interval (dash) in the
following regression for each broad investment style.
T∑
t=1
ri, j,k,T = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t T = 1, 2, ...8
The dependent variable is the cumulative fund returns from week t + 1 up to t + 8, where t = 0 stands for distress week.
We repeat the regression analysis for each board investment style using the first 2 digits of CRSP investment style code.
They include domestic equity (ED), foreign equity (EF), general fixed income (I), corporate bond (IC), foreign fixed
income (IF), government bond (IG), money market (IM), municipal bond (IU) and balanced (M). The robust standard
errors are clustered by fund.
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Figure 3.5: Effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs for Lenders
This figure reports coefficient of interaction term Distress×ILP (solid) and its 95% confidence interval (dash) in the
following regression for each broad investment style.
T∑
t=1
ri, j,k,T = βDistress6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t T = 1, 2, ...8
The dependent variable is the cumulative fund returns from week t + 1 up to t + 8, where t = 0 stands for distress week.
We repeat the regression analysis for each board investment style using the first 2 digits of CRSP investment style code.
They include domestic equity (ED), foreign equity (EF), general fixed income (I), corporate bond (IC), foreign fixed
income (IF), government bond (IG), money market (IM), municipal bond (IU) and balanced (M). The robust standard
errors are clustered by fund.
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Figure 3.6: Effectiveness of ILP for Matched Sample
This figure reports coefficient of interaction term Distress×ILP (solid) and its 95% confidence interval (dash) in the
baseline regression for the matched sample. The matching is based on investment style, fund size, fund age, expense
ratio, front-end load, redemption fee and past two weeks’ return prior to the third week of September 2008.
T∑
t=1
ri, j,k,T = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t T = 1, 2, ...8
T∑
t=1
ri, j,k,T = βDistress6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t T = 1, 2, ...8
The dependent variable is the cumulative fund returns from week t + 1 up to t + 8, where t = 0 stands for distress week.
The robust standard errors are clustered by fund family and time.
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Table 3.1: Style-Wide Distress Events
This table presents the summary statistics of style-wide distress events. Distress is defined in the sense that the TNA-
weighted weekly returns of funds with the same investment style are below the bottom 0.5th percentile of the same
funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period. Probability is the proportion of observations of distressed
funds in total number of funds with the same investment style. Mean, Median, Q10 and Q90 are distribution of weekly
returns of distressed funds. Detailed information for style classification is provided in Appendix A.11.
CRSP Style Code Obv Probability No. of Distressed Funds Mean Median Q10 Q90
EDCI 11998 0.006 76 -0.142 -0.137 -0.189 -0.106
EDCL 33942 0.004 143 -0.129 -0.115 -0.195 -0.092
EDCM 128362 0.005 579 -0.171 -0.164 -0.234 -0.124
EDCS 195081 0.005 942 -0.163 -0.154 -0.227 -0.117
EDSA 3562 0.006 20 -0.186 -0.19 -0.227 -0.137
EDSC 3152 0.001 3 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18
EDSF 13642 0.004 60 -0.162 -0.164 -0.191 -0.13
EDSG 9220 0.004 39 -0.178 -0.164 -0.229 -0.155
EDSH 19699 0.004 70 -0.13 -0.112 -0.189 -0.106
EDSI 1752 0.003 6 -0.136 -0.136 -0.136 -0.136
EDSM 594 0.002 1 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
EDSN 15918 0.003 55 -0.205 -0.185 -0.306 -0.144
EDSR 38537 0.006 218 -0.166 -0.169 -0.183 -0.144
EDSS 1982 0.003 6 -0.185 -0.185 -0.185 -0.185
EDST 28400 0.005 145 -0.184 -0.16 -0.279 -0.138
EDSU 13942 0.005 67 -0.13 -0.102 -0.23 -0.085
EDYB 241263 0.004 1078 -0.119 -0.101 -0.188 -0.085
EDYG 414880 0.004 1834 -0.143 -0.142 -0.179 -0.109
EDYH 11992 0.004 44 -0.058 -0.058 -0.075 -0.04
EDYI 55514 0.005 286 -0.123 -0.102 -0.199 -0.09
EDYS 778 0.003 2 -0.103 -0.103 -0.103 -0.102
EF 230005 0.005 1150 -0.127 -0.111 -0.191 -0.097
EFCS 25505 0.005 131 -0.134 -0.121 -0.183 -0.108
EFRE 20652 0.005 104 -0.141 -0.132 -0.191 -0.106
EFRI 816 0.005 4 -0.082 -0.082 -0.082 -0.082
EFRJ 7266 0.006 40 -0.123 -0.115 -0.17 -0.094
EFRL 5950 0.005 29 -0.22 -0.201 -0.311 -0.165
EFRM 47312 0.005 225 -0.161 -0.156 -0.216 -0.118
EFRP 8134 0.006 50 -0.125 -0.106 -0.208 -0.08
EFRQ 5105 0.005 25 -0.136 -0.138 -0.152 -0.115
EFRX 10251 0.005 49 -0.141 -0.145 -0.17 -0.104
EFSF 849 0.005 4 -0.146 -0.146 -0.146 -0.146
EFSH 1938 0.005 10 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19
EFSN 5379 0.003 16 -0.269 -0.269 -0.269 -0.269
EFSR 5999 0.002 11 -0.185 -0.185 -0.185 -0.185
EFST 1827 0.007 13 -0.138 -0.138 -0.138 -0.138
I 246928 0.004 984 -0.03 -0.027 -0.039 -0.025
ICQH 30299 0.002 67 -0.032 -0.029 -0.037 -0.028
ICQY 31097 0.003 99 -0.04 -0.031 -0.07 -0.028
IF 54073 0.005 278 -0.034 -0.032 -0.043 -0.029
IFM 659 0.003 2 0 0 0 0
IG 30212 0.004 125 -0.023 -0.022 -0.028 -0.021
IGD 9253 0.005 43 -0.016 -0.016 -0.018 -0.013
IGDI 13872 0.005 63 -0.019 -0.018 -0.023 -0.017
IGDS 21244 0.003 66 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.01
IGT 13015 0.005 66 -0.045 -0.042 -0.061 -0.037
IM 236534 0.003 726 0 0 -0.001 0
IU 264530 0.005 1323 -0.037 -0.034 -0.052 -0.03
IUI 62189 0.005 309 -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 -0.02
IUS 12012 0.005 57 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004
M 231161 0.005 1115 -0.083 -0.07 -0.135 -0.056
MT 3925 0.005 20 -0.044 -0.039 -0.067 -0.027
OC 765 0.004 3 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036
OM 38222 0.004 156 -0.018 -0.015 -0.026 -0.015
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables. The sample consists of fund-week observations from 1998
to 2014. ILP is a dummy variable equals one if the fund family are eligible for Interfund Lending Programs in month
t, and zero otherwise. Fund Return is calculated as TNA-weighted weekly returns for funds with the same CRSP
investment style. Fund TNA is log of fund’s total net assets. Fund Age is log of years since fund’s inception in N-SAR
filings. Expense Ratio is the percentage of total expenses (N-SAR Item 72-X) over total net assets. Front-End Load is
percentage of total front-end sales loads collected from sales over total net assets. Redemption Fee is percentage of total
amount deferred or contingent deferred sales loads and redemption fees over total net assets. Investment style variables
are first 2 digits of CRSP investment style code. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.9.
N Mean S.D. Q10 Q25 Median Q75 Q90
ILP 2982445 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Fund Return % 2981967 0.12 2.21 -2.02 -0.46 0.08 0.87 2.30
Fund TNA (Billion) 2798874 1.85 6.41 0.02 0.08 0.28 1.06 3.77
Fund Age 2982445 5.35 3.67 2.00 2.00 4.00 7.00 11.00
Expense Ratio % 2798874 1.14 0.95 0.37 0.67 0.97 1.34 1.92
Front-End Load % 2798874 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.15
Redemption Fee % 2798874 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
Equity: Domestic 2982445 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Equity: Foreign 2982445 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Fixed Income: General 2982445 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed Income: Corporate 2982445 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed Income: Foreign 2982445 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed Income: Government 2982445 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed Income: Money Market 2982445 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fixed Income: Municipal 2982445 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Balanced 2982445 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mortgage-Backed 2982445 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 3.3: Effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs: Baseline Regression
This table presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) on fund returns following exogenous negative return
shocks. The sample consists of fund-week observations from 1998 to 2014. Specifically, we estimate the following two
regressions:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress 6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the
sense that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th,
0.5th and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is
a dummy variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund
family j. The investment styles are based on CRSP 4-digit investment style code. Detailed variable definitions are
provided in Appendix A.9. All regressions include style-time and fund fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered
by fund family and time are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Borrowers Lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP 0.0005 -0.0002∗∗∗
(1.63) (-2.77)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP 0.0006∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
(1.72) (-2.85)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0010∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(1.82) (-2.70)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP 0.0017∗∗ -0.0002
(2.14) (-0.66)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0032∗∗∗ -0.0002
(5.63) (-0.32)
ILP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.84) (0.90) (0.95) (0.98) (1.00) (1.61) (1.50) (1.48) (1.18) (1.15)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600
Number of Fund Families 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
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Table 3.4: Effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs by Board Investment
Style
This table presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) on fund returns following exogenous negative return
shocks for each board investment style. The sample consists of fund-week observations from 1998 to 2014. Specifically,
we estimate the following two regressions:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress 6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the
sense that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th,
0.5th and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is
a dummy variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund
family j. We repeat the regression analysis for each board investment style using the first 2 digits of CRSP investment
style code. They include domestic equity (ED), foreign equity (EF), general fixed income (I), corporate bond (IC), foreign
fixed income (IF), government bond (IG), money market (IM), municipal bond (IU) and balanced (M). Detailed variable
definitions are provided in Appendix A.9. All regressions include style-time and fund fixed effects. The robust t-
statistics clustered by fund are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Borrowers (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ED EF I IC IF IG IM IU M
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ -0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0035 0.0067 -0.0006 -0.0002∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0025
(5.30) (2.66) (-2.86) (1.44) (1.07) (-0.82) (-2.33) (3.58) (1.30)
ILP 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(1.53) (-0.68) (0.47) (-0.24) (-1.33) (0.12) (-1.54) (0.38) (-0.30)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1232304 373920 244588 60921 54049 86895 292874 336545 228988
Number of Funds 5411 1631 1146 291 268 388 1078 1144 1092
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.90 0.42 0.65 0.48 0.70 0.56 0.84 0.77
Panel B. Lenders (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ED EF I IC IF IG IM IU M
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0003∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ -0.0011 0.0021 -0.0004 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ -0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0006
(1.65) (4.39) (-1.27) (1.57) (-0.21) (3.41) (4.06) (-6.32) (-1.17)
ILP 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000∗∗ -0.0000
(1.61) (-0.72) (0.51) (-0.33) (-1.24) (-0.17) (-1.62) (2.04) (-0.24)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1232304 373920 244588 60921 54049 86895 292874 336545 228988
Number of Funds 5411 1631 1146 291 268 388 1078 1144 1092
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.90 0.42 0.65 0.48 0.70 0.56 0.84 0.77
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Table 3.5: Effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs Conditional on Credit
Market Liquidity
This table presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) on fund returns following exogenous negative
return shocks conditional on credit market liquidity. The sample consists of fund-week observations from 1998 to 2014.
Specifically, we estimate the following two regressions:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress 6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the sense
that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th, 0.5th
and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is a dummy
variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund family j. The
investment styles are based on CRSP 4-digit investment style code. Illiquid period is defined as time period when TED
rate is above the sample median. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.9. All regressions include
style-time and fund fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered by fund family and time are reported in parentheses.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Borrowers
Low TED Rate High TED Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP -0.0001 0.0006∗
(-0.40) (1.80)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP 0.0000 0.0007∗
(0.12) (1.78)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0001 0.0012∗
(1.04) (1.87)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP -0.0011∗ 0.0017∗∗
(-1.65) (2.18)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0001 0.0033∗∗∗
(0.06) (5.49)
ILP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.72) (0.70) (0.69) (0.70) (0.70) (1.01) (1.10) (1.16) (1.17) (1.21)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1338175 1338175 1338175 1338175 1338175 1617276 1617276 1617276 1617276 1617276
Number of Fund Families 452 452 452 452 452 559 559 559 559 559
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
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Panel B: Lenders
Liquid Period Illiquid Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP -0.0001∗ -0.0003∗∗
(-1.84) (-2.26)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗
(-2.59) (-2.23)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP -0.0004 -0.0006∗∗
(-1.50) (-2.31)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP -0.0003 -0.0002
(-1.21) (-0.55)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP -0.0001 -0.0002
(-0.28) (-0.30)
ILP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001∗∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001 0.0001
(0.88) (0.87) (0.79) (0.72) (0.70) (1.99) (1.79) (1.82) (1.44) (1.43)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1338175 1338175 1338175 1338175 1338175 1617276 1617276 1617276 1617276 1617276
Number of Fund Families 452 452 452 452 452 559 559 559 559 559
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
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Table 3.6: Effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs Conditional on Intra-
Family Style Diversity
This table presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) on fund returns following exogenous negative return
shocks conditional on intra-family style diversity. The sample consists of fund-week observations from 1998 to 2014.
Specifically, we estimate the following two regressions:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress 6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the sense
that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th, 0.5th
and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is a dummy
variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund family j. The
investment styles are based on CRSP 4-digit investment style code. High-diversity fund families are defined as having
above-median Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of fund total net assets based on CRSP investment styles, where the HHI
is calculated as summation of squared proportion of TNA belonging to the CRSP 4-digit investment style code within
families. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.9. All regressions include style-time and fund fixed
effects. The robust t-statistics clustered by fund family and time are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Borrowers
Low Diversity High Diversity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP 0.0007 0.0003
(1.31) (0.67)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP 0.0007 0.0005
(1.11) (1.11)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0006 0.0010
(0.60) (1.45)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP 0.0015 0.0017
(1.05) (1.57)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0025 0.0037∗∗∗
(0.85) (3.89)
ILP -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(-1.01) (-0.96) (-0.89) (-0.92) (-0.91) (-0.42) (-0.46) (-0.44) (-0.40) (-0.41)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1477502 1477502 1477502 1477502 1477502 1474516 1474516 1474516 1474516 1474516
Number of Fund Families 546 546 546 546 546 193 193 193 193 193
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
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Panel B: Lenders
Low Diversity High Diversity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP -0.0001 -0.0002∗∗
(-1.28) (-2.34)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP -0.0001 -0.0003∗∗
(-0.54) (-2.48)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0001 -0.0007∗∗∗
(0.38) (-2.84)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP 0.0008 -0.0004
(1.45) (-1.20)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0010∗∗ -0.0003
(2.52) (-0.69)
ILP -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(-0.60) (-0.76) (-0.85) (-0.97) (-0.95) (0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (-0.12) (-0.22)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1477502 1477502 1477502 1477502 1477502 1474516 1474516 1474516 1474516 1474516
Number of Fund Families 546 546 546 546 546 193 193 193 193 193
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
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Table 3.7: Competitive VS. Cooperative Fund Managers
This table presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) on the returns of lending funds with competitive
VS. cooperative fund managers following exogenous negative return shocks. The sample consists of fund-week obser-
vations from 1998 to 2014. Specifically, we estimate the following regression:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress 6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t−1 is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the sense
that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th, 0.5th
and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is a dummy
variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund family j. The
investment styles are based on CRSP 4-digit investment style code. We divide the sample based on competitive and
cooperative fund managers. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.9. All regressions include style-
time and fund fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered by fund family and time are reported in parentheses. ***, **
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Borrowers
Competitive Managers Cooperative Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP 0.0003 0.0002
(0.70) (1.18)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP 0.0003 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.58) (2.68)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0004 0.0007∗∗∗
(0.47) (3.05)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP 0.0008 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.62) (2.72)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0014 0.0027∗∗∗
(0.78) (5.37)
ILP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002∗∗ 0.0002∗∗ 0.0002∗∗ 0.0002∗∗ 0.0002∗∗
(0.49) (0.52) (0.55) (0.55) (0.56) (2.43) (2.43) (2.49) (2.50) (2.52)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1371338 1371338 1371338 1371338 1371338 1376922 1376922 1376922 1376922 1376922
Number of Fund Families 451 451 451 451 451 278 278 278 278 278
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
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Panel B: Lenders
Competitive Managers Cooperative Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP -0.0003∗∗ -0.0002∗
(-2.28) (-1.95)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP -0.0004∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
(-2.41) (-2.60)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP -0.0006∗∗ -0.0004∗∗
(-2.24) (-2.42)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP -0.0004 0.0000
(-0.79) (0.00)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP -0.0005 0.0001
(-0.60) (0.15)
ILP 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.99) (0.90) (0.83) (0.67) (0.64) (3.02) (2.95) (2.82) (2.60) (2.67)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1371338 1371338 1371338 1371338 1371338 1376922 1376922 1376922 1376922 1376922
Number of Fund Families 451 451 451 451 451 278 278 278 278 278
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
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Table 3.8: Effectiveness of Interfund Lending Programs around Collapse of
Lehman Brothers
This table presents the effect of Interfund Lending Program (ILP) on fund returns around the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers in September 2008. The sample consists of fund-week observations. Specifically, we estimate the following two
regressions for the matched sample:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress 6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the
sense that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th,
0.5th and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is
a dummy variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund
family j. The investment styles are based on CRSP 4-digit investment style code. Panel A reports result for unmatched
sample, while Panel B reports result for matched sample. The matching is based on fund size, fund age, expense ratio,
front-end load, redemption fee, past two weeks’ return prior to the third week of September 2008, and investment style.
Panel C reports result of balance test for covariates before and after the matching. We define include 10 weeks of pre-
and post-event period. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.9. All regressions include style-time
and fund fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered by fund family and time are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Unmatched Sample
Borrowers Lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP 0.0015∗ -0.0011
(1.91) (-1.62)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP 0.0018∗∗ -0.0014∗∗
(2.18) (-2.79)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0022∗∗ -0.0016∗∗∗
(2.21) (-3.08)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP 0.0026∗∗ -0.0005
(2.12) (-0.66)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0035∗∗∗ -0.0001
(3.68) (-0.15)
ILP 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗
(3.29) (2.93) (3.22) (3.75) (3.16) (4.07) (5.09) (4.67) (5.07) (4.89)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 76687 76687 76687 76687 76687 76687 76687 76687 76687 76687
Number of Fund Families 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248 248
Adjusted R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
152
Panel B: Matched Sample
Borrowers Lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP 0.0013∗ -0.0010∗∗
(2.08) (-2.12)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP 0.0014∗∗ -0.0011∗∗∗
(2.10) (-3.02)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0018∗∗ -0.0013∗∗
(2.35) (-2.72)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP 0.0023∗∗ -0.0003
(2.37) (-0.43)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0019∗∗ -0.0000
(2.20) (-0.04)
ILP 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗
(3.50) (3.32) (3.51) (2.84) (3.50) (5.72) (5.50) (5.80) (5.71) (5.60)
Style FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 36226 36226 36226 36226 36226 36226 36226 36226 36226 36226
Number of Fund Families 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185
Adjusted R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
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Panel C: Balance Test of Covariates
Sample Control Treatment Diff T-stats
Lagged Fund Return Full -0.16 -0.16 -0.01 -1.87
Matched -0.15 -0.15 0.00 0.87
Ln(Fund TNA) Full 12.26 13.28 -1.02 -13.94
Matched 13.09 13.02 0.06 0.73
Ln(Fund Age) Full 1.43 1.70 -0.27 -9.49
Matched 1.70 1.62 0.08 2.27
Expense Ratio Full 1.44 1.08 0.36 10.02
Matched 1.10 1.14 -0.04 -1.10
Front-End Load Full 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.86
Matched 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.72
Redemption Fee Full 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -3.46
Matched 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.12
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Table 3.9: Robustness Checks: Defining Distress Events with Broad CRSP In-
vestment Styles
This table presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) on fund returns following exogenous negative return
shocks. The sample consists of fund-week observations from 1998 to 2014. Specifically, we estimate the following two
regressions:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress 6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the sense
that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th, 0.5th
and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is a dummy
variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund family j.
The investment styles are based on the first 2 digits of CRSP investment style code. Detailed variable definitions are
provided in Appendix A.9. All regressions include style-time and fund fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered
by fund family and time are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Borrowers Lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP 0.0004 -0.0003∗∗
(1.59) (-2.14)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP 0.0007∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
(1.83) (-2.67)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0009∗ -0.0009∗∗∗
(1.67) (-2.99)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP 0.0016∗ -0.0005
(1.88) (-1.21)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0003
(5.12) (0.89)
ILP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.85) (0.87) (0.97) (0.98) (0.99) (1.49) (1.60) (1.47) (1.26) (1.09)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600
Number of Fund Families 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
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Table 3.10: Robustness Checks: Defining Distress Events with N-SAR Invest-
ment Styles
This table presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) on fund returns following exogenous negative return
shocks. The sample consists of fund-week observations from 1998 to 2014. Specifically, we estimate the following two
regressions:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress 6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the sense
that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th, 0.5th
and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is a dummy
variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund family j. The
investment styles are based on N-SAR investment style formulated from Item 61-70. Detailed variable definitions are
provided in Appendix A.9. All regressions include style-time and fund fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered
by fund family and time are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Borrowers Lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.54) (-1.15)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP 0.0002 -0.0004∗∗∗
(0.44) (-3.01)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0005 -0.0002
(0.81) (-0.68)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP 0.0014 -0.0003
(1.58) (-0.68)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗
(5.35) (2.01)
ILP 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.99) (1.03) (1.01) (1.00) (1.01) (1.27) (1.44) (1.20) (1.18) (1.02)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600
Number of Fund Families 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
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Table 3.11: Robustness Checks: Defining Distress Events with Fixed Return
Thresholds
This table presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) on fund returns following exogenous negative return
shocks. The sample consists of fund-week observations from 1998 to 2014. Specifically, we estimate the following two
regressions:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress 6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the
sense that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below -2%, -3%, -4%, -5% and
-6%, respectively. ILP j,t is a dummy variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive order of Interfund
Lending Program for fund family j. The investment styles are based on CRSP 4-digit investment style code. Detailed
variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.9. All regressions include style-time and fund fixed effects. The robust
t-statistics clustered by fund family and time are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Borrowers Lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Below -4%)×ILP 0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0001
(2.69) (-1.55)
Distress (Below -5%)×ILP 0.0010∗∗∗ -0.0001
(2.66) (-1.25)
Distress (Below -6%)×ILP 0.0013∗∗ -0.0001
(2.36) (-1.06)
Distress (Below -7%)×ILP 0.0016∗∗ -0.0001
(2.36) (-0.43)
Distress (Below -8%)×ILP 0.0017∗∗ 0.0000
(2.07) (0.07)
ILP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.73) (0.81) (0.88) (0.92) (0.98) (1.45) (1.33) (1.26) (1.18) (1.11)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600
Number of Fund Families 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
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Table 3.12: Robustness Checks: Excluding Financial Crisis Period
This table presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) on fund returns following exogenous negative
return shocks. The sample consists of fund-week observations from 1998 to 2014, excluding financial crisis period from
2008-2009. Specifically, we estimate the following two regressions:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress 6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the
sense that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th,
0.5th and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is
a dummy variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund
family j. The investment styles are based on CRSP 4-digit investment style code. Detailed variable definitions are
provided in Appendix A.9. All regressions include style-time and fund fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered
by fund family and time are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Borrowers Lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP 0.0003 -0.0001
(1.39) (-1.12)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP 0.0003 -0.0000
(1.19) (-0.83)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0007∗∗ -0.0001
(2.18) (-1.55)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0000
(2.74) (0.24)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0003
(10.87) (1.30)
ILP 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(1.34) (1.41) (1.41) (1.43) (1.43) (1.60) (1.49) (1.53) (1.47) (1.45)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2556609 2556609 2556609 2556609 2556609 2556609 2556609 2556609 2556609 2556609
Number of Fund Families 557 557 557 557 557 557 557 557 557 557
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
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Table 3.13: Robustness Checks: ILP Application
This table presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) on fund returns following exogenous negative return
shocks. The sample consists of fund-week observations from 1998 to 2014. Specifically, we estimate the following two
regressions:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress 6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the
sense that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th,
0.5th and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is
a dummy variable equals one for the time period after application of Interfund Lending Program for fund family j.
The investment styles are based on CRSP 4-digit investment style code. Detailed variable definitions are provided
in Appendix A.9. All regressions include style-time and fund fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered by fund
family and time are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Borrowers Lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP 0.0005 -0.0002∗∗
(1.59) (-2.43)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP 0.0006 -0.0002∗∗
(1.63) (-2.58)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0009∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(1.77) (-2.67)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP 0.0017∗∗ -0.0002
(2.30) (-0.59)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0032∗∗∗ -0.0002
(5.72) (-0.34)
ILP 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.87) (0.93) (0.97) (0.99) (1.02) (1.59) (1.52) (1.54) (1.20) (1.17)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600
Number of Fund Families 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563 563
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
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Table 3.14: Robustness Checks: Additional Control Variables
This table presents the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) on fund returns following exogenous negative return
shocks. The sample consists of fund-week observations from 1998 to 2014. Specifically, we estimate the following two
regressions:
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + ηXi,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
ri, j,k,t+1 = βDistress 6k, j,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + ηXi,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the
sense that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th,
0.5th and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is
a dummy variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund
family j. Additional control variables include lagged fund return in the past two weeks, fund TNA, fund age, and
expense ratio. The investment styles are based on CRSP 4-digit investment style code. The control variables include
lagged fund returns, log of fund TNA, log of fund age and expense ratio. All regressions include style-time and fund
fixed effects. The robust t-statistics clustered by fund family and time are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Borrowers Lenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP 0.0004∗ -0.0002∗∗∗
(1.69) (-2.82)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP 0.0005∗ -0.0002∗∗∗
(1.69) (-2.87)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0008∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(1.81) (-2.77)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP 0.0015∗∗ -0.0002
(2.05) (-0.59)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0028∗∗∗ -0.0001
(3.61) (-0.20)
ILP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.48) (0.56) (0.61) (0.63) (0.65) (1.33) (1.20) (1.19) (0.83) (0.79)
Lagged Fund Return 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Ln(Fund TNA) -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
(-5.42) (-5.42) (-5.42) (-5.42) (-5.43) (-5.43) (-5.43) (-5.44) (-5.43) (-5.43)
Ln(Fund Age) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(1.18) (1.18) (1.18) (1.18) (1.18) (1.23) (1.23) (1.25) (1.21) (1.20)
Expense Ratio -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
(-6.60) (-6.60) (-6.60) (-6.60) (-6.60) (-6.61) (-6.62) (-6.62) (-6.61) (-6.61)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2759746 2759746 2759746 2759746 2759746 2759746 2759746 2759746 2759746 2759746
Number of Fund Families 557 557 557 557 557 557 557 557 557 557
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
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Table 3.15: Liquidity Management and External Borrowing
This table presents effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) for liquidity management and external borrowing. The
sample consists of fund-year observations from 1998 to 2014. Specifically, we estimate the following regression:
∆Cashi, j,k,t = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + θi + δt + i,t
ExternalBorrowingi, j,k,t = βDistressk,t × ILP j,t + γILP j,t + δk,t + i,t
where ∆Cashi, j,k,t is the change of cash holding of fund i in fund family jwith investment objective k from year t−1 to year
t. The cash holding is calculated as sum of cash (N-SAR Item 74-A and 74-B), short-term debt (N-SAR Item 74-C) and
other investments (N-SAR Item 74-I) over TNA in year t. ExternalBorrowingi, j,k,t is an indicator which equals one if the
funds have any amount of bank overdraft (N-SAR Item 55-A) / bank loan (N-SAR Item 55-B), or engaged in borrowing
activities (N-SAR Item 77-O) in year t. Distressk,t is a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is
in distress in year t. Distress is defined in the sense that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment
objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th, 0.5th and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during
the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is a dummy variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive
order of Interfund Lending Program for fund family j. The investment styles are based on CRSP 4-digit investment
style code. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.9. All regressions include style-time fixed effects.
The robust t-statistics clustered by fund are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
∆Cash/TNA Borrowing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Distress (Bottom 3%)×ILP 0.0001 -0.0162∗
(0.04) (-1.75)
Distress (Bottom 2%)×ILP 0.0030 -0.0062
(1.60) (-0.70)
Distress (Bottom 1%)×ILP 0.0071∗∗∗ -0.0303∗∗∗
(2.91) (-3.51)
Distress (Bottom 0.5%)×ILP 0.0093∗∗∗ -0.0229∗∗
(2.60) (-2.15)
Distress (Bottom 0.25%)×ILP 0.0128∗∗∗ -0.0085
(3.05) (-0.73)
ILP -0.0012 -0.0025∗∗ -0.0029∗∗∗ -0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0381∗∗∗ -0.0439∗∗∗ -0.0395∗∗∗ -0.0439∗∗∗ -0.0457∗∗∗
(-1.03) (-2.29) (-3.30) (-2.83) (-3.01) (-4.13) (-5.08) (-4.82) (-5.51) (-5.79)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 56777 56777 56777 56777 56777 72704 72704 72704 72704 72704
Number of Funds 10614 10614 10614 10614 10614 12117 12117 12117 12117 12117
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
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Table 3.16: Comparison Between Interfund Lending Program and External Bor-
rowing
This table compare the effect of Interfund Lending Programs (ILPs) and external borrowing on fund returns following
exogenous negative return shocks. The sample consists of fund-week observations from 1998 to 2014. Specifically, we
estimate the following regression:
ri, j,k,t+1 = β1Distressk,t × ILP j,t + β2Distressk,t × External Borrowingi,t + γ1ILP j,t + γ2External Borrowingi,t + θi + δk,t + i,t
where ri, j,k,t+1 is the return of fund i, belonging to fund family j with investment objective k in week t + 1. Distressk,t is
a dummy variable equals one if funds with investment style k is in distress in week t. Distress6k, j,t is a dummy variable
equals one if funds in family j with investment style other than k is in distress in week t. Distress is defined in the
sense that the TNA-weighted weekly returns of funds with investment objective k are below the bottom 3rd, 2nd, 1th,
0.5th and 0.25th percentile of the same funds’ weekly returns during the whole sample period, respectively. ILP j,t is
a dummy variable equals one for the time period after SEC exemptive order of Interfund Lending Program for fund
family j. External Borrowingi,t is a dummy variable equals one if funds have any amount of bank overdraft / bank loan,
or engaged in borrowing activities in year t. The investment styles are based on CRSP 4-digit investment style code.
Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.9. All regressions include style-time and fund fixed effects.
The robust t-statistics clustered by fund family and time are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bottom 3% Bottom 2% Bottom 1% Bottom 0.5% Bottom 0.25%
Distress×ILP 0.0005
(1.60)
Distress×External Borrowing 0.0001
(0.59)
Distress×ILP 0.0006∗
(1.68)
Distress×External Borrowing 0.0002
(0.72)
Distress×ILP 0.0010∗
(1.83)
Distress×External Borrowing 0.0008∗∗
(2.13)
Distress×ILP 0.0017∗∗
(2.14)
Distress×External Borrowing 0.0012∗∗
(2.35)
Distress×ILP 0.0033∗∗∗
(5.98)
Distress×External Borrowing 0.0017∗∗∗
(5.06)
ILP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.82) (0.88) (0.93) (0.95) (0.78)
External Borrowing 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.10) (0.08) (-0.06) (0.03) (0.10)
Style-Time FE Y Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600 2955600
Number of Fund Families 563 563 563 563 563
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX
Chapter 1
Factor Model-Based Estimates
Our factor-model-based proxies include the expected returns estimated by the
CAPM (Eret-CAPM), the 3-factor model (Eret-FF3) (Fama and French (1993))
and the 4-factor model (Eret-FF4) (Carhart (1997)). Specifically, at the end of
each month for each firm, the expected monthly return is estimated as
Eˆt
[
ri,t+1
]
= r f ,t+1 +
J∑
j=1
βˆiEˆt
[
f j,t
]
(A.1)
Eˆt
[
ri,t+1
]
is expected return for t+1, r f ,t+1 is the risk-free rate for t+1, βˆi is the factor
loadings and Eˆt
[
f j,t
]
is the expected factor premiums at time t, and J = 1, 3, 4
according to different model specifications. The factor loadings are estimated
through time-series regression using past five years of monthly stock returns.
Factor premiums are the means of factor returns over the same five-year period.
Finally, the monthly expected returns are compounded into an annual return for
a given fiscal year. We obtain monthly factor premiums, RM − R f , S MB, HML,
and UMD from Ken French’s data library.
The Implied Cost of Capital
Following Li et al. (2013), we assume that the steady-state earning growth rate
after 15 years (gt) will be a rolling average of annual GDP growth rate: e.g.
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gt = ICCt × bt, where bt is the constant retention ratio after year 15. Given the
first two years’ forecast earnings (FE), the initial growth rate (gt+2) is given by:
gt+2 = FEt+2FEt+1−1. This implies that gt+2 exp{g
g
t ×15} = gt with ggt being the growth rate
of growth rate gt+2, which yields g
g
t = ln
(
gt
gt+2
)
/15. Now we can construct FEt+k
for the next 15 years as FEt+k = FEt+2 × (1 + gt+2 exp{ggt × (k − 2)}) for 3 ≤ k ≤ 16.
The retention rate is assumed to revert linearly to the constant rate bt =
gt
ICCt
by year 16. Thus, we have bt+k = bt+1 − (bt+1−
gt
ICCt
)
15 × (k− 1) for 2 ≤ k ≤ 16. The initial
retention ratio is estimated as bt+1 = [1- Cash Dividendt /Net Incomet].
Now we construct the stream of dividends as Dt+k = FEt+k × (1 − bt+k) for
1 ≤ k ≤ 15. For the terminal value of remaining cash dividends after year 15,
we have: FEt+16 × (1 − bt)/(ICCt − gt). Putting all terms together, we estimate
ICC-LNS from the following equation.
Pt =
15∑
k=1
FEt+k × [1 − bt+1 + (bt+1−
gt
ICCt
)
15 × (k − 1)]
(1 + ICCt)k
+
FEt+15 × (1 − bt)
(ICCt − gt)(1 + ICCt)15 . (A.2)
This equation is equivalent to equation (4) in Li et al. (2013).
We consider an alternative model following the Claus and Thomas (2001)
approach. For this, we can obtain the initial forecast value of equity as BEt+1 =
BEt +FEt+1× (1−bt+1), where BEt is the book equity value per share at t. We then
obtain ICC-CT based on the economic profit for shareholders as in the following
equation:
Pt = BEt +
5∑
k=1
FEt+k − ICCt × BEt+k−1
(1 + ICCt)k
+
(FEt+5 − ICCt × BEt+4)(1 + gt)
(ICCt − gt)(1 + ICCt)5 (A.3)
where the growth rate after 5 years, gt, is estimated by inflation rate. The advan-
tage of using the Claus and Thomas (2001) approach relative to the previous ap-
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proach is that it does not require future payout ratios. However, this approach
is sensitive to the estimated growth rate gt.
As the last approach, we follow the Gebhardt et al. (2001) and estimate ICC-
GLS as follows:
Pt = BEt +
12∑
k=1
(ROEt+k − ICCt)BEt+k−1
(1 + ICCt)k
+
(ROEt+12 − ICCt)BEt+11
ICCt(1 + ICCt)12
(A.4)
where ROEt+k is the return on equity at t + k which is assumed to fade linearly
to the industry median ROE (based on 10 years of past data for 48 Fama and
French industries, excluding firms with losses) by year t + 12. The book value
of equity is given by BEt+k = BEt+k−1 + FEt+k × (1 − bt+k). This approach mitigates
the sensitivity of the ICC to the estimated growth rate in the Claus and Thomas
(2001) approach.
The sample includes firms with I/B/E/S earnings forecasts for up to five
years and a long-term growth forecast. We also require non-missing data for
the prior year’s book value of equity and earnings. When explicit forecasts are
unavailable, we obtain forecasts by projecting the long-term growth rate on the
prior year’s earnings forecast.
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definitions
Dependent Variables
CAPX Capital expenditure (CPAX) over beginning-of-year total assets (AT)
CAPX + R&D Capital expenditure plus R&D (XRD) over beginning-of-year total assets (AT)
CAPX + R&D + M&A Capital expenditure plus R&D (XRD) and M&A (AQC) over beginning-of-year total as-
sets (AT)
Issuance Log difference of adjusted shares outstanding between year t and t − 1, where adjusted
shares outstanding is shares outstanding (SHROUT) divided by total factor (CFACSHR).
Explanatory Variables
ICC − LNS Internel rate of return that equates a stock’s current price to the present value of its ex-
pected future free cash flows. Following the methodology of Li, Ng, and Swaminathan
(2013))
ICC −GLS Following the methogology of Gebhardt et al. (2001))
ICC −CT Following the methogology of Claus and Thomas (2001))
Eret −CAPM Monthly expected returns estimated by CAPM. RetCAPMi,t+1 = R f ,t+1 + βˆ1E
[
Mktr ft
]
. β is the
slope coefficient of time-series regression using past five years of monthly stock returns,
and Mktr f is the expected factor risk premium calculated as the average value in the past
five years.
Eret − FF3 Monthly expected returns estimated by Fama-French three-factor model. RetFF3i,t+1 = R f ,t+1+
βˆ1E
[
Mktr ft
]
+ βˆ2E [S MBt]+ βˆ3E [HMLt]. β is estimated by past five years of monthly stock
return, and Mktr f , S MB, HML are the expected factor risk premiums calculated as the
average value in the past five years.
Eret − FF4 Monthly expected returns estimated by Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model.
RetCAPMi,t+1 = R f ,t+1 + βˆ1E [S MBt] + βˆ2E [HMLt] + βˆ3E [HMLt] + βˆ4E [UMDt]. β is estimated
by past five years of monthly stock return, and Mktr f , S MB, HML ,UMD are the expected
factor risk premiums calculated as the average value in the past five years.
Q Total assets (AT) plus market capitalization (CSHO*PRC) minus common equity (CEQ)
over total assets (AT)
CF Income before extraordinary items (IB) + depreciation and amortization (DP) over total
assets (AT)
1 − R2 Price nonsynchronicity, calculated as 1-R2, where R2 is the R-square of time-series regres-
sion of daily stock returns on market and 3-digit SIC industry returns at year t.
Equity Dependence Measured by KZ Index, which is calculated as KZi,t = −1.002CFi,t − 39.368DIVit −
1.315CASHi,t + 3.139LEVi,t
FC Following Hadlock and Pierce (2010), financial constraint is defined as FCi,t = 0.737 ×
Sizei,t+0.043 × Size2i,t−0.04 × Firmagei,t .
S ize Natural log of total assets (AT)
Lev [long-term debt (DLTT) + debt in current liabilities(DLC)] / [long-term debt (DLTT) +
debt in current liabilities(DLC)+ Stockholders’ Equity (SEQ)
Div Cash dividend (DV) / total assets (AT)
FA Net plant, property, and equipment (PPENT) / total assets (AT)
Cash Cash and short-term investments (CHE) / total assets (AT)
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Table A.2: Erickson & Whited Errors-in-Variables GMM
This table provides estimation results from Errors-in-Variables GMM regressions. The sample consists of US firms from
1985 to 2013. The dependent variable is capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (AT). ICC-
LNS, ICC-GLS and ICC-CT are the implied cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li et al. (2013), Claus and
Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt et al. (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM, Eret-FF3, and Eret-FF4 are expected returns based
on the CAPM, the FF3M, and the FF4M. All the cost-of-equity proxies are measured at the beginning of the year. Q is
Tobin’s q at the beginning of the year and CF is concurrent free cash flow. All regressions include year and firm fixed
effects. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix B. We treat Tobin’s q and cost-of-equity proxies as
misspecified variables, and use fifth-order cumulants as in Erickson et al. (2015). We performance within transformation
at both firm and year dimension before estimation. The robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: CAPX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.119∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.037∗∗
(0.02)
ICC-GLS -0.128∗∗∗
(0.04)
ICC-CT -0.048∗∗
(0.02)
Eret-CAPM 0.102∗∗∗
(0.02)
Eret-FF3 0.117∗∗∗
(0.02)
Eret-FF4 0.032
(0.03)
Year FE No No No No No No
Firm FE No No No No No No
Observations 38093 38180 37503 37176 37176 37176
rho 0.085 0.076 0.082 0.080 0.072 0.073
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Table A.3: Controlling for Cummins et al. (2006)’s Real Q
This table provides estimation results from panel regression. The sample consists of US firms from 1985 to 2013. The
dependent variable is capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (AT). ICC-LNS, ICC-GLS
and ICC-CT are the implied cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li et al. (2013), Claus and Thomas (2001),
and Gebhardt et al. (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM, Eret-FF3, and Eret-FF4 are expected returns based on the CAPM,
the FF3M, and the FF4M. All the cost-of-equity proxies are measured at the beginning of the year. Real Q is Cummins
et al. (2006)’s q at the beginning of the year and CF is concurrent free cash flow. All regressions include year and firm
fixed effects. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix B. The robust standard errors adjusted for firm-
level clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Dependent Variable: CAPX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.138∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Real Q 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.059∗∗∗
(0.01)
ICC-GLS -0.152∗∗∗
(0.02)
ICC-CT -0.029∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-CAPM 0.043∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-FF3 0.018∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-FF4 0.020∗∗∗
(0.00)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 36009 35771 35359 33763 33763 33763
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.151 0.148 0.151 0.150 0.150
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Table A.4: The Performance of COE Proxies in Recession / Non-Recession Peri-
od
This table provides estimation results from panel regressions. The sample consists of US firms from 1985 to 2013.
The dependent variable is capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (AT). ICC-LNS, ICC-
GLS and ICC-CT are the implied cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013),
Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM, Eret-FF3, and Eret-
FF4 are expected returns based on the CAPM, the FF3M, and the FF4M. All the cost-of-equity proxies are measured at
the beginning of the year. Q is Tobin’s q at the beginning of the year and CF is concurrent free cash flow. All regressions
include year and firm fixed effects. Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix B. The robust standard
errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Non-Recession Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.112∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.039∗∗∗
(0.01)
ICC-GLS -0.075∗∗∗
(0.02)
ICC-CT -0.014∗
(0.01)
Eret-CAPM 0.030∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-FF3 0.007
(0.01)
Eret-FF4 0.012∗∗∗
(0.00)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 31753 31803 31227 31019 31019 31019
Adjusted R2 0.163 0.162 0.162 0.156 0.155 0.156
Panel B: Recession Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.099∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC-LNS -0.015
(0.02)
ICC-GLS 0.022
(0.05)
ICC-CT -0.013
(0.02)
Eret-CAPM 0.036∗∗
(0.02)
Eret-FF3 0.032∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret-FF4 0.018
(0.01)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 6340 6377 6276 6157 6157 6157
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.201 0.202 0.191 0.192 0.191
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Table A.5: Long-term Effects of the Cost-of-Equity Proxies
This table provides estimation results from panel regression. The sample consists of US firms from 1985 to 2013. The
dependent variable is capital expenditures (CAPX) scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (AT). ICC-LNS, ICC-GLS
and ICC-CT are the implied cost of equity estimates following the methods of Li et al. (2013), Claus and Thomas (2001),
and Gebhardt et al. (2001), respectively. Eret-CAPM, Eret-FF3, and Eret-FF4 are expected returns based on the CAPM,
the FF3M, and the FF4M. All the cost-of-equity proxies are measured at the year t − 1 and t − 2. Q is Tobin’s q at the
beginning of the year and CF is concurrent free cash flow. All regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Detailed
definitions of variables are provided in Appendix B. The robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering are
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CF 0.110∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Q 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ICC − LNS t−1 -0.039∗∗∗
(0.01)
ICC − LNS t−2 -0.000
(0.01)
ICC −GLS t−1 -0.078∗∗∗
(0.02)
ICC −GLS t−2 -0.001
(0.02)
ICC −CTt−1 -0.013∗
(0.01)
ICC −CTt−2 0.005
(0.01)
Eret −CAPMt−1 0.025∗∗∗
(0.01)
Eret −CAPMt−2 0.011
(0.01)
Eret − FF3t−1 0.012∗∗
(0.01)
Eret − FF3t−2 0.004
(0.00)
Eret − FF4t−1 0.007
(0.00)
Eret − FF4t−2 0.013∗∗∗
(0.00)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 36152 35563 34483 34516 34516 34516
Adjusted R2 0.169 0.166 0.169 0.155 0.155 0.155
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Vanguard GNMA Fund
Vanguard High Yield Corporate Fund
Vanguard Intermediate-term 
Investment-grade Fund
Vanguard Long-term Treasury Fund
Vanguard Windsor Fund
Vanguard Windsor II Fund
Vanguard Fixed Income 
Securities Funds
Vanguard Windsor 
Funds
Wellington 
Management Company
Vanguard Short-term Federal Fund
Vanguard Short-term Investment-grade 
Fund
Vanguard Short-term Treasury Fund
Vanguard Intermediate-term Treasury 
Fund
Vanguard Long-term Investment-grade
Fund
Form N-SAR
Form N-SAR
Form ADV
Vanguard Fund Family
(a) Wellington Management Company
Vanguard Asset Allocation Fund
Vanguard Growth And Income Fund
Vanguard Structured Broad Market 
Fund
Vanguard Capital Value Fund
Vanguard U.S. Value Fund
Vanguard Quantitative 
Funds
Vanguard Malvern 
Funds
Mellon Capital 
Management
Vanguard Structured Large-cap Value 
Fund
Vanguard Structured Large-cap Equity 
Fund
Vanguard Structured Large-cap Growth 
Fund
Form ADV
Form N-SAR
Form N-SAR
Vanguard Fund Family
(b) Mellon Capital Management
Figure A.1: An Example of Mutual Fund Advisor and Clients
This figure shows two examples of organization structure of mutual fund advisory business. Wellington Management
Company and Mellon Capital Management are fund advisors who manage portfolios for mutual funds in the Vanguard
fund family. The data is obtained from N-SAR filings in 2010.
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Table A.6: Breakdown of Advisory Misconduct
This table reports the number and percentage of advisory misconduct with respect to product (Panel A), case initiator
(Panel B), sanction (Panel C), resolution (Panel D), subject (Panel E) and allegation (Panel F), respectively. In Panel B-
Panel F the sample is restricted to mutual fund advisory misconduct. The data is obtained from Regulatory Disclosure
Reporting Page of Form ADV.
Number Percent
Panel A: Product
OTC Equity 909 4.97
Listed Equity 1,111 6.08
Commodity Futures 252 1.38
Financial Futures 212 1.16
Insurance 1,530 8.37
Mutual Fund 1,033 5.65
Options 455 2.49
No Product 5,508 30.14
Others 7275 39.76
Total 18,276 100.00
Panel B: Case Initiator
Foreign 64 6.20
Other 55 5.32
SEC 271 26.23
SRO 237 22.94
State 406 39.30
Total 1,033 100.00
Panel C: Sanction
Cease and Desist 160 16.31
Censure 115 11.72
Civil/Admin. Penalties 460 46.89
Others 246 25.08
Total 981 100.00
Panel D: Resolution
Acceptance, Waiver & Consent(AWC) 196 18.99
Consent 220 21.32
Order 166 16.09
Settled 248 24.03
Others 202 19.57
Total 1,032 100.00
Panel E: Subject
Firm 455 45.91
Affiliates 452 45.61
Firm/Affiliates 84 8.48
Total 991 100.00
Panel F: Allegation
Transaction 164 17.60
Disclosure 124 13.30
Compliance 644 69.10
Total 932 100.00
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Table A.7: Examples of Mutual Fund Advisory Misconduct Cases
Advisor Name Filing Date Initiation Date Initiator Resolution Date Alligation
ALLIANCE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT L.P. 2004/1/5 2003/8/25 State 2003/12/18 Market timing transactions of mutual fund shares, some of which had an adverse effect on mutual
fund shareholders.
MFS INSTITUTIONAL ADVISORS INC. 2005/9/13 2004/2/5 SEC 2004/2/5 False and misleading information regarding market timing in certain mutual fund prospectuses for
which Massachusetts Financial Services Company (”MFS”) serves as investment adviser.
MILLENNIUM MANAGEMENT LLC. 2012/2/14 2005/12/1 SEC 2005/12/1 Certain deceptive practices related to mutual fund trading, including activities related to ”market
timing”.
WACHOVIA SECURITIES, LLC. 2008/6/4 2007/9/19 SEC 2007/9/19 Entered into an agreement to allow a registered representative to market time in a specific evergreen
fund in excess of trading limits set forth in the funds’ prospectus.
MORGAN KEEGAN & COMPANY, INC. 2012/3/30 2010/4/5 State 2011/6/22 Engaged in fraudulent, dishonest or unethical business practices in violation of Alabama, Missis-
sippi, South Carolina And Kentucky Securities Acts.
LINCOLN FINANCIAL SECURITIES CORPORATION 2008/12/3 2008/11/7 State 2008/11/7 Solicited and executed 4 mutual fund transactions between March 1, 2004 and April 30, 2004 while
not being properly licensed in the state of New Hampshire.
CONCORD EQUITY GROUP ADVISORS, LLC. 2009/5/31 2007/8/13 State 2008/7/12 Put clients’ accounts in investments with high commissions and excessive fees, and it failed to dis-
close such fees and charges, including contingent deferred sales charges.
THE HUNTINGTON INVESTMENT COMPANY 2005/8/19 2005/3/14 SRO 2005/6/30 Pay non-cash compensation for a sales contest, which weighted the member’s products more than
other investment products.
TEMENOS INC. 2007/3/15 2005/12/27 SRO 2006/5/10 Unauthorized trades and unauthorized disbursements.
HORNOR, TOWNSEND & KENT, INC. 2012/12/4 2012/10/2 SRO 2012/10/3 Failed to establish and maintain a supervisory system and establish, maintain and enforce written
supervisory procedures.
MORGAN KEEGAN & COMPANY, INC. 2009/3/30 2007/6/4 State 2009/1/23 Fraudulent or deceptive practices in sale of securities.
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Table A.8: Variable Definitions
Variable Definitions
Netflow Total NAV of shares sold less Total NAV of shares redeemed and repur-
chased (N-SAR Item 28), over total net assets (N-SAR Item 74-T).
Inflow Total NAV of shares sold (N-SAR Item 28), over total net assets (N-SAR
Item 74-T).
Outflow Total NAV of shares redeemed and repurchased (N-SAR Item 28), over
total net assets (N-SAR Item 74-T).
Return [NAVt − NAVt−1]/NAVt−1, where NAV is net asset value per share (N-
SAR Item 74-V1)+Dividends from net investment income (N-SAR Item
73-A1)+distributions of capital gains(N-SAR Item 73-B1)+other distribu-
tions (N-SAR Item 73-C).
Monetary Fine Total dollar amount of monetary fine associated with all misconduct.
Fund TNA Total net assets of fund (N-SAR Item 74-T).
Fund Age Number of years since inception in N-SAR filings database.
Expense Ratio Total expenses (N-SAR Item 72-X) over total net assets (N-SAR Item 74-
T), in percentage.
Front-End Load Total front-end sales loads (N-SAR Item 30-A) over total net assets (N-
SAR Item 74-T), in percentage.
Redemption Fee Total deferred or contingent deferred sales loads (N-SAR Item 35) plus to-
tal amount of redemption fees other than deferred or contingent deferred
sales loads (N-SAR Item 38), over total net assets (N-SAR Item 74-T), in
percentage.
Fund Family TNA Total net assets of funds within the same fund family, indicated by N-SAR
Item 19-C.
Flow to Fund Style Average netflow of funds belonging to the same investment style, where
fund investment styles consist of equity (capital appreciation, growth and
income, total return), bond, balanced, index, foreign and others.
Avg. Flow to Fund Style Weighted average of Flow to Fund Style for an advisor, where the weight
is calculated as percentage of TNA belonging to a particular style in total
TNA managed by a advisor.
Total AUM Total dollar amount of assets under management of an advisory firm
(Form ADV Item 5F2).
Total Employees Total number of employees of an advisory firm (Form ADV Item 5A).
Total Clients Total number of clients of an advisory firm (Form ADV Item 5C1).
Total Accounts Total number of client accounts of an advisory firm (Form ADV Item 5F2).
Firm Branches Total number of an advisory firm’s branches, including principal office
(N-SAR Schedule D, Section 1.F).
Firm Age Number of years since inception in Form ADV database.
Mutual Fund Misconduct Dummy Dummy variable equals one if an advisor commits at least one mutual
fund advisory misconduct in current period.
Regional Misconduct Intensity Total number of existing mutual fund advisory misconduct scaled by
population in a Zipcode region.
Interest in Transaction Dummy variable equals one if at least one of the Items 8A1, 8A3, 8B2,
8B3 is ”Yes” in Form ADV.
Referral Fees Dummy variable equals one if Item 8F is ”Yes” in Form ADV.
Soft Dollars Dummy variable equals one if Item 8E is ”Yes” in Form ADV.
Broker in Firm Dummy variable equals one if Item 5B2>0 in Form ADV.
Custody Dummy variable equals one if at least one of the Items 9A1-2, 9B1-2 is
”Yes” in Form ADV.
Percent Client Agents Percent of institutional clients, which is sum of ADV Item 5D1-C, 5D1-D,
5D1-H, 5D1-I, 5D1-J.
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Table A.9: Variable Definitions
Variable Definitions
Fund Return Weekly fund returns calculated from TNA-weighted CRSP fund-share class returns.
Fund TNA Total net assets of fund (N-SAR Item 74-T).
Expense Ratio Total expenses (N-SAR Item 72-X) over total net assets (N-SAR Item 74-T), in percentage.
Front-End Load Total front-end sales loads (N-SAR Item 30-A) over total net assets (N-SAR Item 74-T), in percentage.
Redemption Fee Total deferred or contingent deferred sales loads (N-SAR Item 35) plus total amount of redemption
fees other than deferred or contingent deferred sales loads (N-SAR Item 38), over total net assets
(N-SAR Item 74-T), in percentage.
ILP A dummy variable equals one if the fund family is eligible for lending facility through Interfund
Lending Programs in month t, and zero otherwise.
Distress (Bottom 3%) A dummy variable equals one if the funds with investment style i has average returns in week t
below bottom 3rd percentile of all weekly returns in the whole sample, and zero otherwise.
Distress (Bottom 2%) A dummy variable equals one if the funds with investment style i has average returns in week t
below bottom 2nd percentile of all weekly returns in the whole sample, and zero otherwise.
Distress (Bottom 1%) A dummy variable equals one if the funds with investment style i has average returns in week t
below bottom 1th percentile of all weekly returns in the whole sample, and zero otherwise.
Distress (Bottom 0.5%) A dummy variable equals one if the funds with investment style i has average returns in week t
below bottom 0.5th percentile of all weekly returns in the whole sample, and zero otherwise.
Distress (Bottom 0.25%) A dummy variable equals one if the funds with investment style i has average returns in week t
below bottom 0.25th percentile of all weekly returns in the whole sample, and zero otherwise.
Intra-Family Style Diversity Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of fund total net assets, where the HHI is calculated as summa-
tion of squared proportion of TNA belonging to the CRSP 4-digit style codes within family.
External Borrowing A dummy variable equals one if the funds have any amount of bank overdraft (N-SAR Item 55-A)
/ bank loan (N-SAR Item 55-B), or engaged in borrowing activities ((N-SAR Item 77-O) in year t.
175
Table A.10: Interfund Lending Program: Application and Order Date
N-SAR Family Name Application Date SEC Order Date
STEINROEMF 25-Jul-95
VANGUARDGR 22-Sep-95
JANUSCAPIT 9-Dec-96
TROWEPRICE 30-Sep-98
FIDELITYZZ 27-Feb-98
FRNKTEMGRP 5-Feb-99
FEDERATEDX 29-Jul-99
AMERICENIN 25-Oct-99
INVESCOFDS 13-Nov-98
SCUDDERRRR 16-Jul-99
EVERGREENS 22-Apr-99
SCHWABFUND 17-May-00
PUTNAMFUND 6-Oct-97
FIRSTAMERI 28-Sep-01
ONEGROUPTR 23-Mar-01
EATONVANCE 18-Feb-00
OPPENHEIMR 14-Nov-01
PBHGADVISO 16-Apr-02
NATIONSFUN 26-Feb-02
AMERAADVFD 19-Mar-02
DREYFUSFAM 1-Mar-01
SEILIQUIDA 16-May-02
SEIFINSVCO 16-May-02
SEIASSETAL 16-May-02
SEIINSPROD 16-May-02
SEIOPPMAST 16-May-02
SEIALPHALP 16-May-02
IXISLOOMIS 12-Dec-02
THRIVENTMF 11-Dec-03
RLINSFUNDS 19-Jul-05
WELLSFARGO 14-May-03
RIVERSORCE 26-Mar-02
COLUMBIAFD 26-Mar-02
PIONEERFDS 24-Sep-07 4-Mar-08
DODGECXFDS 18-Jan-08 27-Oct-08
MNGRSTRSTI 24-Jul-08 23-Jun-09
MANAGERSFD 24-Jul-08 23-Jun-09
ALGERFUNDS 25-Sep-08 11-Aug-09
NORTHTRUST 30-Sep-09 18-Aug-10
PRINCORGRP 16-Feb-11 25-Oct-11
MASSFINSER 20-Nov-08 26-Oct-11
JOHNHANCOC 31-Dec-08 14-Dec-11
DFA INVEST 5-Sep-13 2-Apr-14
UNITDGROUP 25-Sep-13 30-Jun-14
IVYFAMILY1 25-Sep-13 30-Jun-14
JACKSONNAT 24-Jan-14 20-Oct-14
JNLVARFND1 25-Jan-14 21-Oct-14
JNLNYVARII 26-Jan-14 22-Oct-14
JNLVARIABL 27-Jan-14 23-Oct-14
FIRSTTRUST 28-Jan-14 24-Oct-14
JNLINVESTR 29-Jan-14 25-Oct-14
CRMCFNDGRP 30-Oct-14 19-Apr-16
TCWFUNDINC 5-Oct-15 7-Jun-16
TCW/WITTER 6-Oct-15 8-Jun-16
TCW/DEANWI 7-Oct-15 9-Jun-16
TCW/DWXXXX 8-Oct-15 10-Jun-16
NATIONWIDE 29-Oct-15 13-Jun-16
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Table A.11: Description of Fund Investment Styles
CRSP Style Code Style Name
EDCI Equity-Domestic: Cap Based: Micro
EDCL Equity-Domestic: Cap Based: Large
EDCM Equity-Domestic: Cap Based: Mid
EDCS Equity-Domestic: Cap Based: Small
EDSA Equity-Domestic: Sector: Telecom
EDSC Equity-Domestic: Sector: Commodities
EDSF Equity-Domestic: Sector: Financial
EDSG Equity-Domestic: Sector: Gold
EDSH Equity-Domestic: Sector: Health
EDSI Equity-Domestic: Sector: Industrials
EDSM Equity-Domestic: Sector: Materials
EDSN Equity-Domestic: Sector: Natural Resources
EDSR Equity-Domestic: Sector: Real Estate
EDSS Equity-Domestic: Sector: Consumer Services
EDST Equity-Domestic: Sector: Technology
EDSU Equity-Domestic: Sector: Utilities
EDYB Equity-Domestic: Style: Growth & Income
EDYG Equity-Domestic: Style: Growth
EDYH Equity-Domestic: Style: Hedged
EDYI Equity-Domestic: Style: Income
EDYS Equity-Domestic: Style: Short
EF Equity-Foreign: General
EFCS Equity-Foreign: Cap Based: Small
EFRC Equity-Foreign: Regional: Canada
EFRE Equity-Foreign: Regional: European
EFRI Equity-Foreign: Regional: India
EFRJ Equity-Foreign: Regional: Japan
EFRL Equity-Foreign: Regional: Latin America
EFRM Equity-Foreign: Regional: Emerging Markets
EFRP Equity-Foreign: Regional: Pacific
EFRQ Equity-Foreign: Regional: China
EFRX Equity-Foreign: Regional: Pacific Ex Japan
EFSF Equity-Foreign: Sector: Financial
EFSH Equity-Foreign: Sector: Health
EFSI Equity-Foreign: Sector: Industrials
EFSN Equity-Foreign: Sector: Natural Resources
EFSR Equity-Foreign: Sector: Real Estate
EFST Equity-Foreign: Sector: Technology
EFYG Equity-Foreign: Style: Growth
EFYT Equity-Foreign: Style: Total Return
I Fixed Income: General
IC Fixed Income: Corporate
ICQH Fixed Income: Corporate: Quality: High
ICQY Fixed Income: Corporate: Quality: High Yield
IF Fixed Income: Foreign: General
IFM Fixed Income: Foreign: Money Market
IG Fixed Income: Government: General
IGD Fixed Income: Government: Duration
IGDI Fixed Income: Government: Duration: Intermediate
IGDS Fixed Income: Government: Duration: Short
IGT Fixed Income: Government: TIPS
IM Fixed Income: Money Market: General
IMM Fixed Income: Money Market: Muni
IU Fixed Income: Municipal: General
IUI Fixed Income: Municipal: Intermediate
IUS Fixed Income: Municipal: Short
M Balanced: General
MT Balanced: Target Date
O Others: General
OC Others: Currency
OM Others: Mortgage-backed
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